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EMINENT DOMAIN AND WATER LAW
I. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE
EMINENT DOMAIN POWER
A.

INTRODUCTION.

The doctrine of eminent domain' has played a unique role in the
attainment of social and economic goals in the United States because
it permits property to be taken rather easily from private persons
for public uses and purposes. Today condemnation procedures are
particularly significant tools in urban renewal projects, municipal
and state expressways, national interstate and defense highways,
multipurpose water development undertakings, sewerage, and flood
control works.
One of the most troublesome legal questions growing out of the
doctrine of eminent domain is whether the government should be
required to pay compensation for particular property taken or
damaged by its action. This article examines that question generally and in the context of selected situations in water development
and allocation.

B. SoRmcFs

OF

EMInENT DoAnm PowER.

The power of both state and federal governments to acquire
private property for a public or a semipublic use is well recognized 2
and is theoretically explained as either a "reserved right" or a power
inherent in "sovereignty." Under the "reserved right" theory, the
state is the presumed original owner of all property and subsequent
private ownership is deemed subject to the prerogative of the
sovereign to resume possession whenever the best interests of
society require. The presumption necessary to this theory has
proven unsatisfactory to American jurists because it does not explain the power in terms of either American history or the federal
system. Much land in this country, for example, was privately
owned before the formation of the federal government and consequently the idea that at the time of the original grant the government reserved a right to resume possession is an absurd fiction.
Further, the reserved right theory, based upon ultimate governmental control, does not adequately account for the simultaneous
1 "Eminent domain is the right to take private property for public use."
3 A /_icAw LAW OF PROPRTY § 13.17 (Casner ed. 1952), citing Light

v. City of Danville, 168 Va. 181, 190 S.E. 276 (1937).
2 "It is an inherent power." 1 P. NICHOLs, THE LAW OF EMINENT DoMAM

§ 1.14 [2] (rev. 3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as NIcHOLS]. See also
James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937); 11 E. McQu-mun,
THE LAW OF MuxIcnPAL CoaRoRAroNs § 32.11 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as McQuILLm].
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3
existence of the power in both state and federal governments.
Under the more widely accepted "sovereignty" theory, the state is
deemed to possess the power to regulate or expropriate property in
the public interest as a necessary attribute of sovereignty. 4 The
power is inherent in the very concept of a state and exists independently of any constitutional provisions.5 The people, not having
the power of eminent domain individually, cannot grant such
authority to the state in any constitution established by them.
Rather, a constitution creates the type of state desired and the
power of eminent domain then attaches to the state as an element
of sovereignty. References in constitutions to the power are a
recognition that it exists, and they constitute limitations upon its
use 6 which are necessary to protect property rights.7 The usual
limitations in the United States are that the taking be for a "public
use" and that "just compensation" be paid. It is interesting to note,
that in exercising the power of compulsory acquisition, no written
constitution binds the English Parliament and it may act without
restraint. The practice, however, is to provide for compensation
in every act which authorizes the taking of property for a public
use, and it is doubtful that a parliamentary majority in England
would ever authorize any substantial expropriation without such a
provision.8 Nevertheless, the matter is one of policy rather than
of power.

Although our federal government is one of constitutionally
delegated powers and the prerogative of eminent domain is not
explicitly granted to it, the United States Supreme Court in Kohl
3 Judicial criticisms of the "reserved right" theory are referred to in
1 NICHOLS, supra note 2, at § 1.13 [3]. See also Wolfe, The Appropriation of Property for Levees: A Louisiana Study in Taking Without
Just Compensation, 40 TuL. L. REv. 242 (1966).
4 1 NICHOLS, supra note 2, at § 1.13 [4]; 11 McQUILLiN, supra note 2,

at § 32.11.

5 "It requires no constitutional recognition." Boom Co. v. Patterson,

98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878). See 1 NICHOLS, supra note 2, at § 1.14 and
the cases cited therein. Reter v. Davenport, R.I. and Northwestern Ry.
Co., 243 Iowa 1112, 54 N.W.2d 863 (1952).

6 United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513 (1883). See also 11 McQUILLIN,

supra note 2, at § 32.11.
§ 1.14 [2]. The Supreme Court has spoken
of the provision as an instrument for the socialization of the costs of
federal projects. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960);
United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945).
See also Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 429 (1935).

7 1 NICHOLS, supra note 2, at

8 Megarry, Compensation for the Compulsory Acquisition of Land in
England, in LAw AND LAND: ANGLO-AMERICAN PLANNING PRACTICE 212

(C. Haar ed. 1964).
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v. United States9 used the sovereignty theory to affirm the power of
eminent domain in the federal government. The Court found the
power to acquire property to be necessary "for the exercise of the
conceded powers of the Federal government,"'1 and described the
fifth amendment provision that private property shallnot be taken
for public use without just compensation as an "implied recognition"
of the power of eminent domain. 1 The United States thus has
inherent sovereign power to take property
for the purpose of carry2
ing out its constitutional activities.'
C. PUBIC USE.
By definition the sovereign power of eminent domain applies
only to a taking for a public use and does not exist if the proposed
use is private.' s Any taking for private use is therefore without
either sovereign or constitutional authority, and the due process
clause of the Constitution renders such governmental action invalid.14 The concept of public use, however, is given a broad definition in eminent domain proceedings as demonstrated by the
Supreme Court opinion in Brown v. United States. 5 In Brown the
question arose whether taking land for a reclamation reservoir is a
public use even when an entire town has to be moved and only a
specific group of private individuals will benefit. The Court held the
use a public one entitling the Government to expropriate not only
the old town but, in addition, land for a substitute city as near as
possible to the old one. The opinion states, "[T]he acquisition of the
town site was so closely connected with the acquisition of the district to be flooded and so necessary to the carrying out of the project
9

10

Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875).

Id. at 372.

11 Id. at 372-73.

United States
Missouri Pac.
sion of what
14 For a history
12

13

v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 679 (1896).
Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896). But see discusconstitutes "public use" infra.
of the limitations on the power of eminent domain im-

posed under natural law theory, as they became incorporated into

15

the meaning of "due process," see Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, 6 Wis. L. REv. 67 (1931); also,
Grant, The Natural Law Background of Due Process,31 COLum. L. REV.
56 (1931), wherein he asserts at page 65: "[T]he modern definition of
'due process' is merely the 'natural justice' of Story, Marshall, Miller,
Field, et al. under a new name, 'reasonableness."'
263 U.S. 78 (1923). See also United States v. Power County, Idaho,
21 F. Supp. 684 (D.Idaho 1937) (relocation of town upheld); Burley
v. United States, 179 F. 1 (9th Cir. 1910); Comment, Substitute Condemnation, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1097 (1966). See also Brest v. Jacksonville Expressway Auth., 194 So.2d 658 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967),
aff'd, 202 So.2d 748 (1967); 5 HousToN L. REV. 198 (1967).
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that the public use of the reservoir covered the taking of the town
site."'16 In another case, a Tennessee Valley Authority reservoir
flooded a highway which was the only practical access to a thinly
inhabited area located between the reservoir and a national park.
Finding it cheaper to condemn the isolated region than to build a
replacement or substitute road, the Authority commenced eminent
domain proceedings. The United States Supreme Court, reversing
both the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals7 for the
Fourth Circuit, held the taking to be for a public purpose.'
It has also been held that when substantial and direct benefits
are provided to people within the state authorizing a condemnation,
the taking is not unconstitutional because a major portion of the
benefits are received by residents of another jurisdiction. Thus it
is a proper public use when a water company in Connecticut makes
diversions both for meeting obligations to supply customers within
Connecticut and for sale to a
New York water supplier for utiliza18
tion within New York State.
Condemnations for access control, boat launching facilities,
picnic areas, rental cottages in parks, restaurants, motels, and
marinas for pleasure craft have been held to be for a public use; 9
and takings are not defeated even though leases are made with
private persons or firms for operating facilities such as swimming
pools, service stations, and stores. 20 The incidental private benefits
do not override the paramount public interest, but leases must
include appropriate provisions to insure that the uses will remain
public. 21 For instance, a delegation of eminent domain powers

Brown v. United States, 263 U.S. 78, 81 (1923).
United States ex rel. T.V.A. v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546 (1946).
18 Adams v. Greenwich Water Co., 138 Conn. 205, 83 A.2d 177 (1951);
Greenwich Water Co. v. Adams, 145 Conn. 535, 144 A.2d 323 (1958).
16
17

'9

See R. REIs, CONNECTICUT WATER LAW: JUDICIAL ALLOCATION OF WATER
RESOURCES 60-62 (1967).
Pearl River Valley Water Supply Dist. v. Wood, 248 Miss. 748, 160
So.2d 917 (1964). United States v. Bowman, 367 F.2d 768 (7th Cir.
1966) (property taken by United States to be turned over to State
and franchises for profit to be granted by State to individuals for

developing recreation in connection with Government reservoir). See
also Gregory Marina, Inc. v. City of Detroit, 378 Mich. 364, 144 N.W.2d
503 (1966) (municipal expenditure for public purpose even though

few boat owners could use facility), and 53 VA. L. REv. 743 (1967).
20
21

Home v. Pearl River Valley Water Supply Dist., 249 Miss. 358, 162
So.2d 504 (1964).
Pearl River Valley Water Supply Dist. v. Brown, 248 Miss. 4, 156
So.2d 572 (1963).
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which leaves a condemning agency free to lease or sell the property
22
without restriction as to its use has been held unconstitutional
D. NECESSIy.
As distinguished from public purpose, the extent of public necessity for construction of an improvement and its location are
legislative questions and not subject to judicial review.P The constitutional requirements are met when the purpose is public and
just compensation is paid, and, accordingly, to make the issue of
necessity nonjusticiable infringes no rights of a condemnee.24 But
if the determination of necessity by an administrative agency or
quasi-public corporation is based upon bad faith, fraud, or abuse of
discretion, there are decisions stating the condemnor's judgment
should be overruled. 25 As a practical matter, however, proof problems and the narrow limits of review place the possibility of
reversing administrative decisions on these grounds almost beyond
the pale.
United States v. 620.98 Acres of Land26 illustrates the difficulties
when arbitrariness or excessiveness is claimed. The Government
condemned the fee simple title of a small land tract for use in connection with the Dardanelle Lock and Dam on the Arkansas River
and it was conceded the property would be subject to overflow
possibly once in fifty years. Consequently, the landowner argued
the taking should be limited to a flowage easement only. The court,
however, found the decision of the Secretary of the Army was
Rudee Inlet Authority v. Bastian, 206 Va. 906, 147 S.E.2d 131 (1966),
53 VA. L. REv. 743 (1967). See also Home v. Pearl River Valley Water
Supply Dist., 249 Miss. 358, 162 So.2d 504 (1964).
3 North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276 (1925). See generally 26 Am. JuR.2d Eminent Domain § 111; 27 Am. Ju .2d Eminent
Domain § 404 (1966).
24 People v. Superior Court of Merced County, Cal.2d -, -, 436
P.2d 342, 348, 65 Cal. Rptr. 342, 348 (1968).
25 See Southern Pacific Land Co. v. United States, 367 F.2d 161, 162 (9th
Cir. 1966) which collects the citations to various courts of appeal
cases which say that an exception to judicial non-reviewability exists
when an administrative decision to condemn a particular property
is alleged to be arbitrary, capricious, or in bad faith. See Banach v.
City of Milwaukee, 31 Wisc.2d 320, 143 N.W.2d 13 n. 7 (1966); Bailey
v. Board of Levee Comm'rs, 204 So.2d 468 (Miss. 1967); 1 NIcHOLS,
supra note 2, at § 4.11 [2]; Comment, 44 WAsm L. REv. 200, 216-58
(1968).
26 255 F. Sump. 427 (W.D. Ark. 1966). Also see Chapman v. Public Utility
Dist. No. 1, 367 F.2d 163 (9th Cir. 1966) (action by Federal Power
Commission licensee in condemning fee rather than flowage easement upheld).
22
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neither arbitrary nor capricious, and held it to be final. Numerous
other federal cases reach a similar result,2 7 and the situation ap-

pears to be generally the same in the state courts.
In People v. Chevalier,28 the Supreme Court of California in a
landmark case set forth the general proposition that necessity is not
a judicial question and ruled that necessity cannot be considered
by the courts even though facts constituting fraud, bad faith or
abuse of discretion on the part of the condemning body are alleged.
These issues may only be raised by a condemnee in an effort to
show a taking is not for a public use.29 A different approach is
shown by a recent New Jersey decision, Texas East Transmission
Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves,Inc.,30 in which the plaintiff commenced
proceedings to condemn a right of way across land which the nonprofit eleemosynary defendant corporation devoted to the preservation of wildlife. In its answer, defendant claimed plaintiff's choice
of the right of way through important wooded areas constituted
arbitrariness when a suitable alternative route on the land owned
by Wildlife Preserves was available. The trial court struck defendant's answer as insufficient in law. The New Jersey Supreme
Court reversed and remanded the matter for trial. In its opinion,
the court said:
On the remand hearing in the trial court the ultimate burden of
proving arbitrariness in the choice of route will be on Wildlife
Preserves. Procedurally, however, if it introduces reasonable proof
of (1) the serious damage claimed to result from installation of the
pipeline on the path chosen by plaintiff, and (2) an apparently reasonably available alternate route or routes, which will avoid the
serious damage referred to, the burden of going forward with the
evidence will shift to plaintiff. A prima facie case of arbitrariness
having been made out, Texas Eastern may present its evidence to
the contrary, which it claims indicates that the location of the right
of way selected represented a reasonable and not capricious choice,
considering all the factors which may properly enter into the
question of what course of action is reasonably required to serve
27
28

29
30

E.g., United States v. Mischke, 285 F.2d 628 (8th Cir. 1961); West,
Inc. v. United States, 374 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1967).
52 Cal.2d 299, 340 P.2d 598 (1959), noted in 48 CALIF. L. REV. 164
(1960). See also People v. Lagiss, 223 Cal. App.2d 23, 35 Cal. Rptr.
554 (1963) and United States v. Mischke, 285 F.2d 628 (8th Cir. 1961)
(assertion of bad faith or arbitrary action does not make issue of
necessity justiciable).
The Chevalier case relies to some extent upon a 1913 amendment to
section 1241 of the California Code of Civil Procedure.
48 N.J. 261, 225 A.2d 130 (1966). For an excellent article which
includes a discussion of necessity, judicial review, and standing to
sue, see Forer, Preservation of America's Park Lands: The Inadequacy of Present Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1093, 1104-06, 1110-14, 1122
(1966).
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the public convenience and necessity. In this connection plaintiff
has suggested that the alternate route proposed by defendant will
be much more costly than the one chosen. Of course, cost is a factor
for consideration, but a relative one. Within reasonable limits the
fact that an alternate route will be more expensive should not deter
its selection by a utility, if the public convenience and necessity
are better served thereby.... Information on the subject of such
additional costs should be regarded by the trial court as within the
knowledge and experience of the plaintiff. If opposition to a serviceable alternative route shown by defendant is to be predicated
upon that ground, evidence of additional and disproportionate cost
should be treated as part
of plaintiff's burden of meeting defend3
ant's prima facie case. '

Wildlife Preserves was unsuccessful in meeting this burden of
proof for the judge found plaintiff's selection of the right of way
route represented a reasonable exercise of judgment and was
neither arbitrary nor capricious.32 The effect of the decisions in
this area is to give determinations of necessity almost complete
immunity from attack regardless of how ill-founded they may be
although it has been stated there "is a tendency in decisions for the
courts to apply a stricter test with private corporations than with
state and federal agencies in determining'33 that decisions of necessity are actually arbitrary or capricious.
E.

Du PRocEss RQUmEEMENTs, COMPENSATION mn MoNEY,
PROCEDURAL PoInTs, AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES.

In addition to prohibiting the taking of property for private
purposes, the due process clause of the constitution requires that

eminent domain, as an exclusively legislative prerogative, be
authorized by action of the legislature.3 4 A statutory grant of
authority to condemn should not be construed so strictly that
an apparent legislative objective is defeated; and once the power
is granted, it cannot be surrendered. 35 A recent decision of the
31 Texas East Transmission Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc., 48 N.J.
261, 275-76, 225 A.2d 130, 138-39 (1966).
32 Texas East Transmission Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc., 49 N.J.
403, 230 A.2d 505 (1967). Counsel for Wildlife Preserves, Inc., has
written in favor of a more liberal rule. McCarter, The Case That
Almost Was, 54 A.B.A.J. 1076 (1968).
33 Lavine, Extent of Judicial Inquiry into Power of Eminent Domain, 28
So. CALIF. L. REv. 369, 377-80 (1955).
34 E.g., United States v. Parcel of Land, 100 F. Supp. 498 (D.D.C. 1951).

35

See also Slattery Co. v. United States, 231 F.2d 37 (5th Cir. 1956)
holding that an improper method of determining compensation deprives an owner of property of due process of law.
State ex rel. Devonshire v. Superior Court, 70 Wash.2d 630, 424 P.2d

913 (1967).

334

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 48, NO. 2 (1969)

Washington Supreme Court, Bellevue School Dist. No. 405 v. Lee, 6
would indicate the legislative grant is not jurisdictional, but this
appears questionable.37 In the Lee case a school district commenced
proceedings to condemn 30 acres under a statute which prevented
condemning more than 15 acres. The court held that the landowners could not raise the defense of legislative authorization
on appeal when they had failed to object at the trial. In connection
with procedure, several matters are of sufficient importance to
mention. First, there is no right under the federal constitution to
a jury trial in condemnation cases.88 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71 A (h) provides that there shall be a jury trial, if
demanded, "unless the court in its discretion orders that, because
of the character, location, or quantity of the property to be condemned, or for other reasons in the interest of justice, the issue of
compensation shall be determined by a commission of three persons
appointed by it."' 9 When the request of a party for a jury is denied,
the appellate court has a duty to feview the reasons for appointing
a commission; and if both parties ask for a jury, a denial should be
the exception and not the rule 0
The due process clause does impose other procedural safeguards
in favor of the property owner. The principle established by
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 41 that due process
requires direct notice rather than notice by publication be given
70 Wash.2d 947, 425 P.2d 902 (1967).
See 26 Am. Jum. 2d Eminent Domain § 114 (1966).
38Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1897) and cases cited at 167 U.S. 593.
28 U.S.C. § 2402 states that actions against the United States under
28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1964) (except tax cases) shall be tried without jury.
Accordingly, Tucker Act cases are tried by a judge in federal district
courts. See Blair, Federal Condemnation Proceedingsand the Seventh
Amendment, 41 HARv. L. REv. 29 (1927); Hines, Does the Seventh
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States Require Jury
Trials in All Condemnation Proceedings?, 11 VA. L. REV. 505 (1925);
Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 7 (1950). For a discussion of the TVA Act and
procedure, see Hearings on H.R. 4846, H.R. 10351, H.R. 11181, H.R.
11269, H.R. 17178 and S. 1637 before the Subcomm. on Flood Control
of the House Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
39 When Congress expressly constitutes a tribunal for trying the issue
of just compensation as in the case of the TVA and the District of
Columbia, that tribunal determines the issue. See W. BARRON & A.
HOLTzoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1525 (rules ed. 1958);
7 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 2789 (2d ed. 1966). For standards of
supervision which a district court is to apply to commissions, see
United States v. Merz, 376 U.S. 192, 197 (1964).
40 Sykes v. United States, 392 F.2d 735 (8th Cir. 1968). See Juergensmeyer, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71A (h) Land Commissions:
The First Fifteen Years, 43 IND. L.J. 677, 684-707 (1968).
86
87

41

339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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defendants where feasible, was applied to condemnation proceedings
in Walker v. City of Hutchinson,4 and in Schroeder v. City of New
York. 43 In the latter case, proceedings to condemn riparian interests
in the flow of a river were held to violate the due process clause
because the only notices given were published in a newspaper and
posted near the river, but not on defendant's property. "The
general rule that emerges from the Mullane case is that notice by
publication is not enough with respect to a person whose name and
address are known or very easily ascertainable and whose legally
protected interests are directly affected by the proceedings in
question."44
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment makes all
constitutional limitations-including that of just compensation4 5binding upon the states 46 and their subdivisions; 47 and in any event,
all but a few states explicitly provide in their own constitutions for
just compensation when property is taken for public use. In the
remainder of the states, payment is required under other constitutional provisions. 48 "Just compensation" 49 under the general rule is
compensation in money.5 o It has been held, for instance, that a
condemnor cannot provide water from a substitute source in lieu
of money if the condemnee objects.5 1 The Utah Supreme Court has
analogized this to offering a condemnee of land a different piece of
42 352 U.S. 112 (1956).
43 371 U.S. 208 (1962).
44 Id. at 212-13.
45 Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S.
226 (1897). See also Annot., 18 L.Ed.2d 1388, 1406-07 (1968).
46 See Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 Q.896); Foster
v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. MYich. 1966).
47 Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
48 In New Hampshire, compensation is required under N. H. CoNsT.
Part I, art. 12th. See also Ash v. Cummins, 50 N.H. 591 (1872); DeBruhl
v. State Highway & Public Works Comm., 247 N.C. 671, 102 S.E.2d
229 (1958).
49 The word 'just" adds "nothing to the meaning." 3 NICHOLS, supra
note 2, at § 8.6. See also Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Laws,
80 HAyv. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
50 Vanhorne v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 fall.) 304, 315 (1795). The Supreme
Court has recognized that private property can be taken and transferred to a public comdemnee as indemnification. In the case, a private
owner objected to the condemnation of his property for use as a substitute town site. Brown v. United States, 263 U.S. 78 (1923). See also
Jefferson Co. v. TVA, 146 F.2d 564 (6th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 324 U.S.
871 (1945) (substituted highway system of equal utility satisfies Government's obligation to public comdemnee); County of Sarpy v. United
States, 386 F.2d 453 (Ct. CL 1967).
51 Shurtleff v. Salt Lake City, 96 Utah 21, 82 P.2d 561 (1938).
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property.5 2 This approach, however, fails to recognize that the rule
prohibiting substitution of land is based upon the proposition that
each parcel of land is unique, and it has been urged that exchanges
of water should be allowed so long as the condemnee is supplied,
at no cost to him, with an equivalent quantity equally suitable for
his purposes.53 The extent to which a user should be obligated to
accept different water, however, may depend upon whether the
diverter acts gratuitously or is under an obligation to replenish
the original supply. If there is no legal right to compel continuance
of the new substitute54 supply, diversion from the original source
should be enjoinable.
In Collier v. Merced Irrig. Dist.,5 5 an irrigation district reduced
stream flow by impounding waters behind a dam and plaintiff, a
riparian owner, commenced an action for an injunction and for
damages. Because a public use had intervened, the action became
one of inverse condemnation and the defendant-condemnor then
made a written guaranty never to impound or divert water from the
river unless a specified quantity was flowing in the main channel at
the location of the condemnee's lands. The condemnee objected to
the jury's considering this offer on the ground it resulted in compensation in kind rather than in money. The court, in rejecting the
objection, held the situation was one of a partial taking with a
reservation of part of the property for the condemnee's use.56 This
follows the general rule that a condemnor is under no obligation to
take the whole interest of the condemnee, and is distinguishable
52 Id. at 28, P.2d at 565. But see Comment, Substitute Condemnation,
54 CALIF. L. REv. 1097 (1966). See also Weyel v. Lower Colorado River
Authority, 121 S.W.2d 1032 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938); Benbow, Public

Use as a Limitation on the Power of Eminent Domain in Texas, 44
TExAs L. REv. 1499, 1513 (1966).
53 Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Kimball, 76 Utah 243, 255, 289 P.
116, 120 (1930) (separate opinion of Judge Hansen); Bd. of Directors
v. Jorgensen, 64 Idaho 538, 136 P.2d 461 (1943). See A.B.A. SECTION OF

1967 REPORT OF COMM. ON
WATER RESOURCES 220 (1967) for a discussion of California State Water
MINERAL AND NATURAL REsouRcEs LAW,

Rights Board Decision D1259, August 31, 1966, permitting exchange
of ground water for surface water. In Pima Farms Co. v. Proctor,
30 Ariz. 96, 245 P. 369 (1926), the court stated no injunction would
issue if the junior appropriator (a public carrier) of ground water
furnished water to the senior.
54 Neal v. City of Rochester, 156 N.Y. 213, 50 N.E. 803 (1898).
55 213 Cal. 554, 2 P.2d 790 (1931); Accord, Olympia Light & Power Co. v.
Harris, 58 Wash. 410, 108 P. 940 (1910); Spokane Valley Land & Water
Co. v. Arthur D. Jones & Co., 53 Wash. 37, 101 P. 515 (1909).
56 "We have here then a partial taking, with a relinquishment to the
stream of a portion of the right seized." Collier v. Merced Irr. Dist., 213
Cal. 554, 566, 2 P.2d 790, 795 (1931). In an original action a reservation
rather than a relinquishment would be involved.
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from cases in which a condemnor attempts to mitigate damages by
offering to return a portion of the
property taken after the con57
demnee has been divested of title.
When the property interest taken is for temporary use only, it
has been held unconstitutional to authorize, rather than a single
lump sum payment, an annual determination and payment of
damages. The rule has been applied where rights in a river are
temporarily utilized. s If property is used on a temporary basis but
no condemnation proceedings are instituted, just compensation is
due for all damages affecting the value of the land. For instance, in
Patrick v. City of Bellevue,59 debris from the city's garbage dump
obstructed the natural drainage causing water, garbage and debris
to flow onto plaintiffs' lands. The trial court held no damages were
payable because the city was engaged in a governmental, as distinguished from a proprietary, function and no issue of a public
nuisance was involved. The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed on
the ground that a temporary taking had occurred and compensation
was due from the city notwithstanding it was engaging in a governmental function and regardless of whether the use was or was not
a nuisance.
Consequential Damages.
As late as the early part of the 20th century, the prevailing
doctrine limited a landowner's recovery of compensation under
eminent domain to a direct as distinct from a "consequential" taking
of property. For example, recovery was denied for damages due to
smoke, cinders, gases and vibrations caused by passing trains
because no physical invasion or permanent taking occurred. Numerous cases arose in which municipalities lowered or raised street
grades leaving adjoining buildings without ingress or egress and
often without lateral support. Although it was totally inequitable,
recovery was denied because the property, although damaged or
ruined, had not actually been taken. Courts regarded such damages as merely consequential or incidental.60 For such injuries it
was said the law provided no recovery.
57

58

See Reynolds v. State Board of Public Roads, 59 R.I. 120, 194 A. 535
(1937), noted in 51 HARV. L. REv. 741 (1938) (statute permitting
reconveyance of property taken in condemnation in mitigation of
damages is unconstitutional.); Smith v. Potomac Electric Power Co.,
236 Md. 51, 202 A.2d 604 (1964).
Waterbury v. Platt Brothers & Co., 76 Conn. 435, 56 A. 856 (1904).

164 Neb. 196, 82 N.W.2d 274 (1957).
60 See Searle v. City of Lead, 10 S.D. 312, 73 N.W. 101 (1897); Johnson
v. City of Parkersburg, 16 W.Va. 402 (1880).
59
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Beginning with Illinois in 1870, a number of state constitutions
were amended to change the rule to provide that private property
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without compensation. 61 The purpose of the amendments was to permit recovery for
damages 62which previously would have been regarded as consequential.
Relief still is frequently denied in water cases however if an inquiry is found to be too "remote," or when special rules regarding
public rights are interpreted to prevent private ownership of certain
properties connected with navigable waters. Recent bridge cases
show various aspects of the problem. In State v. Masheter,63 decided
in 1964 under the Ohio Constitution which limits compensation to a
"taking," a highway bridge was constructed over a river about one
mile downstream from a marine terminal and grain elevators owned
by the plaintiff, a limited partnership. The bridge blocked grain
ships which formerly had been able to reach the terminal and
plaintiff brought suit for destruction of its right to use the river in
connection with its business. The Ohio Supreme Court in denying
relief held no physical invasion of the property had taken place and
that a riparian right of access to navigable waters does not include
a right of access to the entire outside world. In reaching this conclusion, the court divided plaintiff's right. First, there is a private
right to get into the water from riparian land, and subsequently a
public right to navigate which is shared with every other citizen.
As only the public right was impaired at the bridge, the court
thought plaintiff's damages were no different in that regard than
those of the general public.
Plaintiff obviously did suffer more than ordinary persons however and the loss was not remote. Thus a somewhat more justifiable
rationale for the holding might have been that before compensation
is due a complete destruction of property is necessary under a constitution which requires payment only when property is "taken."
But this viewpoint is unsound because intangible and non-physical
rights are as valuable as tangible ones and as much subject to being
taken. The Masheter opinion does imply plaintiff could have recovered under a constitutional provision requiring compensation
when property is "damaged" as well as taken; 4 and in this con-

61 See Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 555 (1914).
62 Patrick v. City of Bellevue, 164 Neb. 196, 82 N.W.2d 274 (1957).
63 1 Ohio St.2d 11, 203 N.E.2d 325 (1964).
64 Id. at 13-14, 203 N.E.2d at 327-28.
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nection Colberg, Inc. v. State, 5 a 1967 declaratory relief decision
by the Supreme Court of California, is of interest. In the Colberg
case two large shipyard businesses which had constructed and repaired ocean going vessels for more than sixty years were held not
entitled to eminent domain damages resulting from erection across
a navigable waterway of two low-level, state highway bridges which
curtailed access by water to the shipyards. The court said, inter
alia, that compensation would have been required if a physical
invasion or encroachment had occurred but that the California
constitutional provision requiring compensation for both "taking"
and for "damaging" did not necessitate payment. The case was
finally decided on an expanded view of the navigation servitude doctrine which is discussed later, but, nevertheless, to discuss a right of
recovery on the basis of physical versus non-physical invasion
appears contrary to the intent of a constitutional provision for
compensation whenever property is damaged. The purpose of such
a provision is to make loss of intangible property interests compensable if the damages are substantially greater than those suffered
by the general public.6 6
This view is supported by Commonwealth v. Thomas6 7 in which
the Kentucky Court of Appeals pondered both the Masheter and
Colberg decisions and did not follow them. After remarking that
legal research in the area of riparian access rights leads "to a jungle
of confusion and inconsistencies," the Kentucky court concluded
that a right of ingress and egress from riparian property would be
virtually meaningless unless the riparian were allowed access to
the main body of water. As Professor Prosser has observed, the
problem in such cases is one of degree. 68 One reason for narrowly
construing the riparian access right is fear that low bridges on busy
waterways will result in damage claims so widespread as to prevent
projects. One of the favorite examples used by condemning authorities is a low-level drawless bridge at the mouth of the Mississippi
River. This prospect, as Justice Friedman said in the Colberg litigation, may be a theoretical possibility, but it is not a practical one
unless the federal government abdicates all responsibility of control
over the nation's river systems. The continuing legitimate needs
65 67 Cal.2d 408, 432 P.2d 3, 62 CaL Rptr. 401 (1967), cert. denied, 390

U.S. 949 (1968), noted in 72 DIcK. L. REV. 375 (1968), 21 VAN. L. REV.
277 (1968) and 13 VILL. L. REV. 667 (1968).
66 See J. BEuscHER, LAND USE CONTROLS 545 (4th ed. 1966).
67 427 S.W.2d 213 (Ky. 1967).
68 Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997, 1022
(1966). See also Justice Peters, dissenting in Colberg, Inc. v. State,
67 Cal.2d 426, 432 P.2d 15, 62 CaL Rptr. 413 (1967); Justice Herbert,
dissenting in State v. Masheter, 1 Ohio St.2d 15, 203 N.E.2d 328 (1964).
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of governmental units for more property are constantly expanding,
and prospective damages can of course reach monumental proportions. If they do, administrators should then examine alternatives
because a proper balancing of interests would preclude established
businesses from bearing a disportionate cost of public improvements. In weighting different interests, those who have already
developed and used their lands in connection with the navigability
of a watercourse are in a different position than the general public
or riparians claiming loss of a mere naked legal right. Existing
businesses suffer damages which are not only direct and substantial
but different in both degree and kind from those sustained by the
public generally. It is also important that a right to enter onto
navigable water in front of riparian land usually is of little value
if that is as far as one can go. In his dissenting opinion in the
Colberg case, Justice Peters stressed that the damages to the shipyards were not incidental or consequential and that constitutional
provisions requiring compensation when property is damaged as
well as taken, show an intent to expand the area of compensability.
The majority did not make any serious claim to the contrary. Other
cases which consider questions of consequential damages are considered later.
Other ProceduralPoints.
In addition to requiring money compensation whenever property
is taken or damaged, some state constitutions contain other safeguards for private property such as the right to a jury trial in condemnation actions, payment of security before the taking, and provision that the owner shall be compensated in full for the property
taken irrespective of any benefit conferred upon his remaining
property by reason of the condemnation.6 Constitutional provisions
sometimes also declare certain uses to be public, or authorize taking
for certain private purposes, thus narrowing the scope of property
protection.
In the absence of an adequate remedy which can be invoked by
condemnees, a constitutional requirement for just compensation is
self-executing and the 7courts
are obliged to provide a means for
0
enforcing its provisions.

69

For a discussion of state constitutional provisions, see Comment, 43
IOWA

70

L. REv. 303 (1958).

Loup River Public Power Dist. v. North Loup River Public Power
and Irrig. Dist., 142 Neb. 141, 153, 5 N.W.2d 240, 248 (1942); Hurley
v. State, 143 N.W.2d 722 (S.D. 1966).
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When the federal government institutes a condemnation action,
it proceeds under the Federal Declaration of Taking Act 7' and
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 71A 2 The meaning of
"property" is a federal question 73 and Congress can determine
"within constitutional limitations" 74 what constitutes property for
federal condemnation purposes.7 5 Where Congress has not spoken,
reference will be made to state law7 6 except where the "property"
77
is part of a navigable stream.
When the government "takes" property without compensation,
the injured owner may sue the government in "reverse" or "inverse"
eminent domain.7 8 It should be noted that when the United States is
the plaintiff, it proceeds only against property described in the
complaint and declaration of taking. For instance, in a proceeding
to condemn property for flooding, an owner cannot claim compensation for property other than that referred to in the government's
pleadings. Any claim for the additional property which the landowner contends will also be flooded would have to be the subject

71

46 Stat. 1421 (1931), 40 U.S.C. § 258a (1964). See also Rivers and

72

Harbors Act, 40 Stat. 911 (1918), 33 U.S.C. § 594 (1964). For a discussion of the Declaration of Taking Act, see 6 NicHoLs, supra note 2, at
§ 27.25. The Government is not, however, required to proceed under
the Declaration of Taking Act. United States v. Certain Tracts of
Land, 225 F. Supp. 549 (D.C. Kan. 1964).
For a discussion of the Rule, see 7 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACT1CE c. 71A
(2d ed. 1966); 3 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE AND FEDPROCEDURE § § 1515 to 1530 (rules ed. 1958); Paul, Condemnation Procedure Under Federal Rule 71A, 43 IowA L. REV. 231 (1958).
United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266 (1943). When
the federal government reduces the assessment base of a drainage or
irrigation district by condemning land within the district, it becomes
necessary to determine whether a compensable "property" interest has
been taken. Compare Columbia Irr. Dist. v. United States, 268 F.2d
128 (9th Cir. 1959) with Adaman Mutual Water Co. v. United States,
278 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1960). See United States v. Howell, 251 F. Supp.
787 (D. Ore. 1965) (condemnee irrigation district had no interest in
land which was subject to annual assessment by District for operation and maintenance charges); Helena Valley Irr. Dist. v. State Highway Comm'n, 433 P.2d 791 (Mont. 1967); 2 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS
169 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 250 F. Supp. 255, 258 (E.D.
Pa. 1966).
See United States v. Certain Property, 306 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1962).
United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266 (1943). See also
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
See discussion of federal servitude for navigation infra.
See discussion of reverse condemnation infra.
ERAL

73

74
75
76
7
78
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of a separate inverse condemnation action.79 Of course, where only
part of a tract is taken, an owner may claim severance damages to
the remainder. 80
II. EMINENT DOMAIN AND POLICE POWER.

A. DISTINGUISHING CoiP!ENsABLE "TAXINGs" FROM NoN-coIwENsABLE

"REGULATIONS."

The general concepts governing eminent domain and the police
power cut across many types of decisions and become significant
when determining whether compensation is payable. For that
reason, it is worthwhile to briefly look at some of the principles
before discussing cases falling exclusively within the area of water
law. The rules are simple to state; but, as Justice Holmes said, the
lines are pricked out gradually by a contact of decisions on opposing
sides of the boundary line which separates eminent domain from
81
police power.

When private property is taken for a public use under the power
of eminent domain, the owner is entitled to receive just compensation from the taker. Conversely, if a restriction upon the utilization
of property is merely a proper exercise of the government's police
power, no compensation is due.82 A general regulation for preservation of the public health, morals, safety or general welfare is
frequently found not to be a taking of property requiring compensation to an owner even though his property is destroyed or its value
substantially decreased.8 3 Theoretically, the owner in these situations is deemed sufficiently compensated because he shares in the
79

See United States v. 9 Acres of Land, 100 F. Supp. 378 (E.D. La. 1951),
affd sub nom., Oyster Shell Products Corp. v. United States, 197

F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 885 (1952); United

80

81
82

83

States v. 29.40 Acres of Land, 131 F. Supp. 84 (D. N.J. 1955); United
States v. Merchants Matrix Cut Syndicate, 219 F.2d 90 (7th Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 945 (1955).
An increase in value of remaining riparian land due to improvement
of navigation is a special benefit and may be deducted from the value
of the property taken. See United States v. River Rouge Imp. Co., 269
U.S. 411 (1926); See also United States v. Mills, 237 F.2d 401 (8th Cir.
1956); United States v. 9 Acres of Land, 100 F. Supp. 378 (E.D. La.
1951); United States v. Easements and Rights Over Certain Land, 259
F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Tenn. 1966).
Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911), -rehearingdenied,
219 U.S 519 (1911).
1 NICHOLS, supra note 2, at

§ § 88, 100.

E.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Hadacheck v. Sebastian,
239 U.S. 394 (1915); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590
(1962); Marblehead Land Co. v. Los Angeles, 47 F.2d 528 (9th Cir.
1931), cert denied, 284 U.S. 634 (1931).
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benefits which result from the government action. Even though a
regulation may harm one landowner to a greater degree than others,
unless he is able to prove specific injury to his property which other
members of the public did not also incur, 4 a court will not usually
find a compensable taking. For example, a municipal zoning setback line which denies property owners the right to use a portion of
their property for most purposes, is merely an exercise of police
power by the municipality and the owners are not entitled to compensation for any decrease in property value."5
Zoning which limits riparian lands to residential uses also frequently causes a decline in value because agricultural, industrial
and business uses are excluded. In Poneleit v. Dudas, 6 an action
was brought to enjoin a boat livery business conducted in an area
zoned residential B where businesses were prohibited. The court
upheld the ordinance and stated that defendants' damages were
incidental to the valid exercise of police power and there was no
taking of property for which compensation had to be paid. But a
zoning ordinance prohibiting a marina is confiscatory unless there is
proof to indicate it might constitute a private
or public nuisance or
7
irreparably menace the public welfare.8
Because absence of compensation makes exercise of the police
power harsh from the viewpoint of private owners, the paramount
question in the adjudicated cases is when do acts cease to be valid
under the police power and become a "taking" under eminent
domain. Many cases are plain. Prohibition by the government of
commercial animal herds in highly urbanized areas or forbidding
the storage of oily rags in attics and basements are valid restrictions
under a state's police power; and an obvious exercise of eminent
domain is the taking of land for construction of a United States
post office. But between such polar examples is a nebulous area
84 E.g., Feltz v. Central Neb. Power & Irr. Dist., 124 F.2d 578 (8th Cir.
1942).
85 Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927) (building line approved as part

of comprehensive zoning plan but not as a means to lower the cost
of future public acquisition). In connection with flood plain encroach-

ment lines, see Dunham, Flood Control Via the Police Power, 107 U.
PA. L. REv. 1098 (1959); Beuchert, State Regulation of Channel Encroachments, 4 NATuRAL REsoutcEs J. 486 (1965); 50 IowA L. REV.

552 (1965).

86 141 Conn. 413, 106 A.2d 479 (1954). See also Dennis v. Village of

Tonka Bay, 64 F. Supp. 214 (D. Minn. 1946), aff'd, 156 F.2d 672 (8th
Cir., 1946) (property is not taken without compensation when effect
of zoning ordinance is to forbid boat renting business on riparian
property). See Comment, Role of Local Government in Water Law,
1959 Wis. L. REv. 117, 137.
87 Johnson v. Apton, 18 N.Y.2d 668, 219 N.E.2d 868 (1966).
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where courts encounter almost insoluble difficulties in deciding
which of the two doctrines applies. Justice Holmes described the
problem succinctly in Bent v. Emery:
We assume that one of the uses of the convenient phrase, police
power, is to justify those small diminutions of property rights,
which, although within the letter of constitutional protection, are
necessarily incident to the free play of the machinery of government. It may be that the extent to which such diminutions are
lawful without compensation is larger when the harm is inflicted
only as incident to some general requirement of public welfare.
But whether the last mentioned element enters into the problem or
not, the question is one of degree, and sooner or later we reach a
point at which the Constitution applies, and forbids physical appropriation and legal restrictions alike unless they are paid for.s&
In part, the determination also turns on whether the relation between the restriction and its purpose is a reasonable one, and it has
been asserted that: "A point is reached-sooner or later, depending
upon the particular court-where police regulation may in fact
become a 'taking' of the private property, i.e., it exceeds the judicial
boundaries of reasonableness. Compensation must then be paid by
the public agency."8 9 The judicial boundaries, however, are indistinct
and do not become apparent after reading what Professor Allison
Dunham calls the "long series of judgments that appear to make up
a crazy-quilt pattern of Supreme Court doctrine on the law of expropriation." 90
A similar situation exists in the state court decisions. Although
the principal tests to distinguish non-compensated restrictions under
the police power from compensable takings appear definite, their
inadequacies readily become apparent in concrete cases. A consideration of the chief standards articulated by courts is helpful
nevertheless when attempting to find the misty line separating
police power from eminent domain.
173 Mass. 495, 496, 53 N.E. 910, 911 (1899). See also 1 C. RATHKOPT,
THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING c. 6, p. 5 (3d ed. 1966); E. FREUND,
THE POLICE POWER § 518 (1904).
89 Haar & Rodwin, Urban Land Policies: United States, Housing and
Town and County Planning, BULL. 7 U.N. at 129 (ST/SOA/SER.
C/7. Sales number 1953. IV.22) (1953).
88

90 Dunham, Griggs v. Alleghany County in Perspective: Thirty Years
of Supreme Court ExpropriationLaw, in THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
63 (P. Kurland ed. 1962). See also Sax, Takings and the Police Power,

74 YALE L. J. 36, 46 (1964) ("A survey of the recent cases... leaves
the impression that the Court has settled upon no satisfactory rationale for the cases and operates somewhat haphazardly, using any or
all of the available, often conflicting theories without developing any
clear approach to the constitutional problem.").
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B. RESTuCTION OR TAKING.
A number of courts state that compensation is payable whenever
an owner is physically dispossessed, but that only consequential
damages occur when there is no dispossession. 9 1 This test fails to
demonstrate the method of reasoning and merely places the problem
in new terms which are no more helpful and are one step removed
from the primary terms, police power and eminent domain.
The physical appropriation theory was better suited for an
earlier era but breaks down under present activities which do not
amount to actual physical occupation but nevertheless cause increasing hardship to private owners. The airplane cases made this
clear. In United States v. Causby,9 2 a compensable taking was found
where low flying planes flew directly over the plaintiffs' land and
effectively destroyed the use of the property as a chicken farm,
frightened the owners, and deprived them and their family of sleep.
Theorizing that flights through the airspace directly above the land
are an invasion of plaintiffs' physical property, Justice Douglas
stressed the position of the aircraft in order to rest the outcome
upon an "easement of flight," or a physical appropriation. The case
was remanded to the Court of Claims so an "accurate description of
the property taken" could be delineated 3
Causby was followed by Griggs v. Allegheny County,94 where
the Court held that frequent flights in and out of defendant's county
airport at very low altitudes over plaintiff's residence resulted in
the taking of an air easement for which compensation was required
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The question next arises whether identical injuries to neighboring properties from airplane flights would constitute compensable
takings. If a "physical appropriation" is essential, no recovery
would be granted unless the planes passed directly over the property
and recent cases in the lower federal courts have so held 5 Thus,
91 See Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain, 41 YALE
L. J. 221 (1931). See also 1 J. LEWIs, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 16 (3d ed. 1909) [hereinafter cited as LEwis]; 11

McQuirLIn, supra note 2, at 276.

92 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
93 Id.
94 369 U.S. 84 (1962).

95 Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 955 (1963); Avery v. United States, 330 F.2d 640 (Ct. Cl.
1964); Bellamy v. United States, 235 F.Supp. 139 (E.D. S.C. 1964);
Bennett v. United States, 266 F. Supp. 627 (W.D. Okla. 1965). See also
Schubert v. United States, 246 F.Supp. 170 (S.D. Tex. 1965); Leavell
v. United States, 234 F.Supp. 734 (E.D. S.C. 1964). For cases indi-
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it has been stated that use of old property concepts leads to unjust
results because "discrimination between noise interference based on
the position of the source only serves to perpetuate the outworn
common-law concept that property consists primarily of the right
to exclusive possession of a particular space." 96
Standards are admittedly essential to protect the public from
limitless claims. Such standards, however, should be tempered by
financial injury which may result from governmental activity. This
viewpoint was expressed in his dissenting opinion by Judge Murrah
in Batten v. United States97 when he said, ".

.

. the constitutional

test in each case is first, whether the asserted interest is one which
the law will protect; if so, whether the interference is sufficiently
direct, sufficiently peculiar, and of sufficient magnitude to cause
us to conclude that fairness and justice, as between the State and the
citizen, requires the burden imposed to be borne by the public
and not by the individual alone."

cating there can be a taking "even though the noise vector may

come from some direction other than perpendicular" see Thornburg v.
Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962), second appeal,
244 Ore. 69, 415 P.2d 750 (1966). Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash.2d
309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964); City of Jacksonville v. Schumann, 167 So.2d
95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964). The Schumann rule has been held inapplicable to highway noises, dust, and vibrations. Northcutt v. State
Road Dept., 209 So.2d 710 (Fla. Ct. App. 1968). The Florida and Oregon
constitutions provide compensation only for a "taking"; Washington's
specifies "taking or damaging." In the absence of overflight, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court has held there is a cause of action for nuisance but not for inverse condemnation. Ferguson v. City of Keene, 108
N.H. 409, 238 A.2d 1 (1968). Also A.B.A. SECTION OF LOCAL GOV'T LAW,
1965 REPORT OF COMM. ON CONDEMNATION AND CONDEMNATION PROCEDURE 71-75 (1965); Fleming, Aircraft Noise: A Taking of Private
Property without Just Compensation, 18 S. CAm. L. REv. 593 (1966).
96 Note, Airplane Noise, PropertyRights, and the Constitution, 65 COLum.
L. REV. 1428, 1444 (1965). Compare Spater, Noise and the Law, 63
MIcH. L. REV. 1373, 1391-96, 1404-10 (1965) which argues governments
should not be liable except in cases of direct overflights and Stoebuck,
Condemnation by Nuisance: The Airport Cases in Retrospect and
Prospect, 71 DIcK. I. REv. 207, 233-36 (1967). See also Dunham, Griggs
v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court
ExpropriationLaw, in THE SUPREME COURT REVIEw 63, 87 (P. Kurland
ed. 1962); Note, Airplane Noise: Problems in Tort Law and Federalism,
74 HARV. L. REV. 1581 (1961); Seago, The Airport Noise Problem and
Airport Zoning, 28 MD. L. REv. 120 (1968). See generally, Gormley,
Changing ConstitutionalConcepts, 41 N.D. L. REV. 316 (1965).
97 306 F.2d 580, 587 (10th Cir. 1962). In United States v. Cress, 243 U.S.
316 (1917), the Supreme Court said, "[I]t is the character of the
invasion, not the amount of the damage resulting from it,... that determines the question whether it is a taking."

EMINENT DOMAIN AND WATER LAW
When there is an actual physical ouster as in the case of permanent flooding,9 8 no further question should arise; but to think in
terms of whether there has been a taking or merely regulation
provides little assistance for solving the close questions. For
instance, in Miller v. Schoene,99 the Virginia Cedar Rust Act required destruction of red cedar trees to prevent communication of
plant disease to apple orchards in the vicinity. The cedar trees were
not themselves injured in any way as a result of becoming hosts
of cedar rust, and both apple trees and cedar trees as alternating
host plants were interchangeably responsible for the existence and
continuance of the rust. At the trial, defendant offered to prove his
cedar trees were worth between 5,000 dollars and 7,000 dollars but he
was not permitted to do so because their destruction was held to be a
non-compensable one. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision on
the ground that the state's action was a proper exercise of the police
power.
From the owner's viewpoint, there was a taking despite the fact
that the cut trees were permitted to remain in his possession; but
had the statute given the condemnor power to take possession of the
trees and use the lumber from them, compensation probably would
have been required. The decision raises the question, who should
bear the cost when legitimate property rights of one private group
are destroyed for the benefit of another group-the cedar tree
owners, the owners of the apple orchards, or the public? If the
owners of the apple orchards, then the result could be achieved in
numerous ways, i.e., by delegating the state's power of eminent
domain to the apple growers or by the state itself paying just
compensation upon condemnation and obtaining reimbursement by
a levy on the orchard owners in proportion to benefits. 10 0 As pointed
98 Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).

Compare
cases holding no taking occurs when flooding is temporary or intermittent. E.g., Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146 (1924);
Goodman v. United States, 113 F.2d 914 (8th Cir. 1940). Recovery for
loss of crops due to temporary flooding has been permitted when it is
reasonably inferable that in the normal operation of a project a discharge of reservoir waters will be repeated in the future. Lindsey v.
City of Greenville, 247 S.C. 232, 146 S.E.2d 864 (1966).
99 276 U.S. 272 (1928). This decision is cited in Southwest Eng'r Co. v.
Ernst, 79 Ariz. 403, 291 P.2d 764 (1955) to sustain the proposition that
when water is scarce in critical areas, lands presently irrigated may
be preserved as against lands potentially reclaimable but presently
unirrigated.
100 See Kelleher v. Schoene, 14 F.2d 341 (W.D. Va. 1926); Miller v. State
Entomologist, 146 Va. 175, 135 S.E. 813 (1926); Bowman v. State
Entomologist, 128 Va. 351, 105 S.E. 141 (1920).
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out later, the same question arises in a larger context when the
United States undertakes public improvements. Should the losses
be socialized, borne by the persons and groups benefited, or sustained by those in the path of the project?' 01
IMPACT OF THE INJURY UPON THE OWNER.

C.

In an excellent article by Kratovil and Harrison, the authors
support the following conclusion which balances the needs of the
community vis-a-vis the economic harm to the property owner:
It has come to be recognized that only a difference in degree exists
between non-compensable damage to a property owner under the
police power and a deprivation of property rights under the power
of eminent domain. And in appraising the damage to the property
owner to determine whether or not the line between the police
power and the power of eminent domain has been crossed, the
extent of the diminution of the owner's rights must be 02weighed
against the importance of that diminution to the public.
The most widely cited of all eminent domain decisions, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,103 is based upon this rationale. The case

involved an attack by a single private home owner on the constitutionality of the Kohler Act which prohibited the mining of anthracite coal in such a way as to remove supports and cause a subsidence
of the surface. In finding that the act could not be sustained as a
valid exercise of the police power in those places where the right
to mine had been reserved, Justice Holmes said:
The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated
to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized
We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public
as a taking....
desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way
of paying for the change. As we already have said this is a questherefore cannot be disposed of by general
tion of degree-and
04
proposition.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brandeis used the "taking-regulation" test for his conclusion that the police power had been properly invoked. He wrote: "The property so restricted remains in
the possesion of its owner. The state does not appropriate it or
make any use of it."' 0 5
101 See United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945).
102 Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policy and Concept, 42 CALIF.
103

L. REv. 596, 608-10 (1954).
260 U.S. 393 (1922).

104

Id.

105 Id. at 417.
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06
In United States v. Sponenbarger,1
Justice Black relied upon
the insignificant damage principle when he said:

... if governmental activities inflict slight damage upon land in
one respect and actually confer great benefits when measured in
the whole, to compensate the landowner further would be to grant
him a special bounty. Such activities in substance take nothing from
the landowner. While this Court has found a taking when the Government directly subjected land to permanent intermittent floods
to an owner's damage, it has never been held that the Government
takes an owner's land by a flood program that does little injury
in comparison with far greater benefits conferred.

A number of jurisdictions have litigated the authority of a state
legislature under its police power to shift from an existing common
law system of water rights to a statutory method of prior appropriation.107 These alterations of legal arrangements have almost always
been sustained against attacks upon their constitutionality, and the
basis generally has been that the losses inflicted upon non-using
owners are so infinitesimal that no compensation is due when such
rights are subordinated or cut off.10 8
In Knight v. Grimes,0 9 the issue was "... whether the legislature
may, without compensation, abolish the rule of (so-called) absolute
ownership of unappropriated percolating waters and substitute the
doctrine of appropriation for beneficial use under state super108 308 U.S. 256, 266 (1939). See also Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases
of Eminent Domain, 41 YALE L. J. 221, 226-29 (1931); 1 L. ORGEL, VALUUATiON UN

THE LAW OF EMINNT DoIinORGEL].

inafter cited as

17 (2d ed. 1953)

[here-

107 The constitutionality of the plans has been discussed in numerous

articles, e.g., Fisher, Due Process and the Effect of EasternAppropriation Proposals on Existing Rights with Special Emphasis on the
Michigan Proposal,in THE LAW OF WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN
UNITED STATES 441 (D. Haber ed. 1958); Lauer, The RiparianRight as
Property, in WATER REsouRCEs AND = LAW 131 (Pierce ed. 1958);
King, Regulation of Water Rights Under the Police Power, in WATER
RESOURCES AN TE LAW 269 (Pierce ed. 1958); O'Connell, Iowa's New
Water Statute-The Constitutionality of Regulating Existing Uses of
Water, 47 IowA L. REV. 549 (1962); Note, 41 N. D. L. REv. 545 (1965);

11 S. D. L. REv. 374 (1966). For additional citations, see Harnsberger,
Nebraska Ground Water Problems, 42 NEB. L. 1Ev. 721, 752 n. 155
(1963); S. SATO, WATER RESOuRcES ALLOcAmoN IV at 16-19 (Univ. of
Calif. at Berkeley Sch. of Law 1962).
108 See McCook Irr. & Water Power Co. v. Crews, 70 Neb. 109, 123, 102
N.W. 249, 252 (1905). Mr. Farnham remarked that Wisconsin considered the riparian right to exclusive fishing privileges "as of too
little value to require protection." See 2 H. FAnmex vm,THE LAW OF
WATERS AND WATER RI GrHTS 1368 (1904), citing Willow River Club v.

Wade, 100 Wis. 86, 76 N.W. 273 (1898).

109 80 S.D. 517, 127 N.W.2d 708 (1964).
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vision?" 110 The South Dakota Supreme Court said that, "[b]eyond
doubt there has been an invasion of a pre-existing right or interest";"' but then the court sustained the constitutionality of the act
by the direct approach of holding that the legislature was justified
in imposing reasonable regulations under the police power. The
decision is also based upon the rationale that unregulated withdrawals of ground water are detrimental because the public
welfare demands maximum protection and utilization of the state's
water supply.
Because the degree of quantitative diminution depends upon
precisely identifying and evaluating the property affected, numerous definitional problems are involved; and the valuation of unused
riparian rights is one of the most difficult." 2 Because of such problems in compensable situations, the test of economic harm to private
owners has been challenged as an incorrect approach. 1 3 The decisions probably turn on both the extent of the taking and the
magnitude of the public interest, 1 4 but the criticism of the diminution of value theory has considerable merit. The doctrine nevertheless has the advantage of permitting a flexible approach to fit new
circumstances as the impact of regulation continues to shift rapidly
with greater urbanization and increasing technology.

D.

OTHER SUGGEsT D STANDARDS.

Professor Dunham has taken the position that no compensation
is payable where a regulation forces an owner to bear the external
costs or burdens of his private activities; but that compensation
should be paid when an owner's activities are regulated so that
benefits to the community accrue. In other words, an activity or
enterprise should assume the burden or the cost which it creates,
but it is not proper to compel a particular owner to undertake an
activity to benefit the public." 5
There is much in American constitutional law to support this distinction although precise accuracy in application is not required
under the rule of deference to the legislative judgment. Thus it has
been held unconstitutional to compel an owner, without compen110 Id. at 520, 127 N.W.2d at 711.
MllId.
112 See Trelease, Coordination of Riparian and Appropriative Rights to
the Use of Water, 33 Tex. L. Rev. 24, 57 (1954).

I18 Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74
114

YALE

L. J. 36, 60 (1964).

See the fourth paragraph of Justice Holmes' opinion in Pennsylvania

Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
115 Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 COLum.
L. REv. 650, 669-70 (1958). See also Dunham, Flood Control via the
Police Power, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1098 (1959).
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sation, to leave his land vacant in order to obtain the advantages
of open land for the public or in order to save the land for future
public purchase, but it is within constitutional power to compel
an owner to leave a portion of his land vacant where building
would be harmful to the use and'enjoyment of other land (e.g.,
set-back lines). It is unconstitutional to compel an owner to commit his land to park use in order to meet the public desire for a
park, but an owner may be compelled to furnish a portion of his
land for a park where the need for a park results primarily from
activity on other land of the owner. It is unconstitutional to compel
him to use his land as a parking lot in order to obtain a parking
lot for the community, but it is within constitutional power to
compel an owner to provide a parking lot for the parking needs of
activities on his own land. It is improper to compel a railroad to
install grade-crossings for highways in order to promote the convenience of highway users, but it is permissible to compel the railroad to install grade-crossings so as to eliminate dangers and hazards from the railroad's use of its own property. It is not permissible to compel an owner to hold land in reserve for industrial
purposes by restricting his use to industrial purposes only, but it is
permissible to exclude industrial development from districts where
such development will harm other uses in the district. It is beyond
state power to compel an owner without compensation to set
aside or give land to the public for a street or highway, but it is
within that power to compel him to do so where the need for the
streets is related to the traffic generated by the owner's use of his
other land. Likewise the state may compel an owner to furnish
other community facilities such as water and sewer lines at his own
expense where the need for such facilities results in part at least
from activities on his other land.21G
Some authorities believe the determination should depend upon
the nature of the evil which is to be corrected. One of the best
known statements of the rule is:
If we differentiate eminent domain and police power as distinct
powers of government, the difference lies neither in the form nor
in the purpose of taking, but in relation which the property
affected bears to the danger or evil which is to be provided against.
Under the police power, rights of property are impaired not because
they become useful or necessary to the public, or because some
public advantage can be gained by disregarding them, but because
their free exercise is believed to be detrimental to public interests;
it may be said that the state takes property by eminent domain
because it is useful to the public, and under the police power
because it is harmful, or as Justice Bradley put it,1because
"the
17
property itself is the cause of the public detriment.
116 Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 COLmV.
117

L. REv. 650, 666-67 (1958).

E.FREu-D, THE PoLc. POWER, PUBLIC PoLIcY,

M CONSTITUTIONAL

546-47 (1904). 11 McQumiLm, supra note 2, at 276; Havran,
Eminent Domain and the Police Power, 5 NOTRE DAME LAW. 380, 384
(1930); 27 HAiv. L. REv. 664, 665 (1914); Philadelphia v. Scott, 81 Pa.
80 (1876); Knight v. Grimes, 80 S.D. 517, 522, 127 N.W.2d 708, 713
(1964) (upholding statutes restricting right to appropriate water).
RIGHTs
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This reasoning appears in Vartelas v. Water Resources Comm'n,
a leading flood plain zoning decision. The plaintiff owned five stores
and six apartment buildings on land which was mostly within flood
encroachment lines established by the commission. After the structures were destroyed by disastrous floods in 1955, plaintiff applied
for permission to build a retail market. The application was denied
on the ground that the construction would seriously impair the
capacities of the channel and result in increased upstream water
stages in time of flood. On appeal, the trial court sustained plaintiff's
claim that establishment of the line constituted an unconstitutional
taking of private property for a public use without payment of just
compensation. The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut reversed, stating that the flood plain zoning was a valid exercise
of the police power because uncontrolled use would be harmful to
the public interest and a hazard to life and property in the event of
recurring floods. The court added that the fact plaintiff was denied
the right to construct by use of cinder blocks on a poured concrete
cellar and foundation did not mean he would be forbidden to build
another type of structure which would not impair flood capacity
such as one on piers or cantilevers.
This is somewhat parallel to the doctrine of Justice Harlan in
Mugler v. Kansas1 9 that a private use in the nature of a "nuisance"
may be restricted or completely abated without payment of compensation. There is no doubt that certain types of businesses and
activities may be prohibited or severely restricted because they
create public evils,120 but most of the cases arise from a conflict
between two lawful uses, one of which has been taken or damaged
because of the other. Further, as Professor Sax points out:
... in Harlan's day the standard sort of government activity-regulation of liquor, prostitution, fertilizer works or brickyards-can
quite understandably be described as the mere regulation (rather
than appropriation) of noxious (rather than innocent) uses; such
activity is easily distinguished from the invasion which occurs
when the government appropriates property for a highway or a
post office. In addition, since the exercise of the police power was
generally limited in Harlan's time to the sort of rudimentary functions just mentioned, it was quite possible to accept those functions, and the Harlan theory, without seeing any substantial or
fundamental threat to the institution of private property.

118 146 Conn. 650, 153 A.2d 822 (1959). See also Beuchert, State Regula-

tion of Channel Encroachments, 4

NATURAL RESOURCES

J. 486 (1965).

119 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
120

For a collection of cases, see P. KAuPER,
AND MATRiA.s 901 (3d ed. 1966).

CONSTiTUTiONAL LAW: CASES
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As the scope of governmental regulations grew, however, the
economic impact of government regulation undermined the rationality of Harlan's conceptual distinctions. Particularly with the
growth of zoning, conservation legislation, and pervasive business
regulation, the impact of the police power, however defined as
qualitatively distinct, upon the traditional perquisites of private
ownership could hardly be ignored.'21
In 1964 Professor Sax attempted to formulate a standard and
proposed that the government pay compensation when it takes
private property for its own benefit, but that no liability arise when
the government acts to reconcile disputes between private persons.
This analysis rests upon the distinction between the role of
government as participant and the government as mediator in the
process of competition among economic claims. The losses to individual property owners arising from government activity of the
first type result in a benefit to a government enterprise; losses
arising from the second type of activity are the result of government mediating conflicts between competing private economic
claims and produces no benefit to any government enterprise. 22
The rule proposed here is that when economic loss is incurred as
a result of government enhancement of its resource position in its
enterprise capacity, then compensation is constitutionally required;
it is that result which is to be characterized as a taking. But losses,
however severe, incurred as a consequence of government acting
merely in its arbitral capacity are to be viewed as a non-compensable exercise of the police power.123
The precise rule to be applied is this: when an individual or
limited group in society sustains a detriment to legally acquired
existing economic values as a consequence of government activity
which enhances the economic value of some governmental enterprise, then the act is a taking, and compensation is constitutionally
required; but when the challenged act is an improvement of the
public condition through resolution of conflict within the private
sector of
the society, compensation is not constitutionally re24
quired.

One need not agree with all Professor Sax's conclusions'25 to
recognize that the distinctions he makes have utility and that they
do explain the results in many adjudicated decisions.2 6 Regardless
of the outcome in future controversies, however, the final deter121
122
'2=
'24
125

126

Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L. J. 36, 39-40 (1964).
Id. at 62.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 67.
E.g., Comment, The Validity of Airport Zoning Ordinances, 1965 DUKE
L. J. 792, 798-802.

Under the Sax analysis, Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) is a
correct decision but a number of cases would have had a different
outcome. E.g., Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963); United States v. Central Eureka
Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958).
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minations will ultimately depend, as they should, upon the value
judgments of the judges rather than on any single formula which
points to one choice over another. 127 For instance, if the cedar trees
128
and the apple orchards in Miller v. Schoene had been worth identiwithout payment
permitted
be
then
cal amounts, should the state
of compensation to order the destruction of one class of private
property to save another or should the Holmes' view be invoked
. . if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
that ". 129
taking."'
In the final analysis, the Court is not apt to adopt any fixed
standard which would remove the factor of balancing the interests
of the public against the harm to the individual in each situation,
and as Justice Clark has stated, "[t]here is no set formula to deter30
This statement
mine where regulation ends and taking begins."'
(unhelpful as it may be in advancing the decision making process)
constitutional law as
is one that becomes ever more meaningful13 in
1
the old distinctions become less workable.
III.

PRIVATE UNDERTAKINGS AS PUBLIC USES

A. INTRODUCTION.
Because the power of eminent domain is theoretically based
upon sovereign or public necessity, it follows that the property
taken is to be put to public use.13 2 Even though a legislature approves a project as a public one, the ultimate decision whether the
use is in fact public rests with the courts. 3 The condemnor's
127

"The Fifth Amendment expresses a principle of fairness...." United
States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748 (1947); "The word 'just' in
the Fifth Amendment evokes ideas of 'fairness' and 'equity'...."
United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 124 (1950).
See also Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312,
324 (1893); United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S.
624, 631

(1961).
(1928).
129 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
130 Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962); "No rigid

128 276 U.S. 272

rules can be laid down to distinguish compensable losses from noncompensable losses. Each case must be judged on its own facts."
United States v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 156 (1952).
"No plain and catholic formula exists...." Spiegle v. Beach Haven, 46
N.J. 479, 491, 218 A.2d 129, 137 (1966).
131

"No one seems to have attempted to formulate a comprehensive

definition of the term 'police power'...." Stevens v. City of Salisbury,
240 Md. 556, 564, 214 A.2d 775, 779 (1965). See D. BAKER, LEGAL
AspEcTs OF ZONING 26 (1927).
132 See 2 NICHOLS, supra note 2, at § 7.1.
133 E.g., Pearl River Valley Water Supply Dist. v. Wood, 248 Miss 748,
160 So.2d 917 (1964); People v. Superior Court of Merced County, 65

Cal. Rptr. 342, 348, 436 P.2d 342, 348 (1968).
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identity does not of itself resolve this issue because a legislature
may delegate to any agent 8 4 including individuals; but such identity
does constitute one of the relevant factors in formulating criteria
upon which to make a determination of public use.
There is no exact definition of the term "public use," and most
courts make no effort to formulate one. 85 There have been many
interpretations, and the courts are widely split.'3 6 Under the "narrow" doctrine, which gained wide acceptance in the mid-nineteenth
century, "public use" is equated with "use by the public," and condemnation is allowed only if the public or its agents will have a
legal right to use the condemned property.8 7 Today many courts
follow a more liberal doctrine and find a "public use" in the public
advantage or benefit that will be served by certain condemnations.
However, even the most "liberal" courts have not abrogated the
public use requirement completely, and they thus permit eminent
domain to be exercised only when it will further a recognized public
goal or policy.
One goal of every state is economic development and

"...

con-

demnations necessary for exploitation of natural resources vital to
local prosperity may be for a public use."' s Whether particular
condemnations are within the above category is dictated by local
conditions and local courts. Thus under the abstention doctrine,
federal courts should stay proceedings when local "law" is unclear
and it appears that a state court determination can be obtained
within a reasonable time.
In Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W. S. Ranch Co.,13 9 a diversity action,

the ranch company sought to enjoin Kaiser from trespassing upon
company land. Kaiser claimed that the laws of New Mexico granted
the right of eminent domain to private corporations for the purpose
of securing water to be used in coal mining and that Ranch's sole
remedy was compensation in an inverse condemnation proceeding.
In response to this, Ranch contended if the statutes were so conJAnE, LAW OF EMINENT DomA: VALUATEON AND PRoCEDURE § 14
(1953) [hereinafter cited as JAmn]; 2 NiCHOLS, supra note 2, at § 3.21;
50 IOWA L. Rsv. 799, 803-05 (1965).
135 53 VA. L. Rzv. 743, 744 n. 7 (1967).
136 2 NiCHOLS, supra note 2, at § 7.2.
137 See Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 BosToN U. L. REv. 615, 617 (1940) [hereinafter cited as 20
BosToN U. L. REv.]. See also Benbow, Public Use as a Limitation on
the Power of Eminent Domain in Texas, 44 TEx. L. REV. 1499, 1504-05
(1966); Sackman, The Right to Condemn, 29 ALBANY L. REV. 177, 182
(1965).
138 20 BOSTON U. L. REv., supra note 137 at 623-24.
139 Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W. S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593 (1968).
134 A.
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strued they would violate the New Mexico Constitution which permits taking private property only for "public use." The crucial
question was whether coal mining in New Mexico, like irrigation for
example, is a public use. New Mexico law on this point was unclear,
and therefore Kaiser suggested the proceedings be stayed until
the question was decided by the state courts in a pending declaratory judgment action. The trial court refused to abstain, and decided
on the merits that the ranch company's property had been taken
for a public use.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed on the
ground that coal mining in New Mexico is not such an essential or
paramount industry as to justify giving it powers of eminent domain. 140 Consequently, any statute attempting to do so, expressly
or impliedly, would be unconstitutional. On certiorari, the Supreme
Court of the United States held that the federal proceedings should
have been stayed pending decision of the state law question by the
New Mexico courts. In addition, the Court ordered the federal
district court to retain jurisdiction so as to insure a just disposition
if anything prevented a prompt state court decision.
The Supreme Court view is correct because the "public use"
question presented a major policy issue dealing with vital resources of a state. In these cases, federal courts can do no more
than forecast what local policy will be after the matter has been
resolved later in the state courts,141 and an erroneous forecast means
that parties to the federal litigation will be bound by a different
rule than that applicable to others. From the viewpoint of judicial
administration, the outcome should be the same in both federal and
state litigation when the development, allocation or use of water is
involved. This type of expropriation case therefore should not
routinely be given the Erie treatment as though it were a run-of-themill diversity suit. 42 Rather, when state law is obscure, the cir43
cumstances justify invoking the doctrine of abstention.
Early examples of private condemnations arose under the milldam acts. 44 These acts gave private persons the right to flood
140

W. S. Ranch Co. v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 388 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1967).

141 Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 27 (1959).
142 See Judge Brown, dissenting in W. S. Ranch Co. v. Kaiser Steel Corp.,

388 F.2d 257, 264 n. 6 (10th Cir. 1967).
143

See Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring in Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W. S.
Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593, 594 (1968).

144

For discussions of the milldam cases, see 2 NICHOLS, supra note 2,
at § 7.623; 1 LEWs, supra note 91, at § § 275-80; 20 BosToN U. L. REV.,
supra note 137, at 619-21; Beusher, AppropriationWater Law Elements
in Riparian States, 10 BUFFALO L. REv. 448, 453 (1961).
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riparian lands to raise a head of water and took away the right of
the injured landowners to enjoin such interferences by limiting
their remedy to damages. 45 On the grounds that the public good
justified the procedure, 146 milldam legislation was upheld as a valid
exercise of eminent domain despite its private character. The public
147
frequently had a legal right to receive the services of the mill,
but
48
such a right was not essential to the validity of the acts.'

One reason for judicial acceptance of the measures was the precedent provided by similar practices during colonial days;' 49 and,
another is found in the recurring statement that, "[t]he will or
caprice of an individual would often defeat the most useful and
extensive enterprises if it were otherwise."'150 In these situations
eminent domain was the only practicable means of utilizing water
power, and it followed there was a very real necessity to exercise
the power if the water resources were to be put to fullest advantage. 1 1
The rationale of the milldam cases, reinforced in many instances
by constitutional provisions, was applied in other situations to allow
condemnations for additional uses vital to local prosperity. 52 For
145 A number of the early mill acts are collected in an extensive footnote in 1 LEWIs, supra note 91, at 545-47.
140 Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532, 551 (1866).
147 2 NicHoLs, supra note 2, at § 866.
148 Some courts took the view that practical considerations made a legal
obligation to serve the public superfluous. 'fU there be not an actual,
there is a moral necessity imposed upon the owner of the mill, to
accommodate the public to the extent of his power. Whoever heard
of a refusal?" Boston & Roxbury Mill Corp. v. Newman, 29 Mass.
(12 Pick.) 467, 477 (1832). See also Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532,
549 (1866). However, a number of later courts have taken a contrary
view. See e.g., Gaylord v. Sanitary Dist., 204 Ill. 576, 68 N.E. 522
(1903), and other cases collected in 2 NIcHoLs, supra note 2, at § 869
note 11.
149 "For more than a century the mill owner has had the right to raise
a head or pond of water by flowing the lands of others, paying the
damage." Boston & Roxbury Mill Corp. v. Newman, 29 Mass. (12
Pick.) 467, 478 (1832). In Fiske v. Framingham Mfg. Co., 29 Mass.
(12 Pick.) 68, 70 (1831), it is said that "the origin of these regulations (mill acts) is to be found in the provincial statute of 1714."
150 Boston & Roxbury Mill Corp. v. Newman, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 467, 480
(1832); Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532, 547 (1866); Newcomb v.
Smith, 2 Pin. 131, 140 (Wis. 1849).
151 Fiske v. Framingham Mfg. Co., 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 68, 70 (1831);
Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532, 547 (1866).
152 "The courts of the western states have, as a rule, adopted a liberal
view of the term 'public use,' and in the main have largely followed
the so-called 'Mill Cases' of New England. They have applied the
doctrine announced in those cases to the development of irrigation
and mining." Helena Power Transmission Co. v. Spratt, 35 Mont. 108,
123-24, 88 P. 773, 775 (1907).
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example, in Georgia a gold mining company was permitted to condemn property for a canal right-of-way to transport water needed
in its mining operation, 153 and a lumbering company was allowed to
condemn land for a reservoir necessary to float logs in a stream in
Idaho.154 Agriculture is another important industry with urgent
water needs, and for many years several state courts have allowed
eminent domain to be exercised to accomplish farmland irrigation. 55
Some of these cases were carried to the United States Supreme
Court under the fourteenth amendment. That Court upheld the
right to condemn for the purpose of irrigating arid California land
in Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 58 and went one step
further in Clark v. Nash,'157 holding that under proper circumstances
a private person might exercise eminent domain for the sole purpose
of irrigating his own land. The next year the Court upheld the right
of a mining corporation to condemn a right-of-way for its own use. 5 s
Thus the fourteenth amendment does not forbid the exercise of
eminent domain by a private party in his own behalf when his
purpose is of public as well as private importance. Although Fallbrook and Clark v. Nash were supposedly limited to the particular
factual situations presented, their rationale would make it difficult
to raise a successful fourteenth amendment objection to a condemnation which is claimed to be essential for the prosperity of a
state.5 9 The controlling factors are local needs and conditions, and
state legislative and judicial appraisals of these factors are given
great deference by federal courts. 60
Courts uphold the private power to condemn for a private use
where the personal objectives coincide with the public aim of
developing resources in those economic areas which most clearly
Hand Gold Mining Co. v. Parker, 59 Ga. 419 (1877).
154 Potlatch Lumber Co. v. Peterson, 12 Idaho 769, 88 P. 426 (1906).
155 See, e.g., Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 10 P. 674 (1886); Paxton &
Hershey Canal & Land Co. v. Farmers & Merchants Irrigation & Land

153

Co., 45 Neb. 884, 64 N.W. 343 (1895).
164 U.S. 112 (1896).
198 U.S. 361 (1905).
158 Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527 (1906).
'59 In Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896), the Supreme
Court reversed a Nebraska decision allowing the taking of railway
lands for the purpose of erecting grain elevators. The claim that such
measures were vital to state prosperity was apparently neither urged
by counsel nor considered by the Court; but it would not seem to be
a very convincing argument because the grain elevator business is
not in itself an industry vital to Nebraska's economic well-being, and
the effect of the attempted condemnation on the prosperity of the
agricultural industry probably would have been unnoticeable.
160 Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896).
156
157
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manifest prevalent state interests and aspirations. The power of
eminent domain in these cases is delegated to an individual to be
exercised in his own behalf, not as an individual, but ".... on account
of the expected public purpose he would serve by augmenting

the national resources. He was granted it as a class of individuals,
though he happened to be the only member of the class."'

61

Indi-

vidual activities are an instrument of state policy, and private
persons are clothed with the power of eminent domain to better
enable them to effectuate that policy.
Needless to say, most state courts have not extended the private
right of eminent domain as far as they might under Clark v. Nash.
They require "public use" in varying degrees, and generalizations
are of little value in determining the applicable law in a particular
jurisdiction. Local factors are usually decisive, and the law of each
state must be studied independently. Whether condemnation of
water, or condemnation to facilitate the use of water, will be allowed
in a specific case depends upon the application of the public use
decisions to the specific use in controversy, plus the following factors.
B.

CoNsTrrUTIoNIAL PROVISIONS.

Water is so important in arid states that many constitutions have
provisions for its utilization. These declare either that certain uses
of water are to be deemed "public" or that eminent domain may
be exercised for specified private uses; and some change earlier law
by authorizing previously forbidden condemnations. 16 2
Constitutional provisions take several different forms. Idaho
has a very broad provision, which allows condemnation for irrigation, mining, and ". . . any other use necessary to the complete
development of the material resources of the state."'6 Condemnations relating to the use of water in lumbering' 4 and the generation
of electricity for private consumption 65 have been allowed under
this clause. In Montana and Oregon taking land to store or trans161 J. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIoNS OF CAPITALISM 328 (Univ. of Wisc.
Press ed. 1957).
162 See Steele v. County Conm'rs, 83 Ala. 304 (1887). In H. A. Bosworth
& Son, Inc. v. Tamiola, 24 Conn. Supp. 328, 190 A.2d 506 (1963), the
court stated that a statute authorizing condemnation by an individual
'for land drainage may operate unconstitutionally if the general community advantage is only incidental.
163 IAno CONST. art. I, § 14.
164 Potlatch Lumber Co. v. Peterson, 12 Idaho 769, 88 P. 426 (1906) (condemonation of land for reservoir for the purpose of improving the
navigation of a stream for logs).
165 Bassett v. Swenson, 51 Idaho 256, 5 P.2d 722 (1931).
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port water for beneficial use is itself a public use,166 and some
constitutions provide that the sale, rental or distribution of water
is a public use.167 Provisions approving condemnation for reservoirs
or rights-of-way across private lands for drainage or for conveying
water for irrigation, mining, manufacturing, milling,
or domestic
68
uses are common in Western state constitutions.1
Constitutional provisions regarding use of water may affect the
right to condemn in two ways. First, of course, they obviate the
need to establish in each case the public character of the proposed
use. In addition, they may remove any requirement for legislative
authorization to condemn, for some "use" provisions have been held
to be self-executing. However, the term "self-executing" may refer
to any of several different results. The Colorado provision, which
declares that "[a]ll persons and corporations shall have the right of
way ... [for certain uses] upon payment of just compensation" is
"self-executing" and apparently is effective without any legislative
action. 69 But not all of the constitutional provisions have such an
effect, perhaps because they are not so explicit in conferring the
power-they merely declare certain uses to be public or approve
condemnation for private uses. As applied to the Idaho provision,
"self-executing" means that legislative authority to condemn for
the specified purposes is not necessary, other than to provide the
applicable judicial procedure.170 And the provision in the Montana
constitution, although said to be "self-executing," apparently requires that the legislature determine whether the power should in
a given instance be exercised, who should exercise it, and what
property should be7 1 taken. In other words, the provision confers
no grant of power.
Constitutional provisions affecting the power of eminent domain
for special uses have thus been held to produce widely varying
effects upon the necessity of legislative authorization to condemn,
166 MONT. CONST. art. III, § 15; ORE. CONST.
167 E.g., CAL. CoNsT. art. XIV, § 1.

art. I,

§ 18.

168 See provisions collected in LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING RESEARCH
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, INDEx DIGEST OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS
169

170
171

FUND

OF

460 (2d

ed. 1959); 2 NIcHoLs, supra note 2, at § § 7.32, 7.621 [1] (irrigation);
7.6223 [1] (drainage); 7624 (mining); 7.626 [1] (private roads).
See Town of Lyons v. City of Longmont, 54 Colo. 112, 116, 129 P. 198,

200 (1913). The court chose to ignore Colorado's eminent domain
statutes, stating: "Independent of statutory provisions cited by counsel for plaintiff in error, we think this right is conferred by the constitutional provision above quoted."
Blackwell Lumber Co. v. Empire Mill Co., 28 Idaho 556, 155 P. 680
(1916).
See State v. Aitchison, 96 Mont. 335, 30 P.2d 805 (1934).
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and to characterize a particular provision as "self-executing" is not
to define its effect. The interpretation given to a particular provision regarding this question should therefore be studied on an
individual basis.
C. PREFERXNCES.
In the Western states, the existence of water preference provisions also may affect the right of eminent domain. Generally,
preferences manifest a policy to favor certain uses of water over
other uses and are enacted as either constitutional or statutory
provisions. Most of the seventeen contiguous Western states have
established such preferences. These universally favor domestic
and municipal uses over all others, and usually give agricultural
uses a higher preference than manufacturing uses.172 Some preference provisions explicitly require the payment of compensation
when water rights are taken. 173 Where compensation is not mentioned, a preference provision is construed with general eminent
domain provisions and does not give a junior preferred user the
right to divest senior rights without payment of compensation.'7 4
Since preferences do not of themselves affect vesfed water
rights, they are of little importance after rights to all available
water have been established except insofar as they relate to the
right of eminent domain. 7 5 Some state statutes grant authority to
condemn for a preferred use,176 but others do not expressly relate
preferences to eminent domain law. 77 An interesting question is
172

Excellent articles on preferences generally are Thomas, Appropriations of Water for a Preferred Purpose, 22 ROCKY MT.L. REv. 422
(1950); Trelease, Preferences to the Use of Water, 27 RocKY MT.L.

REv. 133 (1955); Gross, Condemnation of Water Rights for Preferred
Uses-A Replacement for Prior Appropriation?, 3 WM.LIAETTE L. J.
263 (1965).
173 E.g., NEs. CONST. art. XV,§ 6.
174 See, e.g., Town of Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch Extension Co., 42 Colo.
421, 94 P.339 (1908).
175 "If political sub-divisions or agencies of the state having the power of

eminent domain are permitted to exercise such rights in accordance
with, and limited to, the order of use as stated in this [preference]
section, the section becomes meaningful." Noe, Water Law Procedures
176

in Kansas, 5 K". L. REV. 663, 671 (1957).
See, e.g., Wyo. STAT. ANN.§ § 41-2 to 41-4 (1957).

177 "This legislative mandate [referring to the Kansas preference sta-

tute] is not clear, and there is nothing to guide the administrator or
the courts in carrying it into effect.... And if it is intended to relate
the right to condemn an inferior use of water in favor of a preferred
use, then that needs clarification." Hutchins, Western Water Rights
Doctrines and Their Development in Kansas, 5 KAw. L. REV.491, 533,
570 (1957).

362

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 48, NO. 2 (1969)

whether a preference provision might imply the authority to condemn for a preferred use. It was said in a Nebraska case, for example, that the provision is "self-executing," but the statement is
clearly dictum.'7 8 Although there apparently is no direct authority
for the proposition that the right of eminent domain is implied in
a preference, 1'7 9 analogies might be made to other situations in which
the power has been granted by implication.8 0 Where the preferred
use is "public" and the condemnor is qualified to exercise the power
and the condemnation would serve an important public policy, an
implied grant of the eminent domain power might well be recognized.
D. THE PARTY EXERCISING THE POWER.
Another factor which may be important is the identity and the
interests of the condemning party. The doctrine represented by
Nash v. Clark,'8 ' which allows a private person to exercise eminent
domain to acquire property for his own exclusive use, is followed
in several Western states. However, in others a private person cannot exercise eminent domain in his own behalf notwithstanding the
property will be used for what would otherwise be a "public
purpose". For example, in Nebraska, where the irrigation of arid
lands has been held to be a "public use,"'1 2 an individual farmer is
8
not allowed to condemn for the purpose of irrigating his own land.
"Section 6 of article XV of the Constitution, fixing a priority of uses
for which public waters may be appropriated, is a self-executing provision and the courts, in the absence of a statutory method, would be
obliged to provide the means for enforcing its provisions." Loup River
Public Power Dist. v. North Loup River Public Power & Irrigation
Dist., 142 Neb. 141, 153, 5 N.W.2d 240, 248 (1942).
179 See Thomas, Appropriations of Water for a Preferred Purpose, 22
178

RocKY MT. L. Rxv. 422, 427-31 (1950)

for cases that by negative

implication indicate that perhaps an inferior use might be condemned

under a preference provision. But see Brazos River Conservation &
Reclamation Dist. v. Harmon, 178 S.W.2d 281, 291 (Tex. Civ. App.
1944).

180 See, e.g., Ziegler, Acquisition and Protection of Water Supplies by

Municipalities, 57 1Mcir. L. REv. 349, 353-56 (1959) (power of municipality to condemn property outside its boundaries implied from power
to condemn within municipality or power to purchase and hold property outside municipality); 11 McQumiaw, supra note 2, at § § 32.16,
32.17 (implied grant of eminent domain power to municipalities). Cf.
Town of Lyons v. City of Longmont, 54 Colo. 112, 129 P. 198 (1913)
(constitutional provision authorizing condemnation for waterways
self-executing).
181 27 Utah 158, 75 P. 371 (1904), aff'd, 198 U.S. 361 (1905).
182 Paxton & Hershey Irrigating Canal & Land Co. v. Farmers & Merchants Irrigation & Land Co., 45 Neb. 884, 64 N.W. 343 (1895).
183 Vetter v. Broadhurst, 100 Neb. 356, 160 N.W. 109 (1916).
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The right is denied not on the ground that the power of eminent
domain may not be delegated to a private person, but on the ground
that the taking in that situation is not for a public use. 84 Even in
these jurisdictions it is likely that a private condemnation would be
allowed for a purpose in which the public could more directly
participate, e.g., for a toll bridge. 85 What the courts forbid is not
condemnation by a private party, but condemnation by a private
party for his own exclusive use and enjoyment.
Condemnations of property for exclusive use by private individuals must in these jurisdictions be carried out by companies
which are "public" or "quasi-public," rather than by the interested
individual. In this way desirable condemnations are within the
framework of a "narrow" public use doctrine; and courts are spared
the burden of deciding whether the social value of a proposed use
justifies eminent domain by an individual.
How much private initiative is inhibited by requiring a public
condemnor when property is to be used exclusively by private
persons depends upon the difficulty of getting others to associate
in a company and the extent of the control imposed after its organization. Certainly the effect of the rule is mitigated by a corollary
to the "narrow" doctrine of public use which provides that "public"
as used in this connection need not refer to the entire public.
Rather, the requirement may be satisfied even if only a very small
segment of the public will use the condemned property. 86s Although the practical difference between this arrangement and
condemnation by an interested individual may be slight, it has been
predicted increased irrigation needs will force broader judicial
acceptance of the doctrine that a private individual may exercise
eminent domain to irrigate his own land. 87
E. LOcAL CoNDrrioNs.

Since public needs obviously must be determined in relation to
environment, local conditions are an important factor in any jurisdiction which considers public benefit or advantage in determining
whether private utilization of condemned property is for a "public
use." In Fallbrook IrrigationDist. v. Bradley'8 8 the Supreme Court
184 Id.

Foltz v. City of Indianapolis, 234 Ind. 656, 130 N.E.2d 650 (1955) and
cases cited 234 Ind. at 665 and 666.
186 2 NICHOLS, supra note 2, at § 7.2.
187 Yeutter, A Legal-Economic Critique of Nebraska Watercourse Law,
44 NE. L. IREv. 11, 48-9 (1965).
188 164 U.S. 112 (1896).
185
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upheld the use of eminent domain to facilitate irrigation in California because the arid conditions in many parts of that state created
a need so pervasive throughout the community as to make application of water upon private land a "public use."
One of the most famous examples of the consideration given local
conditions is in Clark v. Nash 8 9 where the Court held that because
of the extremely arid Utah climate, eminent domain by a private
party for the irrigation of his own lands was a "public use." The
doctrine of that case has been stated by Professor Wiel:
The situation of a State and the possibilties and necessities for the
successful prosecution of various industries, and peculiar condition of soil or climate or other pecularities, being general, notorious and acknowledged in the State so as to be judicially known
and exceptionally familiar to the courts without investigation-such
conditions justify a State court in upholding a statute authorizing
the taking of another's private property by one individual for his
own enterprise, where it believes, by reason of the above, that such
a taking will, through its contribution to the growth and prosperity
of the State, constitute a public benefit, and the Supreme Court of
the United States
will follow the decision of the State court in
such a case. 190
The "necessity" for accomplishing what is sought to be done
through eminent domain is determined by local conditions, and is
significant in several questions. Some of these questions are legislative ones into which courts may not inquire. There are, however,
at least two questions of "necessity" which do bear upon whether
the underlying purpose is "public", and this of course is a judicial
matter. Both questions must be answered in terms of the relation
of physical factors to economic conditions as found in the particular
local setting.
The first such question of necessity is, "[h]ow necessary is the
industry to be benefited by the condemnation to the economic prosperity of the state?" State courts are reluctant to impede the success
of industries which are of vital economic importance. When water
power was needed for manufacturing in New England the courts
upheld the milldam acts stating, inter alia, "[i]t is of incalculable
importance to this state to keep pace with all others in the progress
of improvements, and to render to its citizens the fullest opportunity
for success in an industrial competition."'19 Courts in many of the
dry Western states recognized the importance of agriculture and
189 198 U.S. 361 (1905). See also Pine Martin Mining Co. v. Empire Zinc
Co., 90 Colo. 529, 11 P.2d 221 (1932).
190 1 S.WiEL, WATER RIGHTS ix THE WEsTERN STATES § 611 (3d ed. 1911)

[hereinafter cited as WIELI.
19' Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532, 551 (1866).
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allowed private condemnations to facilitate irrigation.19 2 Another
interesting illustration is found in Potlatch Lumber Co. v. Peterson,193 in which private condemnation was allowed to facilitate

transportation of logs down a stream. The court justified the procedure not alone on the economic significance of logging, but also
on the importance of establishing a profitable means of clearing the
timber so that the lands might then be devoted to agriculture. The
importance of the mining industry to the Nevada economy controlled in Dayton Gold & Silver Mining Co. v. Seawel' 94 where a
condemnation to facilitate mining was held to be for a public use.
The court pointed out that because inherent physical limitations
precluded most industries common in other states, mining would
have to form the basis of Nevada's economy if the state were to
prosper.
19 5
An early Georgia case, Loughbridge v. Harris,
held condemnation of an easement by persons owning the banks on both sides
of a stream in order to flood upper riparians for the purpose of
operating a mill was unconstitutional as a taking for private use
only. Just six years later however, in Hand Gold Mining Co. v.
Parker,196 the same court held a grant of eminent domain power in
the charter of a gold mining company not to be invalid as condemnation for a private use. The court rested its decision on the "public
good" to be gained because gold mining would ". . . . necessarily
result in an increase of the constitutional currency of the country,
and thereby add to the permanent wealth of the state.... " Although
the court attempted to distinguish the decision from Loughbridge,
the most important reason for the inconsistent results appears to be
the court's view of the role of the manufacturing industry and the
gold mining industry in the economy of Georgia.

The second question of necessity relating to public use is, "[h]ow
necessary is the proposed activity to achieve reasonable prosperity
in the industry to be benefited?" In the milldam cases, for example,
the necessity for flooding certain riparian lands as a means of
raising a head of water to operate the mills was noted by the courts
in sustaining this form of private eminent domain. Where the
192

193

See, e.g., Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 10 P. 674 (1886); Paxton & Hershey Irrigating Canal & Land Co. v. Farmers & Merchants Irrigation
& Land Co., 45 Neb. 884, 64 N.W. 343 (1895).
12 Idaho 769, 88 P. 426 (1906). See also McKenney v. Anselno, 416 P.2d
509 (Idaho 1966).

Dayton Gold & Silver Mining Co. v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394 (1876).
Gallup American Coal Co. v. Gallup Southwestern Coal Co., 39 N.M.
344, 47 P.2d 414 (1935).
'95 42 Ga. 500 (1871).
190 59 Ga. 419 (1877).
194
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success of farming in a particular state depends upon artificial irrigation, irrigation is likely to be held a "public use" in that state.
Such was the case in Fallbrook IrrigationDist. v. Bradley,197 where
the Supreme Court indicated that if farming could have been reasonably successful without irrigation the constitutional objections
to the condemnation would have been sustained. The success of
dry-land farming in Nebraska prompted that state's supreme court
to rule that conditions there did not justify an exercise of eminent
domain by a farmer for irrigation purposes.'98
Although absolute necessity is not required either as to the
importance of the industry or the means of making it successful, it
is axiomatic that a higher degree of necessity will present a stronger
case for allowing the condemnation. Of course, it does not always
follow that an exercise of eminent domain will be allowed upon
showing that it is warranted by "local conditions." Such other
factors as precedents, often established under different conditions,
and purely doctrinal "public use" considerations are also quite
important in determining whether an exercise of eminent domain
to serve private interests will be allowed.
IV.

MUNICIPAL WATER SUPPLIES

A. INTRODUCTION.
"Towns and cities are everywhere empowered by either statute
or state constitution to condemn private water rights to secure
water for public or domestic uses,"'19 9 and this effectively gives them
164 U.S. 112 (1896).
198 "Even if it should be held that a great and general public advantage
may, in some cases, constitute a public use, we take judicial notice
of the fact that neither climatic, agricultural, industrial, nor social
conditions in this state indicate that any such advantage will accrue
by permitting such a taking as this statute authorizes." Vetter v.
Broadhurst, 100 Neb. 356, 363, 160 N.W. 109, 115 (1916).
197

199 C. MARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF NATURAL RESOURCES

144 (1951). Usually municipalities are authorized to condemn property
outside their territorial limits. E.g., Schroeder v. City of New York,
371 U.S. 208 (1963). Although it was held in City of Canton v. Shock,

66 Ohio 19, 63 N.E. 600 (1902), that a municipality may take water for
sale to its inhabitants without compensating downstream riparians
who are injured by the diversion, the general rule is that a riparian
municipality does not have the right to make such diversions. See 2
NIcHOLS, supra note 2, at § 5.795; 1 C. KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATER
RiGHTS § 482 (2d ed. 1912); 1 H. FAnNxmUV, THE LAW OF WATERS AND
WATER EIGHTS § 137 (1904). "The case of Canton v. Shock... seems
to stand practically alone in its suggestion to the contrary, and we
find it wanting in valid argument to support the conclusion reached."
Pernell v. City of Henderson, 220 N.C. 79, 81, 16 S.E.2d 449, 451 (1941).
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a preference to use water on condition that the owners are compensated. As a general rule municipal use is public and justifies
exercise of eminent domain. 20 0 But "municipal use" needs to be
defined, for much of the water from a municipal supply goes to
private consumers. Providing for the domestic water needs of a
municipality is a long established public use, and it is probably
equally settled that ". .. other uses are included, such as are fairly
incidental to the ordinary modes of living in cities and large towns,
and as involve the operation of motors requiring but a small quantity of water which may reasonably be supplied from an aqueduct
of such capacity as would be needed to meet the ordinary requirements of the inhabitants for domestic and other similar purposes."20
The power to condemn for municipal use may be inapplicable
where the municipality plans to supply the water to large manufacturing and commercial enterprises. These uses of themselves do not
generally justify an exercise of eminent domain and are usually
well down on the preference schedule if one is applicable. The
generally accepted view is that these condemnations are invalid; 20 2
however, the question of the nature of the use is apparently one of
degree, and there is not enough recent authority on point to consider the issue closed. 203 Of course, there is also the possibility in
200

2 NicHoLs, supra note 2,
§ 32.63.

at § 7.5153; 11 McQumwN, supra note 2, at

201 Watson v. Inhabitants of Needham, 161 Mass. 404, 410, 37 N.E. 204
208 (1894).
202 Burger v. City of Beatrice, 181 Neb. 213, 147 N.W.2d 784 (1967) (supplying private users outside city). See In re Barre Water Co., 62 Vt.
27, 20 A. 109 (1889) (condemnation of water from a stream above
mill dams to sell to motor owners in town held unconstitutional as
being for private use); 11 McQuLinx, supra note 2, at § 32.63, citing
Attorney General v. City of Eau Claire, 37 Wis. 400 (1875) and City
of Austin v. Nalle, 85 Tex. 520, 22 S.W. 668 (1893). In State ecx rel.
Shropshire v. Superior Court for Pacific County, 51 Wash. 386, 99
P. 3 (1909), the court said that water delivered for the purpose of
supplying steam power for private manufacturing concerns was for
private use, but allowed the condemnation because of the city's need
of water for fire protection, sewerage purposes, etc., and to supply its
inhabitants for domestic uses.
203 The question of a municipality's disposition of the water is not discussed in many cases. Perhaps this is because domestic need alone
will justify the condemnation even where it is proposed to supply
private manufacturing concerns [State ex rel. Shropshire v. Superior
Court for Pacific County, 51 Wash. 386, 99 P. 3 (1909)] as well as
the difficulty of tracing the condemned water to the private uses
where the municipality has several sources of water supply. Light v.
City of Danville, 168 Va. 181, 190 S.E. 276 (1937), where the court
said that incidental private benefit may be disregarded where it is
so blended with public use that it is difficult to observe the line of
demarcation. "It would be unreasonable to deny to the city the exer-
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such cases that the particular manufacturing or commercial use
might be held to be public in itself because of the economic benefit
it confers upon the community. In this event,
its characterization
204
as a municipal use would be unnecessary.
When no extra-territorial power of eminent domain is expressly
granted to a municipality, important questions may arise concerning
the condemnation of a water supply outside its boundaries. In view
of the strong policy considerations for allowing a municipality fo
obtain a water supply for its inhabitants, it is not surprising that
the weight of authority implies an extra-territorial power of eminent domain either from the power to purchase property outside
the city, or from the power to condemn a water supply within the
city.20 5 There is good reason in these situations for not strictly
construing statutes which delegate the power of eminent domain,
since "[w]ithout the power of eminent domain, a municipality,
because of local animosity or inability to reach a monetary agreement, may effectively be deprived of a water supply outside its
jurisdiction even though it has the power to purchase and hold
outside property.120 6 If municipalities are allowed to condemn
water supplies, they can get an impartial determination of value in
condemnation proceedings; whereas if the cities are forced to purchase water rights, they might often be in a very unfavorable
bargaining position,
especially where there are few competing
207
sources of supply.
cise of such a public service [supplying electric power] in behalf of
its citizens merely because in rendering that service it may incidentally, and to its own advantage, be helpful to others of the public
than those to whom it is directly obligated. Dillon on Mun. Corp.
(5th Ed.) § 1300." 168 Va. at 208, 190 S.E. at 287.
204 See Jacobs v. Clearview Water Supply Co., 220 Pa. 388, 69 A. 870
(1908).
20 See Ziegler, Acquisition and Protection of Water Supplies by Munipalities, 57 McH. L. REv. 349, 354-56 (1959). City of North Sacramento

v. Citizens Utilities Co., 192 Cal. App. 2d 482, 13 Cal. Rptr. 538 (1961),
where a city, empowered to condemn that portion of a water system
within its boundaries, was held to have the implied power to condemn
that portion outside its boundaries. The system had been operated as
a unit, but it appeared that the portion outside the city could be
severed and operated separately. Compare City of Birmingham v.
Brown, 241 Ala. 203, 2 So. 2d 305 (1941), where the acquisition was
for park rather than water supply purposes; implication of extraterritorial power of eminent domain was denied.
206 Ziegler, Acquisition and Protection of Water Supplies by Municipalities, 57
i L. Rzv. 349, 356 (1959).
c,
207 Reference to problems of this nature was made in Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 161 (1896): "[T]he cost of the
undertaking would be so greatly enhanced by the knowledge that the
land must be acquired by purchase that it would be practically impossible to build the works or obtain the water."
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Because the rate of municipal use is rapidly increasing at the
same time that unclaimed water sources are diminishing, 208 it is
often expedient for municipalities to acquire a larger supply of
water than is presently needed to provide for future expanded
needs. Despite general disfavor in the law for "excess" condemnation,209 courts sometimes allow =icipalities to condemn water
sufficient to provide for future needs, so long as the determination of
the quantity to be needed is reasonable. 210 Cities may also protect
the purity and conserve the quantity of a public water supply by
restricting riparian rights or acquiring a "buffer strip" around the
211
source of water through exercise of the eminent domain power.
And to give public water supplies a further measure of stability, it
has been suggested that where established municipal diversions
have no appreciable effect on navigation, their rights to withdraw
water should be confirmed by Congress as against any claims of
the United States under the navigation servitude.212
B.

EFFEcTS OF LocAL Doc~mr-Es.

The amount a municipality must pay when condemning water
rights depends upon local water law. For instance, the quantity of
water that may be diverted by a riparian owner and the uses to
which it may be applied vary among states committed to the
riparian doctrine. Under one early theory every riparian landowner
had the right to have the stream flow across or past his land in its
natural quantity and purity. Diversions were sometimes permissible
even under this theory, such as for domestic, livestock, and even
small scale irrigation uses where the stream flow was not substantially affected. But any diversions which went beyond these
strict limitations were enjoinable by downstream riparians. The
208

See Martz, Water for Mushrooming Populations, 62 W. VA. L. Rsv.

1 (1959).
209 See 2 NICHOLS, supra note 2, at § 7.5122.
210 E.g., New Haven Water Co. v. Russell, 86 Conn. 361, 85 A. 636 (1912).

Trelease, Preferences to The Use of Water, 27 RocKYz MT. L. REv. 133,
138-40 (1955). For discussions of economic and legal matters pertaining to condemnations by New York City, see Lee, Acquisition of Riparian Rights in New York, in PRocEEDinGs OF ABA SECTION OF MINmEA AND NATURAL RESoURCES LAW 13 (1964); J. HmSL ER, J.
DEHAVEN & J. MILLIMAN, WATER SUPPLY-ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY,
AN
PoLicY 255-88 (1960); and Hirshleifer and Milliman, Urban Water
Supply: A Second Look, 57 Am. EcoN. REV. 169 (1967).

211 See City
212 WITqER,

of Tacoma v. Welcker, 65 Wash. 2d 677, 399 P.2d 330 (1965).
FEDERAL WATER RIGHTS LEGISLAToN-THE PROBLEMS AND

THEIR

BACKGROUND, HOUSE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS,
86TH CONG., 2D SEss., FEDERAL WATER RIGHTS LEGISLATION 21 (Comm.

Print 19 1960).
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effect of this theory upon condemnation of a water supply is very
drastic, for it implies that every downstream riparian or littoral
owner must be compensated for the diminished flow even
when he
213
cannot show that the water was usable on his property.
The "natural flow" riparian doctrine is extremely wasteful in
that it gives every riparian the right to have stream waters flow
uselessly into the sea, and it has been replaced in many jurisdictions
by a "reasonable use" riparian doctrine. California, by constitutional amendment in 1928, prohibited riparians who were not
making a reasonable use of the water from complaining about nonriparians and appropriators who were. 214 In 1966 New York rejected
the natural flow philosophy when it enacted section 429-j of the
Conservation Law. This specifies that a harmless alteration in a.
natural watercourse or lake, whether for the benefit of riparian or
nonriparian land, is not actionable and does not create a cause of
action essential to the initiation and establishment of a prescrip215
tive right.
The reasonable use doctrine promotes beneficial water utilization
by allowing riparians to divert such water as they may reasonably
use to satisfy the natural demands for water upon their riparian
property. Under this doctrine a vital question for a condemnor is
whether the right to use water may be severed from the riparian
land. If a diversion to non-riparian land is by definition held to be
an unreasonable use as against a riparian use,2 16 a condemnor of a
water supply for non-riparian use would be liable to every downstream riparian who could show that he needed the water for his
own reasonable uses. But if riparian rights to water may be reserved or conveyed to non-riparian land, a condemnor might acquire
the rights to the amount of water to which the riparian condemnee
would be entitled without being required to compensate other
riparians. Development of such a "severability doctrine" under
the riparian doctrine can be supported as necessary to remove
obstacles to condemnation of water supplies and to facilitate the

213

214
215

216

6A AmEicAN LAW OF PROPERTY § § 28.56, 28.57 (A. J. Casner ed. 1954);
Harnsberger, PrescriptiveWater Rights in Wisconsin, 1961 WIs. L. REV.
47, 50-54.
See 1 AiWFmcAN LAW or PROPERTY § 28.3 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952).
Farnham, The Improvement and Modernization of New York Water
Law Within the Framework of the RiparianSystem, 3 LAND & WATER
L. REv. 377 (1968).
See, e.g., Kennebunk, Kennebunkport & Wells Water Dist. v. Maine
Turnpike Authority, 145 Me. 35, 71 A.2d 520 (1950); Harrell v. City
of Conway, 224 Ark. 100, 271 S.W.2d 924 (1954).
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most economic development of water resources in riparian juris217
dictions.
The usual measure of damages under the riparian doctrine for
taking of water is the depreciation in the value of the riparian
land.2 1S This rule probably results from the idea that riparian rights
are mere incidents of ownership of riparian land and that the measure of "just compensation" is the "value" of the property taken,
as distinct from the loss suffered by the owner or the gain realized
by the taker. In most instances, moreover, it is the only suitable
method available for measuring compensation. 19 However, a Massachusetts case 220 states that if riparian rights have recently been sold
in the vicinity, the "market value" established
by the transactions
221
may be evidence of the condemnee's loss.
Since numerous persons may have riparian interests in the
waters of a lake or stream, it has been suggested that the best way
to condemn water in riparian jurisdictions is through inverse eminent domain. In this way the taker is not required to ascertain all
the riparian interests in advance, and is concerned only with those
who have a sufficient interest to initiate an action against him.
Where a state constitution requires that compensation be made
before the taking, the availability of inverse condemnation is doubtful and a riparian might be allowed to enjoin the diversion until

217

218

219

220
221

See Martz, Water for Mushrooming Populations,62 W. VA. L. Ray. 1, 12
nn. 37-41 (1959), for a list of state statutes which may affect severability of riparian rights. Cf. Carlsbad Mut. Water Co. v. San Luis
Ray Development Co., 78 Cal. App.2d 900, 178 P.2d 844 (1947).
See Annot., 58 L.LA. 240, 253-56 (1903).
"[W]hile the riparian right is a part and parcel of the land in a legal
sense, yet it is an usufructuary and intangible right inhering therein
and neither a partial nor a complete taking produces a disfigurement
of the physical property. The only way to measure the injury done
by an invasion of this right is to ascertain the depreciation in market
value of the physical property." Collier v. Merced Irr. Dist., 213 Cal.
554, 571, 2 P.2d 790, 797 (1931).
Amory v. Commonwealth, 321 Mass. 240, 72 N.E.2d 549 (1947).
Cf. Clough v. State, 208 Misc. 499, 144 N.Y.S.2d 392 (1955), where the
diversion of claimants' water was only temporary. The court said that
the usual measure of damages (the difference in the market value
of the riparian land before and after the taking) was inapplicable
and that compensation should be based upon "the usable value of the
water of which claimants were deprived, the effect of the interference
with the operation of claimants' business as a going concern, its production schedule, its loss of profits and the expense necessarily
incurred due to shutdowns. National Cellulose Corp v. State, 292 N.Y.
438, 446, 55 N.E.2d 492, 495 (1944)." Id. at 503, 144 N.Y.S.2d at 397.
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direct condemnation proceedings are brought and compensation
2
is paid. 2
In the Western states the right to a continuous supply of a
specific quantity of water from a stream or lake may be obtained
by appropriating it for a beneficial use. Once such an appropriative
right has attached it may not be taken without payment of compensation.
Under the appropriation doctrine, diversions can be made to any
lands where the water may be advantageously employed, and a
change in both place and type of use usually may be made upon
approval of a state agency or officer. 223 Moreover, an appropriation
is fixed in quantity and therefore more certain than a riparian's
indefinite right. Thus under the appropriation doctrine, a condemnor is not faced with issues which arise under the riparian
system. He need be concerned only with the appropriator whose
water right he is taking. When the rights of others using water
from the same source are unaffected by the transfer, no one except
the appropriator whose water is being taken may claim compensation.
While an appropriator may be entitled to have the loss to the
value of his land considered as an element of his damages, 224 courts
speak primarily in terms of the "market value" of the water taken,
and it is said that the appropriator must be paid the market value
of 225
his water as affected by the demand or "market" that exists for
it.
A problem arises when the condemnor diverts water from
the same source but at a different location than the appropriator
whose right he is taking. As water travels downstream a portion
of it evaporates into the atmosphere or seeps into the ground around
the stream bed. Thus, some of the water diverted by a condemnor
upstream from the appropriator's point of diversion would never
have reached the appropriator in any event. It becomes necessary,
therefore, to decide whether the condemnor must pay full value for
all of the water he actually diverts or only for the amount that
would have reached the appropriator after natural loss through
evaporation and seepage. In Sigurd City v. State,228 for example,
222

See Trelease, Coordination of Riparian and Appropriative Rights to
the Use of Water, 33 TEx. L. REv. 24, 55-8 (1954); 1 WEL, supra note
190, at § 616.

223 See

W.

IN THE

224
225
226

HuTcHINs, SELECTED PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF WATER RIGHTS
WEST 378-84 (1942).

See Sigurd City v. State, 105 Utah 278, 142 P.2d 154 (1943).
Shurtleff v. Salt Lake City, 96 Utah 21, 82 P.2d 561 (1938).
105 Utah 278, 142 P.2d 154 (1943).
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the condemnor's diversion was made many miles upstream from the
appropriator's point of diversion, and transportation loss would
have occurred before the appropriator could have diverted the
water. It was said that the appropriator's rights were not property
rights in the water itself, but only the right to make beneficial use
of the water that reached his land; the deprivation of the right to
use the water formed the basis of his damages. Since the water
lost by evaporation and seepage was not usable by him,
just com227
pensation did not require payment for such quantities.
C.

VALUE TO MUNIcIPALrrY.

When a municipality condemns property to obtain an entirely
new source of supply from a ground water reservoir, or to expand
an existing well field, proceedings are typically commenced against
an owner of agricultural land who, because of the property's adaptability for water production, demands substantially more than the
market value would be for farming purposes. 228 Frequently in such
situations, no actual sales have occurred and the condemnor invokes
the fundamental rule that "the question is, What has the owner
lost? not, What has the taker gained?" 22 This rejection of the
227

See also City of Walla Walla v. Dement Bros. Co., 67 Wash. 186, 121 P.
63 (1912), where the condemnor diverted water at a point thirteen
miles upstream from defendant's mill It was held that defendant's loss
was to be measured by the quantity actually lost to it, and not by the
entire quantity the city was taking at its point of diversion.

228

See generally 1 ORGEL, supra note 106, at c. VI (2d ed. 1953); Hale,
Value To The Taker in Condemnation Cases, 31 CoLmw. L. REV. 1
(1931). A recent example is City of Connersville v. Joseph J. Riedman,
Fee Book 85, page 576, case number 66-C-194, Henry Circuit Court of
Indiana sitting at New Castle, 1967 ($35,000 jury verdict for 10.97
acres of land having a daily potential recovery of water in excess of
five million gallons). If an interest in ground water has been severed
before condemnation, a separate sum for the water rights may be
awarded. United States v. 4.105 Acres of Land, 68 F. Supp. 279 (N.D.
Cal. 1946). The general rule, however, appears to be that evidence
of the value of minerals separate and apart from the overall value
of the land is inadmissible. In re Appropriation of Easements for
Highway Purposes: Preston, Director of Highways v. Stover Leslie
Flying Service, Inc., 174 Ohio St. 441, 190 N.E.2d 446 (1963); Iske v.
Metropolitan Util. Dist. of Omaha, 183 Neb. 34, 157 N.W.2d 887 (1968).
The existence of multiple interests does not warrant separate trials;
therefore, a motion for dismissal of mineral interests from a condemonation proceeding should be denied. Phillips v. United States, 243
F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1957). See also A. W. Duckett & Co. v. United States,
266 U.S. 149 (1924).
Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910). For
collections of cases see 3 NIcHoLs, supra note 2, at § 8.61; 27 A.m. JuR.
2d Eminent Domain § 282 (1966); 1 ORGEL, supra note 106, at § 81.
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taker's gain favors the condemnor and raises the issue whether a
property's worth to the taker should ever be considered in determining fair market value. In other words, is the owner
entitled to
a larger compensation award because the special adaptability of the
land for a water supply coincides with the condemnor's purpose for
condemning.
Under the rule that market value is based upon all available uses,
including the highest possible use to which the land is or may be
put in the reasonably near future,230 the condemnor's need competes
with similar needs of others and some cases therefore include the
condemnor on the buyer side of the market.23 1 It has been stated:
"Courts do not agree on whether or not the hypothetical market
includes the present taker. If it does include him, the peculiar
adaptability of the property for his purposes may influence the
hypothetical market value. It would certainly affect what he would
be willing to pay if his only alternative were to do without the
property, and in this respect it would influence the hypothetical
market value. Quaere, does all this overemphasize the true influence of a given taker?" 232 Due to fear of such influence, other courts
prohibit consideration of the condemnor's needs 233 but most decisions are ambiguous on whether the taker
has been included in or
2 4
excluded from the hypothetical market. 8
When the condemnor is the only potential taker, the decisions
again are not uniform. 28 5 In a large number of the cases, however,
1 ORGEL, supra note 106, at § § 29, 30. Langdon v. Loup River Public
Power Dist., 144 Neb. 325, 13 N.W.2d 168 (1944).
231 In re Gilroy, 85 Hun. 424, 32 N.Y.S. 891 (Sup. Ct. 1895); Conan v. City
of Ely, 91 Minn. 127, 97 N.W. 737 (1903); In re Daly, 72 App. Div. 394,
76 N.Y.S. 28 (1902); Union Electric Light & Power Co. v. Snyder Estate
Co., 65 F.2d 297 (8th Cir. 1933); Ford Hydro Electric Co. v. Neeley, 13
F.2d 361 (7th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 723 (1926).
230

232

Dodge, Acquisition of Land by Eminent Domain, in J. Beuscher, LAND

233

ORGEL, supra note 106, at § 87.
See 1 ORGEL, supra note 106, at § 88; 4 NICHOLS, supra note 2, at § 12.315;

USE CONTROLS-CASES AND MATERIALS

535-36 (4th ed. 1966). See also 1

State Highway Comm'n v. Arnold, 218 Ore. 43, 343 P.2d 1113, modifying 218 Ore. 43, 341 P.2d 1089 (1959). United States v. Boston,

C.C. & N.Y. Canal Co., 271 F. 877 (1st Cir. 1921) (if special adaptability for use is exclusive to government, such adaptability does not

enhance market value). See United States v. Catlin, 204 F.2d 661
(7th Cir. 1953); State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Howald, 315
234

S.W.2d 786 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1958).
Hale, Value To The Taker in Condemnation Cases, 31 CoLumV. L. REv.
1, 17

235

(1931); Dodge, Acquisition of Land by Eminent Domain, in

J. BEUScHER, LAiN USE CONTROLS-CASES AND MAT RIALS 536 (4th ed.
1966); 1 ORGEL, supra note 106, at § 89.
See 1 ORGEL, supra note 106, at 374. McGovern v. City of New York,
229 U.S. 363 (1913). In United States v. Boston, C.C. & N.Y. Canal
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the condemnee will be able to show that other potential users are
present in the market. For instance, often the highest and most
profitable- use of land is for industrial purposes and the availability
of a water supply does make property desirable for industries needing large quantities. Steam generating plants, abattoir, and industrial plants are examples.
As distinguished from the taker's necessity to obtain the property
which is generally never considered 6 evidence of special adaptability for the taker's purpose is proper.P 7 In Langdon v. Loup
8 the court stated:
River Public Power District,2
Co., 271 F. 877, 893 (1st Cir. 1921), it was said: "We are of the opinion
that, in ascertaining the market value of property taken in a condemnation proceeding the utility or availability of the property for

236

237

238

the special purpose of the taker cannot be shown, if the taker is the
only party who can use the property for that purpose. If, however,
the property has a special utility or availability, not only to the taker,
but to other parties who could use the property for the particular purpose intended by the taker, then this utility or availability may be
shown."
1 ORGEL, supra note 106, at § 91; 4 NICHOLS, supra note 2, at § 12.21;
Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Adams, 116 P.2d 7 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1941).
Niagara, Lockport & Ontario Power Co. v. Horton, 231 App. Div. 402,
247 N.Y.S. 761 (1931) ("The defendants are not entitled to have for
their land what it may be worth to the plaintiff, nor what it would
damage the plaintiff not to be able to obtain it. They are entitled to
what it is worth on the market for the best use to which it is adaptable." Id. at 405, 247 N.Y.S. at 765).
See 27 Am. JuR. 2d Eminent Domain § 282 (1966); Annot., 124 A.L.R.
910 (1940). Mr. Farnham stated: "When lands are taken for any
purpose in connection with the establishment of a municipal water
supply... every element which will give a value to the land may be
considered. If the land is favorably situated for the purposes for
which it is desired by the government, that fact may be considered in
estimating the damages.... The availability of the property for the
purpose for which it is sought is to be considered, but no fictitious
value can be given it by the fact that it is the only property of the
kind which is available for the purposes of the municipality." 1 H.
FAnjAm, TuE LAW or WATERS Am WATR RIGHTS 794-95 (1904). See
Union Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Snyder Estate Co., 65 F.2d 297 (8th
Cir. 1933).
Evidence that property contains water and water yielding formations is admissible; but it appears that generally market value can
not be reached by evaluating the land and the deposits separately.
In re Appropriation of Easements for Highway Purposes: Preston,
Director of Highways v. Stover Leslie Flying Service, Inc., 174 Ohio
St. 441, 190 N.E.2d 446 (1963). Cases reaching a contrary result are
cited in the opinion. See also 4 NIcHOLS, supra note 2, at § 13.23; City
of Springfield v. Beals Industries, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 452, 155 N.E.2d
501 (1958).
Langdon v. Loup River Public Power Dist., 144 Neb. 325, 331, 13

N.W.2d 168, 172 (1944). 4
supranote 134, at § 89.

NICHOLS,

supra note 2, at § 12.3142 (2);

JAim,
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The market value of property includes its value for any reasonable use to which it may be put. If, by reason of its surroundings,
or its natural advantages, or its artificial improvements, or its
intrinsic character, it is peculiarly adapted to some particular use,
all the circumstances which made up this adaptability may be
shown, and the fact of such adaption may be taken into consideration in estimating compensation. The proper inquiry is, what is
its fair market value in view of any reasonable use to which it
may be applied and all the reasonable uses to which it is adapted?
The correct rule is as stated in Alloway v. Nashville, 88 Tenn. 510,
13 S.W. 123: "witnesses should not be allowed to give their opinions as to the value of property for a particular purpose, but should
state its market value in view of any purpose to which it is adapted.
The condition of the property and all its surroundings may be
shown, and its availability for any particular use. If it has a peculiar adaption for certain uses, this may be shown, and if such
peculiar adaption adds to its value the owner is entitled to the
benefit of it. But, when all the facts and circumstances have been
shown, the question at last is, What is it worth in the market?"

The difference between the rule of special adaptability and the
239
rule of value to the taker is illustrated by Lynn v. City of Omaha.
The city condemned land to enlarge its municipal airport; and on
appeal from an 11,625 dollars judgment, it contended the utility or
availability of property for the special purpose of the condemnor
cannot be considered in determining market value if the taker is the
only person who can use the property for that purpose. Based upon
this contention, the city alleged the trial court erred in refusing to
instruct that, "plaintiff is entitled to the market value of property
taken for the use to which it may be most advantageously put and
for which it would sell for the highest price in the market, but you
are not entitled to base your award of damages upon your estimate
'240
of the value of the real estate for enlargement of the airport.
In its discussion, the Nebraska Supreme Court said:
As stated in Minneapolis-St. Paul Sanitary District v. Fitzpatrick, 201 Minn. 442, 277 N.W. 394, 124 A.L.R. 897: "The market
value of property taken in condemnation is not measured by the
benefits to, or needs of, condemnor. The question is, What has the
owner lost? not, What has the taker gained?" Therein the court, by
quoting from Stinson v. Chicago, St. P. & M. Ry. Co., 27 Minn. 284,
6 N.W. 784, goes on to say: "'No reason can be given why property
taken under the eminent domain by a railroad company, or for
any public purpose, should be paid for at a rate exceeding its general value-that is to say, its value for any purpose. Any use for
which it is available, or to which it is adapted, is an element to be
taken into account in estimating its general value. But where a
condemnation is sought for the purposes of a railroad, to single
out from the elements of general value the value for the special
purposes of such railroad, is in effect to put to a jury the question,
239
240

Lynn v. City of Omaha, 153 Neb. 193, 43 N.W.2d 527 (1950).
Id.
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what is the land worth to the particular railroad company, rather
than what is it worth in general? The practical result would be
to make the company's necessity the landowner's opportunity to get
more than the real value of his land.'" See, also, State v. Platte
Valley Public Power and Irrigation District, 147 Neb. 289, 23
N.W.2d 300.

As stated in Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246: "Value
to the taker of a piece of land combined with other parcels for
public use is not the measure of or a guide to the compensation
to which the owner is entitled."

And in United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co.,

229 U.S. 53: "But in a condemnation proceeding, the value of the
property to the Government for its particular use is not a criterion. The owner must be compensated for what is taken from
him, but that is done when he is paid its fair market value for all
available uses and purposes.24 '

The court then pointed out that the rule is not to be confused with
the doctrine which permits evidence concerning all the circumstances which show that a property is peculiarly adapted to some
particular purpose 2 4
V. CONDEMNATION FOR PUBLIC PROGRAMS
A.

INTRODUCTION.

Controlling floods, canalizing channels, developing watersheds
and river basins, and stabilizing watercourses for downstream purposes such as municipal and domestic consumption, industrial
utilization and generation of power are programs primarily undertaken by the federal government, and, with the major exception of
California, states have not entered into these areas to any significant
degree. When these programs are effectuated, properties which
have vested in private persons under state laws are frequently appropriated without payment of compensation. An understanding of
how and when federal power supersedes such private "rights," is
possible only upon a detailed examination of the nature and extent

of the so-called dominant federal navigation servitude applicable
to waters of the United States. This servitude is limited to waters
over which the federal government has jurisdiction, and it is necessary to define the extent of those waters over which Congress may
properly exercise control.
241
242

Id.

Id. at 198, 43 N.W.2d at 530. See also United States v. 3295.61 Acres,
83 F. Supp. 626 (N.D. Tex. 1949), reversed on a different point, 366
F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1966) (possibility of removal of water from beneath pasture lands for industries should be considered in determining
market value).
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THE SCOPE OF THE COMVIERCE POWER IN NAVIGABLE WATERS OF
THE UNTED STATES.

The federal government is one of delegated powers and the most
important in connection with water originates in the commerce
clause. It provides that Congress shall have power "to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes." Federal jurisdiction over water under the
commerce clause is based on the now long accepted construction
of Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Odgen.243 He reasoned that
"commerce" includes "transportation" and the latter includes "navigation." Forty-one years later Congressional power to regulate
navigation was held to comprehend control of waters for the purposes of navigation; 244 and in 1870 the classic definition of "navigable
waters" was set forth in The Daniel Ball:
Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law
which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when
they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary
condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel
are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and
travel on water. And they constitute navigable waters of the United
States within the meaning of the Acts of Congress, in contradistinction from the navigable waters of the States, when they form in
their ordinary condition by themselves, or by uniting with other
waters, a continued highway over which commerce is or may be
carried on with other States or foreign countries in the customary
245

modes in which such commerce is conducted by water.

Thus a watercourse was deemed subject to the power of Congress
if navigable in its natural condition, and for the next seventy years

this test remained relatively unchanged. Minor modifications occurred and the basic test was broadened by adoption of the following
rules:
1. The extent and manner of actual commerce on a waterthe stream is
course are of no great significance. The test is whether
240
capable of sustaining commerce in its natural state.

243 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). For a discussion of Supreme Court
decisions in connection with the test of navigability for determining
title to beds, see Johnson & Austin, Recreational Rights and Titles of

Beds on Western Lakes and Streams, 7 NATuRAL REsouRcEs J. 1, 15
(1967); For navigability to determine admiralty jurisdictions, see
Doran v. Lee, 287 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Pa. 1968); GLoMRE Aim BLACK,
§ § 1-11 (1957).
THE LAw OF AimuRLTn
244 Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865).
245 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
246 The Montcello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 441 (1874).
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2. Rivers which have been dammed or canalized remain navigable
waters of the United States despite the artificial improvements. 247
3. Waters once meeting the test of navigability remain forever
navigable even though changed economic conditions or artificial
obstructions in the channel make the watercourse incapable of
being presently used for commerce. 248
4. Navigability does not depend upon the particular mode in
which commerce is carried on-whether by steamboats, sailing
vessels or flatboats-nor on the presence of occasional difficulties
249
in navigation.
A great liberalization of the federal navigability test came in
1940 when the Supreme Court decided the New River case, United
States v. Appalachian Power Company.25 0 The decision added to
the test of natural susceptibility for commercial use the element of
whether the watercourse could be made commercially usable by
construction of dams, locks, canals or other improvements. If so,
the waters were navigable even though Congress had no present
intention of authorizing such improvements. Mr. Justice Reed,
speaking for the Court, specified one circumscription when he said:
"The district court is quite right in saying there are obvious limits
to such improvements as affecting navigability. These limits are
necessarily a matter of degree. There must be a balance between
cost and need at a time when the improvement would be useful.25'
Whether a watercourse constitutes navigable waters of the
United States is a federal question to be decided under federal
247
248

249
250

251

United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
Economy Light & Power v. United States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921). See
Starr, Navigable Waters of the United States-State and National Control, 35 HARv. L. REV. 154 (1921).
United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926).
311 U.S. 377, rehearingdenied, 312 U.S. 712 (1940). See Laurent, Judicial Criteriaof Navigability, 1953 Wis. L. REv. 8; Comment, 3 So. DA.
L. REv. 109 (1958).
311 U.S. at 408. Wisconsin Public Service Corp. v. FPC, 147 F.2d 743,
745 (7th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 880 (1945). In United States
v. 531.10 Acres, 243 F. 981, 990 (W.D. S.C. 1965) (reversed on a different point, 366 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1966) ), the judge said, "[Tlhe evidence indicates that the river was susceptible to having been made
navigable at great cost by a system of locks and canals, but ... the
cost of making the Seneca navigable in the legal sense, and a useful
artery of commerce was so out of proportion to the use and benefits
to be derived therefrom by the public that it was not reasonable or
practicable to undertake such improvements." The court's award of
compensation was reversed on appeal without consideration of the
findings below regarding the Seneca's navigability. 366 F.2d 915, 921
(4th Cir. 1966).
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law. 252 The Government bears the burden of establishing the
navigability of a stream when it seeks to avoid paying just compensation because of the navigation servitude.253 Professor Morreale
points out that since the New River case, no decision on the issue of
navigability has been decided against the government, 254 and critics
have said that navigation doctrines appear to be "applicable to
Pennsylvania Avenue through the expenditure of enough funds. 255
If navigability of a main stream is established, federal jurisdiction over waters also extends to non-navigable tributaries and to
headwaters of navigable watercourses. In United States v. Rio
Grande Dam and Irrigation Co.,2 56 an 1899 decision, the federal
government successfully enjoined erection of a dam on the nonnavigable upper reaches of the Rio Grande River in New Mexico
because the diversions for irrigation purposes would affect navigation on the lower river. And in Oklahoma ex rel Phillips v. Guy F.
Atkinson Co., the Supreme Court held in 1941 that the federal
construction of a flood control dam on the non-navigable Red River
in Oklahoma, a tributary of the Mississippi River, was a proper
exercise of the commerce power. In the opinion, Justice Douglas
said that "we now add that the power of flood control extends to
the tributaries of navigable streams. For just as control over the
non-navigable parts of a river may be essential or desirable in the
interests of the navigable portions, so may the key to flood control
on a navigable
stream be found in whole or in part on its tribu257
taries."
252

253

United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931); United States v. Holt State

Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926).
See United States v. 531.10 Acres of Land, 243 F. Supp. 981, 986 (W.D.
S.C. 1965), reversed on a different point, 366 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1966).
For the criteria used by the Corps of Engineers in determining navigability of waterways, see 33 C.F.R. § 209.260 (1962). In connection
with the views of the Federal Power Commission, see Union Elec. Co.,
27 F.P.C. 801 (1962), aff'd, FPC v. Union Electric Co. (Taum Sauk),
381 U.S. 90 (1964). Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. FPC, 384 F.2d
200 (4th Cir. 1967). In a condemnation action, findings of the FPC as
to navigability constitute some evidence but such findings are not
conclusive on a federal court when they are made ex parte. United
States v. 531.10 Acres, 243 F. Supp. 981 (W.D. S.C. 1965), reversed on
a different point, 366 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1966).

254

255

Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters: The Navigation Power
and the Rule of No Compensation, 3 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 1, 5 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as Morreale].
See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Irrigation and Reclamation of

the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.,
256
257

ser. 9 at 255 (1959). See also United States v. Twin City Power Co.,
350 U.S. 222, 224 (1956).
174 U.S. 690 (1899).
313 U.S. 508, 525 (1941). See also United States v. Grand River Dam
Authority, 363 U.S. 229 (1960).
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Apparently, under this rationale, almost every creek in the
country is at least theoretically subject to Congressional control
under the navigation power of the United States, 25 8 and as Professor
Sax has written, ".... the constitutional scope of federal power...

is almost embarrassingly extensive."259 The touchstone is navigation. So long as Congress states an intention to promote and aid
navigation (and its statement is almost beyond challenge) ,260
federal control over navigable and non-navigable watercourses is
legitimate although Congress may advance other purposes which
alone would not justify federal intervention. 26 1
C. PRIVATE RIPARLAN RIGHTS

AD THm NAVIGATION SERVITUDE.

Riparian owners2 62 have a number of special rights which are
recognized by state laws as being inseparably connected to the land,
and just compensation is due when they are taken for public uses. 268
Generally speaking, a riparian proprietor has a right to: (1) use
the water for general purposes such as bathing and domestic uses; 26
258

See Justice Roberts, dissenting in United States v. Appalachian Elec.
Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 433 (1940) and Morreale, supra note 254, at 9.
See also Sato, Water Resources-Comments Upon the Federal-State

Relationship, 48 CAL3s. L. REV. 43 (1960); Silverstein, The Legal Concept of Navigability v. Navigability in Fact, 19 RocKY MT. L. REV. 49,
57 (1946).
259 J. SAX, WATER LAw-CASES AND CowinmsTARY 413 (1965).
260 Morreale, supra note 254, at 4-6.
261 Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 456 (1931); Oklahoma v. Guy F.
Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 525 (1941) (flood control is recognized as a
source of power having equal validity with aid of navigation and
objectives such as power development will not invalidate an improvement project if it is concerned at some point with navigation or with
flood control).
262 Ownership of land in the bed is not a prerequisite to riparian status.
Lyon v. Fishmongers' Co. (1876) 1 App. Cas. 662; Diedrich v. Northwestern Union Ry., 42 Wis. 248 (1877); United States v. ChandlerDunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53, 63 (1913). See A. WISDom, THE LAW OF
Rims AN WATERCOURSES 71-72 (1962). For a contrary view, see
REsTATEmENT, TORTS § 843 (1939).
263 4 NICHOLS, supra note 2, at § 13.23; JAn, supra note 134, at § § 43, 58.
See Lauer, The RiparianRight as Property, in WATER REsouRcEs AN
THE LAW 131 (W. Pierce ed. 1958). The usufructuary right is real
property and "as fundamental under the law of riparian rights as
under the law of appropriation." 1 WinL, supra note 190, at § 18 p. 21.
264 See Hilt v. Weber, 252 Mich. 198, 225, 233 N.W. 159, 167-68 (1930);
Bino v. City of Hurley, 273 Wis. 10, 76 N.W.2d 571 (1956) (city ordinance which prohibited bathing, boating and swimming in a lake
where city obtained water supply held unconstitutional on ground it
exceeded the limits of the police power); People v. Hulbert, 131 Mich.
156, 91 N.W. 211 (1902). Contra, State v. Heller, 123 Conn. 492, 196 A.
337 (1937); State v. Morse, 84 Vt. 387, 80 A. 189 (1911). See Note,
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(2) build wharves and piers out into deep water if this can be done
without interferring with navigation; 265 (3) have access to the
water; 266 (4) take title to accretions and alluviums; and (5) make
a beneficial use of the streams and lakes even though the water
level is lowered so long as the use does not unreasonably interfere
26 7
with similar rights of other riparians.
However, regardless of whether title to the beds of streams and
lakes is in these private persons or retained in the state, 268 the
ownership and the rights described above are subordinate to the
power of the United States when exercised by Congress in aid of
navigation. Federal supremacy over private property in such circumstances is sometimes expressed in terms of superior rights,26 9
plenary power, 270 a dominant servitude,27 1 or a superior navigation
27 3
easement,2 2 but generally it is called the navigation servitude.

1959 Wis. L. REv. 341; Comment, Just Compensation and Riparian

265

266

267
268

269

Interests, 3 CATHOLic U.L. REV. 33 (1953); Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 790
(1957). See also People v. Elk River Mill & Lumber Co., 107 Cal. 221,
40 P. 531 (1895) (riparian owners cannot be prevented from causing a
reasonable degree of pollution without condemnation of the rights
when stream is required for a public water supply). In Snavely v.
City of Goldendale, 10 Wash.2d 453, 117 P.2d 221 (1941), the court
indicated that a municipality by condemnation may obtain a right
to pollute a watercourse. See also Sheriff v. Easley, 178 S.C. 504,
183 S.E. 311 (1936).
See United States v. River Rouge Imp. Co., 269 U.S. 411 (1926); Yates
v. Milwaukee, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 497 (1870); Transportation Co. v.
Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691 (1882); Railroad Co. v. Schurmeir, 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) 272 (1868); Ryan v. Brown, 18 Mich. 196 (1869); City of
Grand Rapids v. Powers, 89 Mich. 94, 50 N.W. 661 (1891); City of
Janesville v. Carpenter, 77 Wis. 288, 46 N.W. 128 (1890).
JAHR, supra note 134, at § 59.
See Taylor v. Commonwealth, 102 Va. 759, 773, 47 S.E. 875, 880 (1904).
For a discussion of the effect of federal grants during territorial days
and after statehood, see A Four-State Comparative Legal Analysis of
Private and Public Rights in Water and of the Levels and Agencies
of Government that Enunciate Them at 45 (Phase Rept. No. 21, Contract No. 12-14-100-1010 (43) between the Univ. of Wis. and the
U.S. Dept. of Ag, Beuscher and Ellis editors, 1961).
E.g., United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 510 (1945).
See also United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 312 U.S.
592, 596 (1941).

270

E.g., South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4, 10 (1876).

271

See United States v. Commodore Park Inc., 324 U.S. 386, 391 (1945);
FPC v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239, 249 (1954).
United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 736 (1950);

272

United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229, 231 (1960).
273

United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 233 (1956).
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This dominant navigation easement has been said to "chill"
litigation whenever private owners assert they are entitled to compensation for a "taking" of their "property",2 4 and the servitude's
effectiveness is well recognized:
This title of the owner of fast land upon the shore of a navigable
river to the bed of the river ... is subordinate to the public right
of navigation, and however helpful in protecting the owner against
the acts of third parties, is of no avail against the exercise of the
great and absolute
power of Congress over the improvement of
navigable rivers.2 75
The primary use of the waters and the lands under them is for
purposes of navigation, and the erection of piers in them to improve
navigation for the public is entirely consistent with such use, and
infringes no right of the riparian owner. Whatever the nature of
the interest of a riparian owner in the submerged lands in front
of his upland bordering on a public navigable water, his title is
not as full and complete as his title to fast land which has no
direct connection with the navigation of such water. It is a qualifled title, a bare technical title, not at his absolute disposal, as is
his upland, but to be held at all times subordinate to such use of
the submerged lands and of the waters flowing over them as may be

consistent with or demanded by the public right of navigation. 2 76
The concept of a servitude reserving to the federal government a
latent right or superior title in the nation's waterways is unique.
The United States pays compensation whenever it acts under other
provisions of the Constitution and the existence of an analogous
valid claim in any property other than in watercourses has never
seriously been urged. For instance, no federal servitude exists for
military airplane flights which effectively destroy or appropriate
private propertym or for obtaining property to carry out such
constitutionally delegated functions as highways, post offices and
military installations.
D.

"TAK=Gs" UNDER ThE NAVIGATION SERVITUDE.
Activities of riparian proprietors and the United States fre-

quently interfere with uses the other wants to make of the stream
flow or of the bed. Many early cases between the Government and
the riparians involve federal programs which did not alter the
274 United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 505 (1945).
275

276
277

United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53, 62 (1913). See also
Franklin v. United States, 101 F.2d 459, 461 (6th Cir. 1939), affd, 308
U.S. 516 (1939) ("Riparian ownership is subject to the obligation to
suffer the consequences of the improvement of navigation in the exercise of the dominant right of the government in that regard.").
Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141, 163 (1900). See also United States
v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229, 231 (1960).
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
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water level, but the majority of recent cases involve large scale
projects which either change the level of the water or the direction
of its flow.
When an injured riparian proprietor is denied recovery, the court
has generally reasoned either that (1) although there has been a
taking of property, the damages are only "consequential" rather
than direct, or (2) even though the property has been expropriated
by the government, no "taking" has occurred because such property
was at all times subject to the dominant overriding prerogative to
take without payment of compensation. Under this latter view,
riparian titles are nullities against the United States and defeasible
whenever the servitude governs. The following grouping of the
early cases illustrates the scope of the doctrine.
E.

CUTTING OFF

=

RIPARIAN OwxER's ACCESS TO THE WATER.

In Gibson v. United States, 278 which appears to be the first
decision referring to a servitude, a government dike concentrated
the waters of the Ohio River in the main channel, obstructed use
of the claimant's landing, and thereby reduced the value of her land
from 600 dollars to 200 dollars per acre. The Supreme Court denied
recovery even though claimant's right of access to the navigable
part of the river was substantially damaged, because neither a
physical invasion nor an ouster from possession had taken place
due to the Government's activities. The Court stated: "No entry
was made upon the plaintiff's lot" and the damage was "merely
incidental to the exercise of a servitude to which her property had
always been subject. 2 79 The doctrine was followed in Scranton v.
Wheeler,8 0 where compensation was denied a riparian owner who
was cut off from access to the watercourse by a long pier which the
United States had constructed to aid navigation.
In 1945, the earlier access decisions were reaffirmed in United
States v. Commodore Park.28 ' The Government had dredged in a
bay and deposited the dredged materials in a connecting creek.
This resulted in cutting off access of plaintiff's lands contiguous to
the creek at a place approximately one mile from the filled-in
segment. The Court reversed an allowance of damages for loss of
the riparian right of access for navigation, boating and fishing because "no physical invasion" was involved and under the Government's absolute power navigation may be blocked at one place to
278

166 U.S. 269 (1897).

279
280
281

Id. at 276. Accord, Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1879).
179 U.S. 141, 163 (1900).
324 U.S. 386 (1945).
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foster it at another. Commodore Park was followed in United States
v. Rands, 28 2 a 1967 United States Supreme Court decision; and in
Sherrill v. United States28 3 where recovery was denied when the
Government moved the channel of the Colorado River west to
improve navigation. This left plaintiff's land separated from the
river by the land of third parties instead of fronting on the channel
as it had before. The decision was based not only on the federal
navigational servitude doctrine but also on the view that Arizona
law does not recognize riparian rights and therefore plaintiff lost
nothing under local law when the United States moved the stream.
The court refused to recognize plaintiff's assertion that there is a
distinction between riparian rights to use the water and a riparian
right of access to the watercourse. Judge Davis agreed with the
result but thought it unnecessary and inappropriate to decide the
28 4
state-law issue of riparian access.
The access cases illustrate that the Court's interpretation of the
servitude is broader than the English one for at common law a
riparian had a right of access which could not be destroyed even
for improvement of navigation unless compensation had been
paid. 285 The rule in England
is still the same,288 but few American
2 7
jurisdictions follow it. 8
F.

INJURY TO RIPARIAN PROPERTY iN Tm STREAm BED.

In Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 28 8 dredging
of a bay pursuant to Congressional authorization threatened oyster
beds on submerged lands owned under the laws of the state by
282
283
284
285

United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967).
Sherrill v. United States, 381 F.2d 744 (Ct. C1. 1967).
Id. at 747.
See 1 H. FABNHAm, Tm: LAw OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 65
(1904); Farnham, Right of Damages for the Destruction of Riparian
Owner's Access to Navigability by Improvement of Navigation,Annot.,

286

H.

21 A.L.R. 206, 211 (1922).
CoULSoN AND V. FoRBEs, THE LAW oF WATER, SEA, TWAL, AND
INLAND A
LAND DRAiNAGE 142 (6th ed. 1952); A. WISDom, THE LAw
OF

287
288

rvERs AND

WATERcOURsES 62 (1962); Annot., 89 A.L.R. 1156 (1934).

See 41 W. VA. L. REv. 426 (1934).

229 U.S. 82 (1913). In 1948, the Court of Claims was given jurisdiction

to determine claims by oyster growers for damages resulting from
dredging operations connected with river and harbor improvements.
Act of June 25, 1948, 62 STAT. 941, 28 U.S.C. 1497 (1964). H. J. Lewis
Oyster Co. v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 570 (Ct. CL 1952), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 939 (1953). See also Hawkins Point Light-house Case,
39 F. 77 (C.C.D. Md. 1889) (occupation of lands under navigable
waters for erection of lighthouse in aid of navigation held not a taking
of riparian property).
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plaintiff's lessors. Recovery was denied because the deepening of
the channel was in the interest of navigation, and the servitude
includes the right to use the bed even though property underneath
is totally destroyed.
2 89
In Greenleaf-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison,
the plaintiff
constructed a wharf within harbor lines established by the State of
Virginia and the Secretary of War of the United States. Thereafter,
the Secretary made a new harbor line and approximately 200 feet
of plaintiff's wharf extended outside the proper limits. Plaintiff
commenced court proceedings to enjoin the Government from removing or interferring with its property located in violation of the
reestablished line. The Court held that the wharf could be demolished without payment of compensation to the plaintiff under
the rule expressed in PhiladelphiaCo. v. Stimson20 that Congress
may establish harbor lines and is not thereby precluded from changing them at a later time.

G.

STRUcTUREs IN NAVIGABLE STREAMS.

In Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 291 the defendant was fined
in a criminal proceeding for failing to make certain alterations in its
bridge in compliance with orders by the Secretary of War. On
appeal, the defendant argued that the bridge was lawfully constructed pursuant to authorization from the State of Pennsylvania,
that it was not an unreasonable obstruction to existing navigation,
and that the United States had no authority to require alterations in
289 237 U.S. 251
290 223 U.S. 605

(1915).

(1912). See also Willink v. United States, 240 U.S. 572
(1916). Riparian owners cannot build wharves, piers or other structures outside harbor lines without the permission of the Secretary
of War. Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of March 3, 1899,
30 Stat. 1151, 33 U.S.C. 403 (1964). Where Congress has not taken
exclusive control of navigable waters, joint assent of the state and
federal governments is necessary. Cummings v. Chicago, 188 U.S.
410 (1903); Montgomery v. Portland, 190 U.S. 89 (1903); Economy
Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 F. 792, 799 (7th Cir. 1919),
af'd, 256 U.S. 113 (1921). Minor obstructions and entirely routine

work may be authorized by a letter of permission from the District
Engineer without public notice. For one of the pertinent regulations,
see 33 C.F.R. § 209.130 (a) (6) (1962).
291 204 U.S. 364, 399 (1907). See also Levingston Shipbuilding Co. v. Ailes,
358 F.2d 944 (5th Cir. 1966); Puente de Reynosa, S. A. v. City of
McAllen, 357 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1966). Legislation has been passed
making it unlawful to construct bridges or other structures across
or in navigable streams until the consent of Congress and the approval of the Chief of Engineers and Secretary of War has been
obtained. Act of March 3, 1899, c. 425 § 9, 30 Stat. 1151 (1899), 33
U.S.C. 401 (1964).
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the structure unless it paid compensation for the reasonable cost.
The Court rejected these contentions and held no taking of property
had taken place stating:
The damage that will accrue to the Bridge Company, as the
result of compliance with the Secretary's order, must, in such case,
be deemed incidental to the exercise by the government of its
power to regulate commerce among the States, which includes...
the power to secure free navigation upon the waterways of the
United States against unreasonable obstructions ....
Even if the
bridge, in its original form, was an unreasonable obstruction to
navigation, the mere failure of the United States, at the time, to
intervene by its officers or by legislation and prevent its erection,
could not create an obligation on the part of the Government to
make compensation to the company if, at a subsequent time, and for
public reasons, Congress should forbid the maintenance of bridges
that had become unreasonable obstructions to navigation. It is for
Congress to determine when it will exert its power to regulate
interstate commerce. Its mere silence or inaction when individuals
or corporations, under the authority of a State, place unreasonable obstructions in the waterways of the United States, cannot
have the effect to cast upon the government an obligation not to
exert its constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce
except subject to the condition that compensation be made or
secured to the individuals or corporation who may be incidentally
affected by the exercise of such power. 292
H. Su nWARY OF DECISIONS WI-FaE INwuptIs OccuiR BETWEEN THE
HIGH WATEm MARKS OF A NAvIGAm ST EAM.
Under the foregoing decisions, a riparian owner's rights are
qualified by the federal navigation servitude whenever his property
is located in the bed of a stream below high water level.23 He is
292 204 U.S. 364, 399 (1907).
293 For methods of determining the location of the high water line, see
2 H. FARNHAm, THE LAW OF WATERS mm)WATER RIGHTS § 417 (1904);
J. Gould, A Treatise on the Law of Waters § 45 (3d ed. 1900); 2
NICHOLS, supra note 2, at § 5.7913 [4]: ("[T]he decisions seem to be
uniform in laying down the rule that... [the line of the ordinary or
mean high water line upon the ground] is to be found at that point
where the action of the water ceases to affect the soil or the vegetawhere the action of the water ceases to affect the soil or the vegetation
upon it."); Plager and Maloney, Multiple Interests in Riparian Land,
URBAx LAW 41 (1968). See Borough of Ford City v. United States, 345
F.2d 645 (3d Cir. 1965). In Public Util. Dist. No. 1 v. City of Seattle,
382 F.2d 666, 668 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1967), the court stated that uplands are
those above the mean high water mark, while shorelands are between
the line of navigability of the river and the mean high water mark.
For a discussion pertaining to tidal waters, see Gay, The High Water
Mark: Boundary Between Public and Private Lands, 18 U. FLA. L.
REv. 553 (1966); Corker, Where Does the Beach Begin, And to What
Extent Is This A Federal Question, 42 WASH. U. L. REV. 33 (1966). See
Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967).
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294
entitled to no compensation for destruction of: a submerged bed,
access to the water, 295 wharves and other structures, 2"6 bridges over
the watercourse 2 97 or rights in the flow of the water.298 Different
considerations arise, however, when injuries are caused to property
above the high water marks of navigable watercourses.

I. BACKGROUND

TO THE

"RIVER" CASES.

The liability of the government for artificially changing the level
of the water and for backing up or changing the direction of flow
has been considered in numerous cases beginning with Pumpelly v.
Green Bay Co.- 9 and ending with United States v. Kansas City Life
Insurance Co.0 00 The cases encompass the period from 1871 to 1950
and arise chiefly from governmental flood control activities. A
summary of federal flood control activities showing the magnitude
of the interests involved and the inverse condemnation procedure is
a necessary prerequisite to consideration of litigation between the
United States and private owners.
Congress began systematic programming to improve the navigability of the nation's watercourses in 1879, and since that time
federal improvement projects have continued to increase in number
and size. In 1890, the Army Corps of Engineers was given jurisdiction over the improvement of rivers, but until 1917 the major
obligation remained with local agencies and local interests; and
almost all levees constructed before 1917 were for improving channels rather than to protect lands from overflows.8 0 1 The change
from this predominantly navigational emphasis began with the
"308" reports outlining possibilities for irrigation, power and flood
294

295

Lewis Blue Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82 (1913).
Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897); Scranton v. Wheeler,
179 U.S. 141 (1900); United States v. Commodore Park Inc., 324 U.S.
386 (1945); United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 122 (1967).

298

297
298
299

800

301

Greenleaf-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251 (1915);
United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53
(1913); United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 312 U.S.
592 (1941), modified, 313 U.S. 543 (1941) (land between high and low
water marks).
Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907); Louisville
Bridge Co. v. United States, 242 U.S. 409 (1917) (bridge constructed
in accordance with Congressional acts).
E.g., United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S.
53 (1913).
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
339 U.S. 799 (1950).

A.

FRANK, DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL PRoGRAm

ox =
T=EIR

MIssissippi RivER, 140 (1930). See also H.
HYDROLOGY AND CONTROL 190 (1948).

OF FLOOD CONTROL
FLOODS-

BARRows,
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control, 02 and in 1917 Congress authorized federal funds for flood
control projects as such. Legislation thereafter, especially in 1928,
broadened federal participation, but major flood control activities
outside the Mississippi River Valley did not take place until after
passage of the 1936 Flood Control Act. Thus, federal flood control
legislation is a comparatively recent development.80 3 It is, nevertheless, the basis for the largest program of public works ever
undertaken in the United States. Federal appropriations exceeded
four and one-half billion dollars for Corps of Engineers civil works
allocated to flood control new work for the period 1918 to 1962; and
at the present time Corps flood control projects under construction
are estimated to cost approximately 5.1 billion dollars when completed. 3°4 Since 1944 especially these projects have been of particular
concern to private landowners. During that year construction of
multi-purpose projects began on the tributaries of navigable streams
"under the guise of navigation control;"3 05 and the resulting effects
upon properties located in the river valleys inevitably has led to
extensive litigation between the riparians and the Government.
Unlike the usual condemnation proceedings which the United
States begins when it needs property for a highway or an airport,
the Government frequently does not find it necessary to physically
oust owners from possession in order to commence work. Rather,
unless it is clear that work will result in a taking of property, the
302 See 3 PREsIDENT's Covnw'N ON WATER RESOURCES PoLIcY, WATER RESOURCES LAw 408 (1950).
303 See generally SENATE SELECT Co1iVTTEE or NATONAL WATER RESOURCES, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., FLOODS AND FLOOD CONTROL 10-15 (Comm.

Print 15, 1960); Wolfe, The Appropriation of Property for Levees: A
Louisiana Study in Taking Without Just Compensation, 40 Tur. L.
REv. 233, 239 (1966); 3 PREsmENTs ColxnVe'N ON WATER RESOURCES
PoLacy, WATER RESOURCES LAW ch. 4 (1950).

304 See Hearings Before the House Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs on Policies, Programs, and Activities of the Department of
Interior, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1963); Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Flood Control--Rivers and Harbors of the Senate Committee on Public Works, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1966).
305 See Martz, Water for Mushrooming Populations, 62 W. VA. L. REV. 1,
55 (1959). For studies of coping with floods by regulating use of land
in flood plains, see Dunham, Flood Control Via the Police Power, 107
U. PA. L. Ruv. 1098 (1959); Beuchert, State Regulation of Channel
Encroachments, 4 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 486 (1965) (discusses the
Model Act and contains the text of a Model Floodway Encroachment
Act). Note, Flood PlainZoning for FloodLoss Control, 50 IowA L. REv.

552 (1965) (all conclude that channel encroachment laws, if properly

drafted, are valid exercises of the police power). For an exhaustive
study concerning flood-plain regulation, see Murphy, Regulating FloodPlain Development (Dept. of Geography Research Paper No. 56, Univ.

of Chicago, 1958).
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Government will proceed to carry out its plans without instituting
condemnation actions. Thus compensability is unacknowledged
before wreaking such injuries as backing water upon land, diverting
water from property, blocking ways of access to channels, and
altering currents so as to cause erosion which otherwise would not
occur. This method of taking is proper under the Constitution which
does not require that the power of eminent domain be exercised
by formal proceedings. In United States v. Dow, the Supreme
Court said:
Broadly speaking, the United States may take property pursuant
to its power of eminent domain in one of two ways: it can enter
into physical possession of property without authority of a court
order; or it can institute condemnation proceedings under various
Acts of Congress providing authority for such takings. Under the
first method-physical seizure-no condemnation proceedings are
instituted, and the property owner is provided a remedy under
the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § § 1346 (a) (2) and 1491, to recover
just compensation. See Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95, 104. Under
the second procedure the Government may either employ statutes
which require it to pay over the judicially determined compensation before it can enter upon the land, Act of August 1, 1888, 25
Stat. 357, 40 U.S.C. § 257; Act of August 18, 1890, 26 Stat. 316,
50 USC § 171, or proceed under other statutes which enable it to
take immediate possession upon order of court before the amount
of just compensation has been ascertained. Act of July 18, 1918,
40 Stat. 904, 911, 33 U.S.C. § 594, Title II of the Second War Powers
Act of March 27, 1942, 56 Stat. 176, 177 (employed by the Government in the present case).
Although in both classes of "taking" cases-condemnation and
physical seizure-title to the property passes to the Government
only when the owner receives compensation, see Albert Hanson
Lumber Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 581, 587, or when the compensation is deposited into court pursuant to the Taking Act... the
passage of title does not necessarily determine the date of "taking." The usual rule is that if the United States has entered into
possession of the property prior to the acquisition of title, it is
the former event which constitutes the act of taking. It is that
event which gives rise to the claim for compensation and fixes the
date as of which the land is to be valued and the Government's
obligation to pay interest accrues. See United States v. Lynah, 188
U.S. 445, 470, 471; United States v. 0Rogers,
255 U.S. 163; Seaboard
6
Air Line R. Co. v. United States.

Physical seizure of water rights by the United States may be
accomplished by either a physical invasion of land or interference
07
with the flow of the water upstream as occurred in Dugan v. Rank.
The ability of the United States to appropriate property by physical
seizure, rather than by direct condemnation, has produced many
306 375 U.S. 17, 21 (1958).
307 372 U.S. 609 (1963).
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major decisions in eminent domain law involving reverse, or inverse,
situations, i.e., the injured party is forced to begin the litigation
as plaintiff. The inverse condemnation action is based on the theory
that the federal and state constitutional guarantees of just compensation for public takings are self-executing consents by governments
to he sued for such compensation and thus governmental immunity
from suit is waived.3 08
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained the rationale
behind inverse condemnation litigation as follows:
The term 'inverse or reverse condemnation' contemplates the situation in which property has been taken by the exercise of the power
of eminent domain, but without any payment of compensation
therefor having been made. The theory upon which such an action
is brought is that since a taking, which is otherwise lawful, would
be a violation of due process of law if done without compensation, it must be presumed that the taker intends to pay for the
property condemned. 309
Whether physical seizure occurs or harm is reasonably threatened without institution of a condemnation action or formal eminent
domain proceedings are started, the landowner's most direct remedy
is injunctive relief3 10 which may be granted for a number of reasons.
An injunction will issue, for example, when there are technical
procedural deficiencies, when the taking is not for a public pur3
pose3 11 or the property already is devoted to a superior public use, 2
MTAERIALs, 540 (3d ed.
1964).
309 California v. United States District Court, 213 F.2d 818, 821 n. 10
(9th Cir. 1954). Recovery may be had through inverse condemnation for both real and personal property. Sutfin v. State, 67 Cal. Rptr.
665 (St. App. 1968); Van Alstyne, Saturday Modification of Inverse
Condemnation: The Scope of Legislative Power, 19 STAN. L. REV. 727,
739 (1967).
310 Burger v. City of Beatrice, 181 Neb. 213, 147 N.W.2d 784 (1967). See
footnote 327 infra.

308 J. BEUSCEMR, LAND USE CONTROLS--CASES AND

311 Id.

312

1 NicHoLs, supra note 2, at § 2.2 [8]. The federal government is supreme in its power of eminent domain and property which a state or
city is devoting to a public purpose may be condemned pursuant to
federal authorization. United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230 (1946),
rehearing denied, 329 U.S. 834 (1946). United States v. 20.53 Acres of
Land, 263 F. Supp. 694 (D. Kan. 1967); City of Davenport v. ThreeFifths of An Acre of Land, 147 F. Supp. 794 (S.D. Ill. 1957) (condemnor authorized by federal government to construct an addition
to an existing bridge which could not be done without condemnation
of public lands possessed by neighboring city). For a discussion of
whether a city licensed under the Federal Power Act to construct
a dam may condemn state owned property dedicated to a public use
when the state has not conferred such power upon its political sub-
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or if an excessive amount of property is being taken. The remedy
is, of course, an equitable one and will be denied if an adequate
remedy at law exists or if a balancing of the equities favors the
public interest over harm to the individual.313 In Cubbins v. Mississippi River Commission, 14 plaintiff's lands were flooded and he
sought to enjoin the commission and state levee boards from maintaining and repairing levees.
court said:

In the opinion denying relief, the

Assuming, as we must on a motion to dismiss the bill for want of
equity, that the allegations in the complaint are true, and also
assuming that they are sufficient to make these districts responsible
for the damages sustained by plaintiff, why has he not a complete
and adequate remedy at law? If the land has become utterly
worthless, then the proper measure of damages would be the value
of the land before the injury was inflicted; if the value of the
land has not been utterly destroyed but materially damaged, then
the depreciation of its value by reason of the alleged unlawful
acts of the defendants would be the proper measure of compensation. 31 5

313

division, see City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 49 Wash.2d 781,
307 P.2d 567 (1957), rev'd, 357 U.S. 320 (1958). See also Beezer v.
City of Seattle, 62 Wash.2d 569, 383 P.2d 895 (1963), rev'd, 376 U.S.
224 (1964). It is doubtful the United States can interfere with states
when the latter exercise duties under the federal constitution, Collector
v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871); Fifield v. Close, 15 Mich. 505
(1867), but a possible adverse effect upon state tax revenues is no bar
to federal condemnation. Oklahoma v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S.
508 (1941). As between parties seeking to condemn the same water
rights, the first condemnor to file its action prevails; the remedy of the
other is to press its claim of a higher and better right in the earlier
proceedings. See San Bernardino Valley Mun. Water Dist. v. Gage
Canal Co., 37 Cal. Rptr. 856 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
In Illinois Cities Water Co. v. City of Mt. Vernon, 11 Ill.2d 547,
144 N.E.2d 729 (1957), the Supreme Court of Illinois held that a
municipality can condemn property of an existing public utility
devoted to the same use as that contemplated by the city. The court
distinguished the situation involving two public utilities because a
municipality's use is larger in scope and of more general benefit to
the public. See also City of Beaumont v. Beaumont Irr. Dist., 63
Cal.2d 291, 46 Cal. Rptr. 465, 405 P.2d 377 (1965). See generally Dau,
Problems in Condemnation of Property Devoted to Public Use, 44
TEX. L. REV. 1517 (1966); Johnson, Condemnation of Water Rights,
46 TEx. L. REV. 1054, 1072 (1968).
For collections of cases, see Annot., Injunction Against Exercise of

Power of Eminent Domain, 93 A.L.R.2d 465 (1964); Annot., 133 A.L.R.

11 (1941); Note, Eminent Domain-Rights and Remedies of an Uncompensated Landowner, 1962 WAsi. L. Q. 210. See also Bronson v. Albion

Telephone Co., 67 Neb. 111, 117, 93 N.W. 201, 203 (1903) where Roscoe
Pound says that to grant injunctions rather than damages would pre314
315

vent many useful public improvements.
204 F. 299 (E.D. Ark. 1913).

Id. at 305.

EMINENT DOMAIN AND WATER LAW
... Injunctions are not matters of right, and while they are
issued, not in the arbitrary or whimsical will, but in the judicial
discretion of the court guided by the established principles, rules,
and practice in equity, regard must be had for the comparative
injury which will be sustained if the injunction were granted or
refused. If it appears that the granting of the injunction, although
plaintiff may be ordinarily entitled to it, would inflict such great
damage on the defendants or the public that that suffered by the
plaintiff, if the injunction is refused, will be relatively insignificant,
an injunction must be refused. 31 6
... If the plaintiff had claimed damages in his bill as an alternative relief in case the court held that he is not entitled to an
injunction, it would have been the duty of the court to transfer
the case to the law side, provided the allegations of the bill showed
that he is entitled to such relief... .317

The effect of an intervening public use upon a plaintiff's right
to enjoin a taking is discussed in Hillside Water Co. v. City of Los
Angeles:
When a public use has attached a prohibitory injunction should
be granted only in the event that no other relief is adequate. (Montecito Valley Water Co. v. Santa Barbara, 144 Cal. 578, [77 Pac.
1113].) In such cases compensation in lieu of injunction is preferred. (Newport v. Temescal Water Co., 149 Cal. 531, 538 [87 Pac.
372, 6 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1098].) The doctrine that intervention of a
public use will foreclose the right to an injunction rests not only
on estoppel. The doctrine may be applicable even though the aggrieved party be in ignorance of the violation of his rights. In
other words, implied dedication to public use is not essential to
the operation of the doctrine. Public policy in favor of a continuance of the public use may also be invoked to prevent a prohibitive injunction. (Peabody v. Vallejo, supra, p. 378). When public
use has attached for any recognized reason reverse condemnation
proceedings may be invoked and applied. No good reason has been
advanced why such a proceeding should not be employed in this
case. It would appear to be the only appropriate course to pursue.
To that end the judgment must be reversed. (See Collier v. Merced

Irr. Dist., 213 Cal. 554 [2 Pac. (2d) 790].)318

Professor Sato notes that there is little authority to indicate
whether a party raising the intervening public use as a defense must
have the power to condemn. If the effect of the defense is deemed
to be the transformation of the action into an inverse condemnation
proceeding, then the party should be required to have the power.
If, however, the primary effect of the defense is deemed to be
316 Id. at 307.
317 Id. at 308.
318

10 Cal.2d 677, 688, 76 P.2d 681, 687 (1938). See also Fortenberry,
Exercise of Eminent Domain by Private Bodies for Public Purposes,
1966 U. ILL. L. F. 131, 165-66; 1 ROGER & NIcHOLs, WATER FOR CALIFORNIA,

§ § 312, 313, 403 (1967).
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prevention of hardship to the public, it would not be dependent
upon the defendant having a right of condemnation. 19
A plaintiff faces numerous problems when the United States or
a federal officer is the defendant stemming in part from uncertainties with getting jurisdiction over the federal government. The
United States is free from suit, of course, unless an action may be
brought within the constitutional provision that property can not be
taken without just compensation or Congress expressly waives the
Government's immunity as it has done by statutes such as the
Tucker Act, the Federal Tort Claims Act, and the McCarran Amendment .3s20 Professor Davis has pointed out that cases are often lost
319

See S. SATO, WATER RESOURCES ALLOCATION IX at 10-12 (Univ. of
Calif. at Berkeley School of Law 1962). In Rank v. Krug, 142 F. Supp.
1, 131 (S.D. Cal. 1956) the California decisions are discussed, and the

court holds that the defense of the intervention of a public use can
only be asserted under the California law by one capable of condemning property under the power of eminent domain. For the later disposition of the litigation, see Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963);
820

Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627 (1963). See also W. HuTcmis, CALIFORNIA LAw OF WATER RiGHTS, 279-81 (1956).
The McCarran Act, 66 Stat. 560 (1952), 43 U.S.C. § 666 (a) (1964)
provides that "Consent is hereby given to join the United States as
a defendant in any suit (1) for the adjudication of rights to the
use of water of a river system or other source, or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the United States is the
owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and
the United States is a necessary party to such suit. The United States,
when a party to any such suit, shall (1) be deemed to have waived
any right to plead that the State laws are inapplicable or that the
United States is not amenable thereto by reason of its sovereignty,
and (2) shall be subject to the judgments, orders, and decrees of
the court having jurisdiction, and may obtain review thereof, in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances: Provided, That no judgment for costs shall be
entered against the United States in any such suit." In connection
with the Act and problems of sovereign immunity generally, see Comment, Adjudication of Water Rights Claimed by the United StatesApplication of Common-Law Remedies and the McCarran Amendment of 1952, 48 CAIF. L. REv. 94 (1960); Byse, Proposed Reforms in
Federal "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review: Sovereign Immunity, Indispensable Parties, Mandamus, 75 HAZv. L. REv. 1479 (1962); Davis,
Suing the Government by Falsely Pretendingto Sue An Officer, 29 U.
CHi. L. REv. 435 (1962); Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers:
Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1963); Sperling & Cooney,
Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions, 1 LAND & WATER L. REv.
423, 426-34 (1966). 28 U.S.C. § § 1361 and 1391 (e) (1968) vest original
jurisdiction in the United States District Courts over actions in the
nature of mandamus to compel federal officials to perform their legal
duties, extends the range of service of process, and makes venue
requirements more liberal. See WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 22 (1963).
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because lawyers choose the wrong theory of liability.3 2 1 He states,

for instance, that a claim for relief based upon a taking may be
preferable to suing under the Federal Tort Claims Act 322 which
FED. R. Civ. P. 81 (b) abolishes the writ of mandamus in the district

courts and provides that the "relief heretofore available" by mandamus
may now be obtained by appropriate action or motion. 3A W. BARoN
& A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRAcTrcE AND PROCEDURE § 1692 (rules ed.
1958). For a discussion of suits seeking affirmative relief against the
government under the Venue and Mandamus Act, see Eyse and Fiocca,
Section 1361: the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review of FederalAdministrative Action, 81 HARv. L.
REv. 308 (1967); Town of East Haven v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 282 F.
Supp. 507 (D. Conn. 1968).
321 3 K. DAVIs, ADMVNISTRATiVE LAW 452 (1958).

322 Id. at 452-53. Professor Davis cites Thomas v. United States, 81 F.
Supp. 881 (W.D. Mo. 1949) as a "good example.' In the Thomas case,
plaintiffs brought suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act alleging
that the Corps of Engineers "carelessly and negligently planned and
caused to be installed the said revetment at such angle to the main
current of the Missouri River as to deflect and direct the flow of said
current against and upon lands of the plaintiffs. ... " This theory probably was used to avoid decisions denying recovery where erosion
results from a change in direction of stream flow. E.g., Franklin v.
United States, 101 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1939) af'd, 308 U.S.' 516 (1940).
Schwartz & Jacoby have written, "Query, too, decisions holding construction of navigation and hydrological improvements to be discretionary [under the Federal Tort Claims Act] and thus denying liability
for consequent flooding, e.g., Coates v. United States, 181 F.2d 816 (8th
Cir., 1950); California v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 341 (S.D. Cal.
1956); Cooley v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 385 (D.S.D. 1959); cf.
McGillic v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 565 (D.N.D., 1957). Compare the
not dissimilar cases under the Tucker Act..." D. ScHwARz & S. JACOBY,
GOVERNMVENT LITiGAT ON, CASES AND NOTES 427-28 (1963). Coates
later presented his demands in the Court of Claims, but failed to
prove a causal connection between his losses and installation of Govenment dikes. Coates v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 637 (Ct. CL 1950),
110 F. Supp. 471 (Ct. Cl. 1953).
As amended July 18, 1966, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2675 (a) of the Federal
Torts Claim Act provides: "An action shall not be instituted.., unless
the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate
Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the
agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail." Failure
of the agency to act within six months is deemed a final denial. A
claim must be filed with the agency within two years after it accrues
and any tort action must be brought within six months after final
denial of the administrative claim. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2401. One caveat is
that in the absence of newly discovered evidence an action cannot
be brought for a sum in excess of the amount of the claim presented to
the federal agency. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2675 (b). For the legislative history
of the act, PuB. L. No. 89-506, see 1966 U.S. Code Cong. and Administrative News 2515. Settlements by the Justice Department do not
need court approval under the new law; settlements by federal agencies in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Attorney Gen-
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overcoming such defenses as the "discretionary function
necessitates3' 23
exception.

In Dugan v. Rank,32 4 claimants of riparian and other water rights
along a river sued officials of the Bureau of Reclamation and the
Government to enjoin the storage and diversion of water at a dam
which was part of the Central Valley Project in California. Alternatively, the claimants sought to obtain a physical solution by
judicial decree of water rights to which they asserted superior
claims by virtue of state law. They did not, however, seek relief
as between claimants or the establishment of priorities as to appropriative and prescriptive rights. The Court found that no suit was
presented "for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a
river system or other source" within the meaning of the McCarran
amendment allowing suit against the United States. Because immunity of the Government is waived only when all parties claiming
from a common source are before the court at the same time to
adjudicate their rights against each other, 325 the litigation was
eral must receive his, or his designee's, approval if the amount exceeds

323

$25,000.00. An extensive bibliography of the Tort Claims Act covering
books and periodicals from 1946 to 1964 appears in Symposium on the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 24 FED. B. J. 206 (1964).
For an extensive discussion of authorities, refer to L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAiMS: ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REMEDIES,

c. 12 (1966). See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 42 (1953).

See also Dwyer, Responsibility of the Federal Government for Acts
of Its Officials, 11 RocKY MT. MINERAL LAW INSTITUTE 395 (1966);
James, The Federal Tort Claims Act and The "DiscretionaryFunction"
Exception: The Sluggish Retreat of an Ancient Immunity, 10 U. FLA.
L. REV. 184, (1957); Peck, The Federal Tort Claims Act: A Proposed
Construction of the Discretionary Function Exception, 31 WASH. L.
324

REV. 207 (1956); Note, 41 WASH. L. REv. 340 (1966); Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d
1016 (1965).
372 U.S. 609 (1963). For a discussion of the decision and of the sovereign immunity doctrine generally, see K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw ch. 27 (1965).

325

Nevada v. United States, 279 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1960); Miller v. Jennings, 243 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 827 (1957);
The McCarran Act, 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1964), is applicable to class actions.
Spanish Fork West Field Irr. Co. v. United States, 9 Utah 2d 428,
347 P.2d 184 (1959). A waiver of immunity under the McCarran Act
operates in suits brought in state courts and the United States cannot

remove to federal district court solely by virtue of the Act. In re
Green River Drainage Area, 147 F. Supp. 127 (D. Utah 1956).
See also In re Green River Adjudication v. United States, 17 Utah
2d 50, 404 P.2d 251 (1965) (Government's failure to claim specified
water rights is res judicata and prevents it from asserting rights
which might exist by virtue of withdrawing public lands under theory
of Federal Power Comm. v. Oregon (Pelton Dam case), 349 U.S.
435 (1955). 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 209 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
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viewed as a private suit between the plaintiff, the Government and
Government officials. In this situation, claimants were told that
their proper remedy was under the Tucker Act. 3 26 Further, it was
held that the sovereign immunity doctrine prohibits enjoining
officers of the United States from seizing private property if they

are acting within the scope of their statutory authority and the
actions are constitutional ones. The real basis of the decision, however, is that an injunction would have interfered with operation of
a large-scale project contrary to the intent and mandate of Congress.
Injunctive relief which would cause the Government to be
"stopped in its tracks" is rarely granted; 32 7 and in nearly every
case where a physical seizure of water rights results from the operation of a vast reclamation project, the practical procedure will be
to sue for damages under the Tucker Act.
Once the riparian owner commences court proceedings for a
money judgment under the Tucker Act,3 28 the Government again
326

See also Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627 (1963) and Hurley v.
Abbott, 259 F. Supp. 669 (D. Ariz. 1966). Whenever the United States
is an indispensable party and cannot be joined, an action must be
dismissed. Ogden River Water Users' Ass'n v. Weber Basin Water
Conservancy, 238 F.2d 936 (10th Cir. 1956); Franz v. East Columbia
Basin Irrig. Dist., 383 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1967) (United States indispensable party when withdrawal of lands from irrigation district
affects solvency of project and repayment of money invested in project by Government). Also see Turner v. Kings River Conservation Dist.,
360 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1966); City of Anadarko v. Caddo Elec. Co-op.,
258 F. Supp. 441 (W.D. Okla. 1966). 3 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE §
19.15 (2d ed. 1968); 2 W. BARRON & A. HoLTzoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE
("The United States was held

AN PRocEDuRE 141 (rules ed. 1961)

327

328

to be a necessary party to an action claiming water rights superior
to those of the United States and if the question should arise would
probably be held indispensable."). When a defendant's rights are
severable, such as those of a grazing lessee, then condemnation of the
defendant's interest is permissible without joining the United States
as an indispensable party where its interests will be unaffected. Monterey Co. Flood Control & W. Con. Dist. v. Hughes, 201 Cal. App.2d
197, 20 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1962).
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704
(1949); Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 621 (1963). See also Comment
Traps for the Unwary-The Problems in Seeking Injunctive or Monetary Relief From An Uncompensated Taking by the Federal Government, 46 NEB. L. REv. 816, 820-21 (1967). That a federal officer violates property rights or commits a tort under general law does not
necessarily mean he is acting beyond his powers. Gardner v. Harris,
391 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1968).
36 Stat. 1093, 1136 (1911), 28 U.S.C. § § 1346, 1491 (1964). A discussion
concerning procedure and the nature and jurisdiction of the Court
of Claims appears in 2 WEsT's FEDERAL PRACTICE MAuAL chs. 39 and
40 (Volz ed. 1960); a review of Tucker Act decisions appears in 6
NIcHoLs, supranote 2, at ch. 29.
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has a number of advantages. 3 29 Tucker Act cases are based upon
an implied contract or promise to pay which arises by reason of the
taking; and as illustrated in the later discussion of the decisions,
this has permitted the United States to make a number of technical
defenses based upon whether the elements of an implied contract
exist. The judicial trend, however, does not favor such defenses,
and as Justice Frankfurter has pointed out, it is really immaterial
whether the plaintiff's theory in a Tucker Act case rests upon an
implied promise of the Government or whether it rests upon a
taking under the fifth amendment which also invokes the Act. "In
either event," he said, "the claim traces back to the prohibition of
the Fifth Amendment .... -30
All actions under the Tucker Act are barred unless the petition
is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues, and
the rule is the same in both the district courts and in the Court of
Claims. 31 If a private litigant attempts to enjoin activities of
Governmental officials affecting his land, he must bring his action
in district court because the Court of Claims has jurisdiction only
to award damages, not give specific relief.3 2 By the time it has
329 For treatment of problems which arise in suing under the Tucker
Act, see Fitts and Marquis, Liability of the Federal Government and
Its Agents for Injuries to Real Property Resulting from River Improvements, 16 TENN. L. REv. 801 (1941); Morton, Some Real Property Aspects of Avigation, 35 NEB. L. REv. 277 (1956); Mandelkar,
Inverse Condemnation: The Constitutional Limits of Public Responsibility, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 3; Note, 50 YALE L.J. 668, 670-72 (1941).
See also D. ScHwARTz

AND

S.

JACOBY,

GovERNFFN

LiTIGATION,

CASES AND NOTES ch. II, § VII (1963). Joinder of individuals as defendants with the United States is not permitted in Tucker Act cases. See
3 J. MOORE,FEDERAL PRA mcE § 20.07 [3] (2d ed. 1968), and 2 id. § 1.05
(2d ed. 1968). The same theory is not necessarily applicable to suits
against the United States under the Tort Claims Act. Id.
330 United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748 (1947). See also Abend,
Federal Liability for Takings and Torts: An Anomalous Relationship, 31 FoRDucam L. REV. 481, 487-88 (1963); Marcus, The Taking
and Destruction of Property Under a Defense and War Program, 27
CORNELL L. Q. 476, 510-11 (1942); Cotton Land Co. v. United States, 75
F. Supp. 232, 234 (Ct. Cl. 1948) and cases cited. Further, it has been
pointed out that the defense that if the case were against a private
individual, his liability would be in tort and there is no tort remedy
against the United States may no longer be valid since passage of
the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946. Annot., 94 L. Ed. 1288, 1290
(1950).
331 28 U.S.C. 2501 (1964); 28 U.S.C. 2401 (1964).
332 Gaines v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 925 (Ct. Cl. 1955). See Glidden
Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 557 (1962). The court can exercise equitable jurisdiction only if it is ancillary or essential for awarding or
refusing a money judgment. For instance, it could reform a contract.
E.g., Sutcliffe Storage & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 112 F. Supp.
590 (Ct. Cl. 1953).
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finally been adjudicated that a claimant is not entitled to an equitable remedy from a federal district court, it may be too late then
to sue the Government in the Court of Claims for a monetary judgment. To correct this dilemma, explicit provisions should be made
for a plaintiff to present all his claims for relief in one court. 3 3 In
any event, Congress should either extend the limitation period or
provide that it is tolled during the time when a litigant is diligently
and in good faith pursuing a remedy for relief other than a money
judgment. To abolish the limitation period completely would tip
the present inequity the
other way and would not be a satisfactory
33 4
answer to the problem
There is also some difficulty in determining when the statute of
limitations begins to run. The Supreme Court has stated that the
period does not commence until the consequences "have so manifested themselves that a final account may be struck."3 35 "[W]hen
the government chooses not to condemn land but to bring about a
taking by a continuing process of physical events, the owner is not
required to resort either to piecemeal or to premature litigation to
ascertain the just compensation for what is really 'taken.' ,3" Despite such statements, the
matter frequently is a difficult one for
37
the practicing lawyer
J.

THE "RivER" CAsEs.

The preceding background of inverse condemnation is necessary
in understanding the numerous United States Supreme Court decisions in the "river" cases. These decisions, despite some inconsistent and confused reasoning appearing in the opinions, are important
precedents for determining what rights to what kinds of property
may be successfully asserted in seeking compensation for condemnation against the United States. In addition, the Supreme
833 See 28 U.S.C. § 1500 (1964). See generally, Schwartz, Section 1500 of
the Judicial Code and Duplicate Suits Against the Government and
Its Agents, 55 GEO. L. J. 573-74 (1967).
334 For a discussion of proposed legislation, see Morreale, Federal-State
Confticts Over Western Waters-A Decade of Attempted "Clarifying
Legislation," 20 RTGzEns L. REv. 423, 503-504, 508-509 (1966). Hearings
on S. 1275 Before the Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation
of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. 123-26 (1964).
335 United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 749 (1947).

336 Id. See also Pittle, Suits Against the United States for Taking Prop-

erty Without Just Compensation, 55 GEO. L. J. 631, 640-42 (1967).

337

E.g., Konecny v. United States, 388 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1967)

(fluctua-

tion of lake level because of government dam); Boardiman v. United
States, 376 F.2d 895 (Ct. CL 1967)

(aircraft overflights).
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Court cases are persuasive authority in state courts. 338 It is in this
or Cress line of decisions is of
context that the so-called Pumpelly
339
great interest and importance.

In Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.,340 decided in 1871, the defendant

acting under state authority, built a dam across the Fox River
which was an outlet of Lake Winnebago in Wisconsin. This caused
the lake waters to rise and completely inundate plaintiff's land. No
formal act of condemnation took place, and, when sued, the de-

fendant asserted that the damages were a merely consequential
result of the government's legitimate attempt to improve navigation
and no compensation was due.
The United States Supreme Court held that the flooding of a
riparian's land above the "ordinary level" of a watercourse constitutes a compensable taking, and Mr. Justice Miller answered
defendant's arguments in a paragraph which has been quoted extensively in later opinions:
It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if in con-

struing a provision of constitutional law, always understood to

have been adopted for protection and security to the rights of the
individual as against the government, and which has received the

commendation of jurists, statesmen, and commentators as placing

the just principles of the common law on that subject beyond the

power of ordinary legislation to change or control them, it shall be
held that if the government refrains from the absolute conversion
of real property to the uses of the public it can destroy its value
entirely, can inflict irreparable and permanent injury to any extent,
can, in effect, subject it to total destruction without making any
compensation, because, in the narrowest sense of that word, it is
not taken for the public use. Such a construction would pervert

the constitutional provision into a restriction upon the rights of
the citizen, as those rights stood at the common law, instead of
government, and make it an authority for invasion of private
right under the pretext of the public good,34 which had no warrant
in the laws or practices of our ancestors. 1
This construction recognizes that a taking may occur when loss
results to the owner even though the taker receives no property,
but the opinion is limited to those situations "where real estate is
actually invaded by superinduced additions of water, earth, sand,
338

E.g., Brazos River Auth. v. City of Graham, 163 Tex. 167, 215, 354

339

S.W.2d 99, 130 (1961).
See Annot., 89 L.Ed. 1114 (1945); Annot., 94 L.Ed 1288 (1949) (Compensability of damage resulting from government's exercise of its

340
341

power to improve navigation). A list of related A.L.R., L.R.A. and
L.Ed annotations may be found id. at 1278.
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
Id. at 177.
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or other material, or by having any artificial structure placed on it,
3
so as to effectually destroy or impair its usefulness." 4
Forty-two years later, in United States v. Lynah,343 the federal
government constructed a dam causing waters of a navigable stream
to rise above natural level, back up against plaintiff's enbankment,
and overflow. As a result, plaintiff's rice fields, a large part of which
were located between high water and low water mark, became an
irreclaimable bog. Even though the dam was built to improve
navigation, the Court held an implied promise to pay by the United
States existed within the meaning of the Tucker Act and decided
further that after the compensation was paid, title to the fee and to
riparian rights would pass to the Government.
The dissenting judges found the damage resulted because plaintiff no longer had drainage into the river which was merely consequential to the Government activity and not compensable. They
reasoned that an alleged overflow could be stopped by raising the
plaintiff's embankment; and once this was done, a subsequent contention that the land was worthless would constitute an admission
that the damage resulted from the inability
to drain the property
44
which would not be a direct taking.
The Lynah doctrine permitting recovery on the theory of an
implied contract to pay for the damage under the Tucker Act was
limited in Horstman v. Unit'd States. 45 In Horstman the United
States had constructed an irrigation project a considerable distance
from plaintiff's property which caused an unexpected nineteen foot
rise in the levels of Soda Lakes destroying their value and the value
of plaintiff's works.3 46 Damage to one lake was 35,000 dollars; to the
other 170,000 dollars. Relief was denied in the Supreme Court be842

343

344

Id. at 181. See Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain,
41 YALE L. J. 221, 233 (1931). A great number of cases hold that permanent flooding of land by a dam is a taking. 26 Am. Jun. 2d Eminent
Domain 838 n. 15 (1966).
188 U.S. 445 (1903). Doubt was expressed concerning whether the
damage was caused by overflowing or blockage of drainage but the
court below had found damage resulted both from seepage through
the embankment and overflow above it.
Id. at 484. The majority had distinguished Mills v. United States,
46 Fed. 738 (S.D. Ga. 1891) in which Mdills' rice plantation had been
damaged from the same improvement as in the principal case. The distinction was on the ground that in the Mills case the damage arose from

the blockage of drainage rather than from overflowing, and the
injury was a consequential one which could be remedied for $10,000.
345

346

257 U.S. 138 (1921).

The Court assumed a causal connection between the government's
work and the damage to plaintiff. Id. at 145.
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cause the injuries were unforeseeable. Thus the necessary 34implied
7
intent to pay on the Government's part was not established.
3 48
Proof of an actual intention to take property is unnecessary,
however, and an implied intention may be shown from the fact that
the natural consequences of a government activity would be to take
349
dominion.

In United States v. Cress,350 the United States built dams and

locks to aid navigation in the Cumberland and Kentucky rivers and
thereby backed water into non-navigable tributaries. Several cases
involving damages from the projects were tried together. In one,
347

Cf. Cotton Land Co. v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 232 (Ct. Cl. 1948) in
which recovery was permitted when a government dam caused the

Colorado River to lose velocity and thus increased siltation. The subsequent rise in elevation of the river bed resulted in the overflowing
and backing up of water onto plaintiff's lands. The court considered
whether the damages were remote, i.e., unpredictable and lacking

causal relationship, and decided they were not. It has been stated
that under Supreme Court decisions the damage in Cotton Land Co.
would appear to be "consequential." See Mandelker, Inverse Condemnation: The ConstitutionalLimits of Public Responsibility, 1966 WIs.
L. REV. 3, 42 n. 125. An advance engineering study in Cotton Land

Co. would have shown the danger and this caused the court to

reject the Government's argument that the injuries were consequential and remote. In Albers v. County of Los Angeles, 62 Cal.2d
250, 398 P.2d 129, 42 Cal Rptr. 89 (1965), 17 STAN. L. REv. 763 (1965),
13 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 871 (1966), a survey failed to disclose a hidden
geologic condition and thereafter road construction by the county
caused a landslide. An inverse condemnation judgment for $5,360,000
was upheld by the California Supreme Court which said a plaintiff
need only show that the damage proximately resulted from the construction of a public work deliberately planned and carried out by
a public agency. It is not necessary that the damage be foreseeable nor
does there need to be a finding of intentional or negligent acts. In
Brazos River Auth. v. City of Graham, 163 Tex. 167, 354 S.W.2d 99
(1961) construction of a dam caused a diminished speed of flow causing foreseeable siltation which in turn raised the water level and
resulted in a taking by flooding of a city's sewage disposal plant. See
also Jacobs v. United States, 45 F.2d 34, 38 (5th Cir. 1930) (the "government anticipated that the construction of the dam mentioned
would cause flowage damage to lands located above it," and it had
attempted to obtain a flowage easement from the plaintiff).
348 Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327
(1922).
349 B Amusement Co. v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 386 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
See also Tempel v. United States, 248 U.S. 121 (1918); Columbia Basin
Orchard v. United States, 132 F. Supp. 707 (Ct. Cl. 1955); California v.
United States, 151 F. Supp. 570 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
350 243 U.S. 316 (1917); Jacobs v. United States, 45 F.2d 34 (5th Cir.
1930) (land more subject to overflows after construction of dam).
Cf. Jackson v. United States, 230 U.S. 1 (1913).
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plaintiff's normally uninvaded lands were permanently subjected
to frequent overflows. The Government argued there was no taking
because the property was depreciated only one-half of its value. 51
The Court held complete destruction need not be shown and found
the United States liable for damages in exchange for an easement
to subject the land to intermittent but inevitably recurring flooding.
In the opinion, Mr. Justice Pitney said: "[I]t is the character of the
invasion, not the amount of damage resulting from it, so long as
the damage is substantial, that determines whether it is a taking.8 35 2
In the second case, the Kelly Appeal (No. 718), the head of
water necessary to operate plaintiff's mill was destroyed by the rise
in the natural level of the non-navigable tributary. The Supreme
Court permitted recovery for the depreciation in value of plaintiffs
mill property finding that Congressional control over navigation
does not of necessity include control of non-navigable tributaries
and the right to raise the water level in them.
In United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R. R., 3 s the United
States raised the level of the Mississippi River in aid of navigation
and damaged the defendant's tracks located between high and low
water marks. Under state law a riparian owned the soil to ordinary
low water mark. The Government claimed no compensation was
payable for property within the river bed between high water marks
since such areas are subject to the servitude; the railroad contended
that since its structures did not either obstruct or adversely affect
navigation, the servitude doctrine in favor of navigation was inapplicable. The Supreme Court held the entire bed of a navigable
watercourse between its ordinary high-water marks is subject to the
dominant power of Congress and that any structure placed in the
bed is subject to the risk of injury or destruction without compensation. The absence of physical interference with navigation was
deemed immaterial to the right of compensation.
The case was remanded to determine the railroad's claim that
part of its property was located above high water mark, and that a
part abutted on a non-navigable tributary rather than upon the
navigable Mississippi. By remanding for determination of these
questions, the Supreme Court effectively held that the navigational
351

352
353

United States v. Cress., 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917). Cf. Christman v.
United States, 74 F.2d 112 (7th Cir. 1934). When flooding is temporary,
Goodman v. United States, 113 F.2d 914 (8th Cir. 1940) or intermittent,
Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146 (1924), compensation has
often been denied. See also Brazos River Auth. v. City, of Graham,
163 Tex. 167, 220, 354 S.W.2d 99, 134 (1961).
243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917).
312 U.S. 592 (1941).
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servitude does not extend to land beyond the bed of a navigable
river. The decision expressly overrules Lynah354 which permitted
recovery for plaintiff's property located between low and high
water marks on a navigable river. The Cress decision and United
States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R. R. established that no compensation is due for "takings" in aid of navigation below the natural
high water level of navigable watercourses, but compensation is
required for takings in non-navigable streams and for fast lands.
In Franklinv. United States,355 a leading case decided in 1939 by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the Government had constructed dikes under the Mississippi River Flood
Control Act a short distance above and opposite plaintiff's land.
The river current which previously had been away from the property was deflected toward it at almost a right angle which caused
all but a few acres to be washed away within less than a year. Thus,
at the time of suit, the land which previously had been useful at all
times for farming was now the bed of the river. After the Government demurrer to plaintiff's complaint was sustained by the district
court, the plaintiffs appealed to the circuit court of appeals which
held no "taking" occurs when an artificial change in the natural
course of a stream by the United States results in the washing away
of riparian lands. In its opinion, the court reasons that the government dikes "at no point touch upon appellants' land," 5 6 and in the
absence of a physical invasion such damage is only consequential.
This test of consequential damages is frequently used to distinguish the "flooding" from the "erosion" decisions. In a 1957 case,
Latourette v. United States,157 construction and maintenance of a
rock jetty prevented sand from accreting as it had in the past. As a
result, there was no equalization for normal winter erosion and
ultimately the ocean washed plaintiff's land away. In holding that
the Government is not liable to compensate riparian owners for
consequential damages caused by improvements upon navigable
waterways in aid of navigation, the court said:
354
355

356
357

United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903).
101 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1939), af'd, 308 U.S. 516 (1940), noted in 52
HARv.L. REv. 1176 (1939); 24 IowA L. Rrv. 779 (1939); 18 N.C.L. REV.
43 (1939); 25 VA. L. REv. 854 (1939).
101 F.2d at 461.
150 F. Supp. 123, 125 (D. Ore. 1957). See also Miramar Co. v. City of
Santa Barbara, 23 Cal.2d 170, 143 P.2d 1 (1943) (compensation denied

when breakwater erected by city in aid of navigation caused water
to flow so as to erode beach of littoral proprietor); Camp Far West
Irr. Dist. v. United States, 68 F. Supp. 908 (Ct. Cl. 1946), noted in 31
MARQ. L. REV. 175 (1947)
(no taking when Government removed
gravel from stream bed near small irrigation dam making diversion
of water impossible).
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The term "consequential damages" as used herein is deemed to
mean damages to property not actually taken (emphasis ours) but
an injury to property that occurs as a natural result of an act lawfully done by another and for which no liability exists. The term
"consequential damages" is sometimes taken to mean damages
which would not have been actionable in common law if done by a
private individual. 29 C.J.S., Eminent Domain, § 111, p. 919, and
notes therein.
When erosion results directly from flooding, rather than from a
change in the direction of stream flow, however, the damage is not
merely consequential and a compensable taking occurs. In United
States v. Dickinson,35 the Court awarded damages for the value of
an easement to permanently flood plaintiff's lands and also awarded
severance damages for erosion based on the cost of protective
measures which the landowners might have taken to prevent the
loss. In the opinion, Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, said
that if the Government cannot take the acreage it wants without
also washing away more, that additional property becomes part of
the taking.859 Even in flooding situations, compensation is denied
when the damage arises from levees constructed on the opposite
side of a watercourse from the overflowed property8 60 unless the
water level is raised so high that an injured party cannot take
moderate measures to protect himsel. 61 Where property is in a
flood zone and has overflowed in the past, many decisions deny
recovery on the ground the injury would have taken place in any
event, 62 and a plaintiff usually cannot show a sufficient causal con358 331 U.S. 745 (1947).
359 Id. at 750.
360 Jackson v. United States, 230 U.S. 1 (1913) (all riparians, including the United States, may build levees to protect themselves from
major floods without incurring liability to others). In Salliotte v. King
Bridge Co., 122 Fed. 378, 384 (6th Cir. 1903), cert. denied, 191 U.S. 569
(1903), the court indicated plaintiff might have guarded against
damage resulting from an increase in the volume and force of the
water due to construction by defendant.
31 See Sponenbarger v. United States, 101 F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 1939),
rev'd, 308 U.S. 256 (1939), where plaintiff claimed she was deprived of
the right to protect her property and the value of her lands, located
within a floodway established pursuant to a comprehensive federal
flood control plan. Levees opposite the property had been raised while
those on plaintiff's side had been left at their previous height. In
reversing, the Supreme Court said plaintiff's right of self defense had
not been taken away.
862 Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271 (1939) (retention of water
from unusual floods for somewhat longer period or increase in depth
or destructiveness by reason of set-back levee is not a taking); Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146 (1924); Coleman v. United
States, 181 Fed. 599 (C.C.N.D. Ala. 1910).
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nection between the Government's activity and his harm to allow
recovery. 3 3
Diversion of water from a channel which washes away property
by erosion arguably constitutes as much of an invasion as taking by
submersion. Both are direct encroachments although the foreseeability of damage probably is greater in the flooding situations.
When the Government plans a dam project, it can determine the
total amount of land which will be permanently flooded in order to
maintain a particular water level. Property which will be subjected
to intermittent but recurring flooding as in the Cress case s " also
can be forecast. In the former situation, the fair market value of
the land to be permanently flooded is the estimated cost of acquiring
the fee title; in the Cress situation, the sum necessary to obtain
flowage easements is the calculable acquisition expenditure. 865
Because damage is much less predictable, some courts and
writers have thought that imposition of liability for injuries other
than permanent backwater flooding is undesirable.866 They reason
that, unless damages can be anticipated quite accurately, the ultimate cost of river improvements will be unpredictable and thereby
operate as a practical prohibition of improvements on navigable
streams.3 67 Withholding compensation on a policy argument against
burdening public improvements with unpredictable costs, however,
results in the distorted concept that damage resulting from deflection of the current is "consequential".368 The plaintiffs in the
363

364
365

Yazel v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 1000, 1004 (Ct. Cl. 1950);
Christman v. United States, 74 F.2d 112 (7th Cir. 1934). See also
Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S. 217 (1904); W. A. Ross Const. Co.
v. Yearsley, 103 F.2d 589, 593 (8th Cir. 1939), af'd, 309 U.S. 18 (1940);
Coates v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 471 (Ct. Cl. 1953).
United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
See Saxon, Appraising Flowage Easements, in CONDEMNATION As'PpaISAL PRACTICE

366

3867

368

363 (1961); Boettcher, Appraisal of a Flowage Ease-

ment, in id. at 374; United States v. Easement, 284 F. Supp. 71, 73
(W. D. Ky. 1968).
In John Horstmann Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 138 (1921) the
Supreme Court denied recovery on the ground that the damages
were unpredictable and that to hold the Government liable for unforeseeable injuries would deter useful enterprises due to the factor of
immeasurable liability.
Fitts and Marquis, Liability of the FederalGovernment and Its Agents
For Injuries to Real Property Resulting from River Improvements, 16
TENN. L. REv. 801, 826 (1941). Coleman v. United States, 181 Fed.
599, 604 (C.C.N.D. Ala. 1910). But see Brazos River Auth. v. City of
Graham, 163 Tex. 167, 176, 354 S.W.2d 99, 105 (1961).
For divergent state decisions see 2 NICHOLS, supra note 2, at 244-45.

In Alexander v. City of Milwaukee, 16 Wis. 264 (1892), no recovery
was granted when a large portion of plaintiff's land washed away
after the city has cut through a strip of land which previously gave
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Franklincase clearly should have recovered for the washing away
of their land. The Government's activities were the proximate and
sole cause of the erosion. It was direct. It was substantial. To withhold compensation under such circumstances shifts the burden of
public improvements to individuals and violates the mandate of the
fifth amendment. If owners of flooded property are entitled to be
compensated, there can be no valid reason why loss of land resulting
from submersion due to erosion should go uncompensated. Damaged individuals are entitled to the reasonable cost of whatever
protection is made necessary by the Government's works3 69 If
public undertakings change the physical situation so extensively
that erection of levees, sea walls and piles are ineffective and no
other means of self-protection exist, then full compensation should
be given for all takings which are proven within the proximity of
time and space.3 70 To achieve a proper perspective between private
rights and the rights of people as a whole, the rule should be formulated to give recovery in the greatest number of cases where direct
injuries are the outcome of public works.
Under the Cress371 doctrine, compensation is required for loss of
a power head when the United States causes the level of water in a
non-navigable tributary to rise. Is the result different when the
loss of a power head results from a rise in the natural level of a
navigable
watercourse? In United States v. Willow River Power
Co., 72 plaintiff operated a dam and hydro-electric plant on the nonnavigable Willow River close to its junction with the St. Croix
river, a navigable stream. Tail waters flowed off unobstructed until
the United States by means of a dam on the Mississippi River raised
the level of the St. Croix. This reduced the operating head three
feet, using ordinary high-water as the standard, and decreased the
capacity of the plant to produce electric energy. No fast lands, i.e.,
lands to be flooded by backwater from the dam, were involved. The
only difference between Cress and Willow River Power Co. was the
protection from Lake Michigan waves. It is doubtful the case would
be followed in Wisconsin. See Arimond v. Green Bay & Mississippi
Canal Co., 31 Wis. 316, 335 (1872); Pettigrew v. Evansville, 25 Wis.
223, 3 Am. Rep. 50 (1870). See also Albers v. County of Los Angeles,
62 Ca.2d 250, 398 P.2d 129, 42 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1965).
369 United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947).
370 See 52 HARv. L. Rv. 1176 (1939).
371 United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
372 324 U.S. 499 (1945), noted in 45 COLUM. L. Rv. 792 (1945). The
reasoning of United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co.,
229 U.S. 53 (1913), that a shore owner has no right in two natural
levels of water or to use of the natural difference between as a head
for power production was followed.
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distance from the navigable stream.3 73 The Willow River Power
Company dam was at the confluence and because of its location
kept water from backing into the non-navigable tributary. In Cress
water backed a short distance up the non-navigable watercourse to
where plaintiff's mill was situated.
The Supreme Court denied compensation to the Willow River
Power Company on the theory that riparian owners on navigable
streams have no right which the Government has to pay for when
it alters the flow; and the company could not improve its claim as
a riparian on the navigable St. Croix by alleging to be riparian to
the non-navigable Willow River so as to come within the holding of
the Cress case. The Court reasoned that the Government had not
interfered with the natural flow of the Willow past the company's
lands and the company's only interest in the level of the navigable
St. Croix arose from its riparian status thereon. Thus, it was not
helped by the fact that its only utilization of riparian lands on the
St. Croix involved "conducting over them at artificial levels waters
from the Willow."374
It is difficult to reasonably explain why a property right exists
in the level of water on a non-navigable stream but not in the level
of a navigable one, and the case appears to seriously weaken the
decision in Cress.3 7 5 The Court recognized that the petitioner in
Willow River Power Co. had an economic interest in keeping the
navigable St. Croix at its natural level, but Justice Jackson utilized
the concept of "no property-no right-no compensation" when he
said:
...[A] head of water has value and... the Company has an economic interest in keeping the St. Croix at the lower level. But not
all economic interests are "property rights"; only those economic
advantages are "rights" which have the law back of them, and
only when they are so recognized may courts compel others to
forbear 376
from interfering with them or to compensate for their
invasion.
373 Justice Roberts stated in his dissenting opinion that he could not see
any real difference between the decisions and that Cress was "disregarded or overuled." 324 U.S. at 514. The majority in the Willow
River Power Co. case attempted to distinguish Cress on the ground
that the Government there was charged with the consequences of
changing the level of a non-navigable stream while in Willow River
Power Co. it was sought to be charged with the consequences of
changing the level of a navigable one.
374 324 U.S. at 504.
375 In United States v. 531.13 Acres of Land, 366 F.2d 915, 922 (4th Cir.
1966), the court stated ... Cress on the Kelly appeal has been so
severely pared as a precedent on the present point that we do not
feel justified in allowing it to prevail here. Its scope was sharply
straitened by United States v. Willow River Power Co...."
376 324 U.S. at 502.
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Before the Supreme Court's 1950 decision in United States v.
Kansas City Life Insurance Co.,377 it was assumed that there had
been an abandonment of the Cress doctrine 378 which held the servitude does not extend to non-navigable tributaries. 3 79 In the Kansas
City case, the plaintiff owned a farm located one and one-half miles
from the Mississippi River on a non-navigable tributary creek. The
land was several feet above the normal level of the creek, and
surface as well as underground waters drained into it. After the
United States began operation of a dam on the Mississippi so as to
back up waters and cause them to remain constantly at ordinary
high-water mark, drainage of both surface and subsurface waters
was blocked and the water table was raised sufficiently to soak the
land and destroy its value for agriculture.
The Court held in a 5-4 decision, that the navigation servitude
does not extend to land located beyond the bed of a navigable river
because owners on non-navigable tributaries, unlike riparians on
navigable streams, never had notice their property could be taken
without compensation. The decision therefore limits the servitude
to ordinary high water mark on navigable waterways and makes
the Government liable for damages on non-navigable tributaries
when it exercises its power to raise the level in navigable streams.38 0
Justice Douglas protested that when the Government properly
exercises its servitude by lawfully raising the water level in navigable streams, then it should be freed from liability for all damages
which result. Further, he found it incongruous to deny compensation to owners adjacent to navigable streams and require it for those
bordering on the tributaries when they sustain like injuries from
what is the lawful act of raising the level of a river to high water
mark.
The decision finds underflowing similar to flooding and broadens
the definition of taking to include subterranean flood damage; but
it fails to clarify the circumstances under which recovery will be
permitted for blocking drainage. In writing the Court's opinion,
Justice Burton pointed out that, "The destruction of land value,
without some actual invasion of the land and solely by preventing
377

339 U.S. 799 (1950).

379 United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
379

380

See Justice Douglas dissenting in United States v. Kansas City Life
Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 812 (1950). See also Frank, The United States
Supreme Court: 1949-50, 18 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 15-18 (1950).
The result is different when the Government exercises its control
over non-navigable watercourses as part of a comprehensive flood
protection program. See United States v. 531.13 Acres of Land, 366
F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1966); United States v. Grand River Dam Authority,
363 U.S. 229 (1960).
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the escape of its own surface water, is not before us."38
' 1 He then
added that if a right of drainage existed by virtue of state law,
liability might be imposed upon the Government. If this view were
to prevail, the extent of liability would be made dependent for the
first time upon rights created by state law.
In North v. United States,38 2 the claimant alleged his basement
flooded because the high water level of a Bureau of Reclamation
reservoir interfered with the natural flow of ground waters from
his property. Admittedly no water from the reservoir backed upon
claimant's lands and none reached his property through underground percolation. Therefore, because the actual reservoir water
did not come within 500 feet of the land at any time, the court
distinguished the situation from that which had taken place in the
Kansas City Life Insurance Co. case. No government waters had
mingled with other waters to invade the land, and the court concluded no direct encroachment had occurred. In any event the
Court noted that United States v. Kansas City Life Insurance Co.
was a five to four decision in which "the logic of the dissenting
judges is more persuasive than the reasoning of the main de383
cision."
K.

PROBLEMS OF VALUATION.

Many complex problems arise in attempting to define and
measure just compensation, 384 and opinions differ over the methods
to be used in establishing the value of the property taken. 85 The
matter may be regarded from the viewpoint of value to the taker,
value to the owner, or value in the market; 83 6 but almost universally
the accepted formula is the fair market value of the property at the

381 339 U.S. at 810.
382 94 F. Supp. 824 (D. Utah 1950).

383 Id. at 828.
384 See generally ORGEL, supra note 106. McCormick, The Measure of
Compensation in Eminent Domain, 17 MINN. L. REV. 461 (1933). For
citations to recent law review articles on payment of compensation
for the taking of privately owned damsites, see Comment, 14 STAN. L.
REv. 800 n. 4 (1962).
385 Annot., 106 A.L.R. 955 (1937) (Measure and Items of Compensation
for Damages for Flooding Property Under the Right of Eminent Domain). When government witnesses testify to the value of an easement with and without the burden, condemnee's witnesses cannot be
compelled to adopt that evaluation method rather than their own
method of giving opinions concerning damages to the entire tract.
See United States v. Brumfield, 354 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1966).
386 1 ORGEL, supra note 106, at § § 12-15.
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time of the taking. 87 Potential utilization of the property by the
owner is a relevant factor, but no special value to the condemnor
may be made a part of the award. 388 Of course, no piece of property,
especially if it is mineral land, has a definite, specific value and some
degree of speculation is inherent in all valuation.389 Therefore the
final award of just compensation in the majority of cases is determined by choosing a figure somewhere between conflicting appraisals by expert witnesses of what is fair market value.390
387

E.g., Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246 (1934); United States v.
Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913); BrooksScanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U.S. 106 (1924); United States v.
Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1934); Iriarte v. United States, 157 F.2d 105
(1st Cir. 1946). See 2 Ln. s, supra note 91, at 1174. Where a public
condemnee has a legal duty or one arising from necessity to replace
a condemned facility, then under the "substitute facilities" doctrine it
is entitled to the cost of constructing a functionally equivalent substitute regardless of whether the cost is more or less than the market

value of the facility taken. United States v. Certain Property in
Borough of Manhattan, 403 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1968). See also Pennsylvania Gas & Water Co. v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 428 Pa.
74, 236 A.2d 112 (1967) (water company entitled to either repair or
replacement value of condemned reservoir site); Note, Just Compensation and the Public Condemnee, 75 YALE L. J. 1053 (1966). For
criteria when no market can be established, see United States v.
Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Nay. Co., 338 U.S. 396 (1949); Port Auth.
Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Hudson R. T. Corp., 20 N.Y.2d 457, 285 N.Y.S.2d
24, 231 N.E.2d 734 (1967).
388 United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53
(1913); Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949). See
Hale, Value to the Taker in Condemnation Cases, 31 COLmV. L. REV. 1
(1931).
389 United States v. 180.37 Acres of Land, 254 F. Supp. 678 (W.D. Va.
1966); United States v. 64.10 Acres of Land, 362 F.2d 660, 668 (3d Cir.
1966).
390 See United States v. 244.48 Acres of Land, 251 F. Supp. 871, 874 (W.D.
Pa. 1966) and 1 J. BoNBRiGnT, VALUATON OF PnoPrERY 426-27 (1937).
As is well known, many other types of evidence such as location,
nearby sales, offers, earning capacity, cost, reproduction value, use
value, rents, etc. are used. See C. HAAR, LAN-Us. PLANNING 485-88
(1959); Note, Valuation Evidence in California Condemnation Cases,
12 STAiN. L. Rv. 766 (1960); Sengstock & McAuliffe, What Is the Price
of Eminent Domain? An Introduction to the Problems of Valuation
in Eminent Domain Proceedings, 44 J. URBAN L. 185 (1966) (this
article discusses value, market data, capitalization of income, and
reproduction or replacement costs. The authorities cited are extensive). For an interesting chart showing computations of flooding by
acre-days, see Clemones v. Alabama Power Co., 250 F. Supp. 433,
437 (N.D. Ga. 1966). The competency of expert witnesses testifying
about valuations in eminent domain proceedings in a federal court is
governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 43 (a). United States v. 60.14 Acres of
Land, 362 F.2d 660 (3d Cir. 1966).
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L. MVmimR RULE-DATE OF CownvmuNT.
Large public works such as reclamation projects involve not only
the damsite but often hundreds of thousands of acres of land, and
it is commonplace that rumors concerning proposed plans and
contemplations of need lead to widespread speculation and inflated
prices.3 91 To protect the government from paying for the increased
92
value resulting from its own activities, the so-called Miller rule,
formulated in connection with litigation involving the Central
Valley Project in California, specifies that if property is "probably
within" the scope of a project from the time the government is
committed to the undertaking, even though ultimately it might not
be taken, any increase in value due to the project is excluded.
In United States v. Miller, a railroad had to be relocated in
connection with construction of the Shasta Dam in California. Because of the project, a boomtown developed on what formerly had
been low-grade agricultural land; and when the United States
condemned a portion of this boomtown property in December of
1938 for the railway relocation, the owners sought to establish their
land values by using sales of comparable land near that date. These
sales would, of course, have included the enhanced boomtown valuations. The Supreme Court said property is to be valued as of the
date of taking as a general rule but in certain situations another
date should be used if necessary to exclude increments due to
initiation of a project. The Court therefore held that valuation on
the date of Congressional commitment to the project, rather than
valuation at the time of the taking, was proper.
If a distinct tract is condemned, in whole or in part, other lands
in the neighborhood may increase in market value due to the
proximity of the public improvement erected on the land taken.
Should the Government, at a later date, determine to take these
A recent addition to the rules of the Court of Claims in New
York sets forth an elaborate procedure for filing and exchanging
appraisals. N.Y. COURT OF CLAnIS RULE 25a (McKinney Supp. 1967).
For the proposed federal rule concerning discovery of facts known
and opinions held by experts, see COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE OF TEE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AVIENDMENTS To RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS RELATING TO

DEPOSITION AND DISCOVERY, RULE 26 (b) (4) (Nov. 1967). The proposal

is discussed in 68 COLUm. L. REV. 271, 280-83 (1968).

391 1

J. BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 414-15

(1937).

392 United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943). For a discussion of the
Miller rule, see Glaves, Date of Valuation in Eminent Domain: Irreverence for Unconstitutional Practice, 30 U. Cm. L. REV. 319, 347-52
(1963); 1 ORGEL, supra note 106, at 429-30. The Miller rule is generally followed in the state courts. Annot., 147 A.L.R. 66 (1943).
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other lands, it must pay their market value as enhanced by this
factor of proximity. If, however, the public project from the beginning included the taking of certain tracts but only one of them is
taken in the first instance, the owner of hte other tracts should not
be allowed an increased value for his lands which are ultimately
to be taken any more than the owner of the tract first condemned
is entitled to be allowed an increased market value because adjacent lands not immediately taken increased in value due to the
projected improvement.
The question then is whether the respondents' lands were probably within the scope of the project from the time the Government
was committed to it. If they were not, but were merely adjacent
lands, the subsequent enlargement of the project to include them
ought not to deprive the respondents of the value added in the
meantime by the proximity of the improvement. If, on the other
hand, they were, the Government ought not to pay any increase
in value arising from the known fact that the lands probably would
be condemned. The owners ought not to gain by speculating on
probable increase in value due to the Government's activities.
In which category do the lands in question fall? The project,
from the date of its final and definite authorization in August 1937,
included the relocation of the railroad right-of-way, and one probable route was marked out over the respondents' lands. This being
so, it was proper to tell the jury that the respondents were entitled
to no increase in value arising after August 1937 because of the
likelihood of the taking of their property. If their lands were probably to be taken for public use, in order to complete the project in
its entirety, any increase in value due to that fact could only arise
from speculation by them, or by possible purchasers from them,
as to what the Government would be compelled to pay as compensation.... If, in the instant case, the respondents' lands were,
at the date of the authorizing Act, clearly within the confines of
the project, the respondents were entitled to no enhancement in
value due to the fact that their lands would be taken. If they were
within the area where they were likely to be taken for the project,
but might not be, the owners were not entitled, if they were ultimately taken, to an increment of value calculated on the theory
that if they had not been taken they would have been more valuable by reason of their proximity to the land taken. In so charging
the jury the trial court was correct.393
\

393 317 U.S. at 376-77, 379. The Miller rule is not inapplicable because
the property ultimately will be controlled or used by a local entity
or by private interests. United States v. First Pyramid Life Ins. Co.,
382 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1967). It has been suggested that "The scope
of the project rule should be replaced by a rule which requires that
the government, under sanction of having to pay enhanced value for
after-acquired land, condemn all the property it needs at the outset
of the project." Note, 39 So. CALiF. L. REv. 323, 328 (1966). Glaves,
Date of Valuation in Eminent Domain:Irreverence for Unconstitutional
Practice, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 319, 328 (1963), also argues for an earlier
valuation date.
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Thus decisions made after the government is "committed" cannot94
affect market value for purposes of calculating just compensation.
If plans for a dam and reservoir do not include a tract which the
government subsequently finds it necessary to take, then any increased value arising from proximity to the reservoir must be paid
because this later acquisition is outside the scope of the original
undertaking. 95
The Miller case involved enhancement in the market value of the
condemned property. Frequently, however, large federal works
cause values to become depressed as the threat of condemnation
drives buyers from the market.396 The Supreme Court's 1961 decision in United States v. Virginia Electric & Power Co. had a significant effect on just compensation because it applied the Miller
principle to protect property owners from decreases in value as a
result of a project. The Court said:
The value of the easement must be neither enhanced nor diminished by the special need which the Government had for it. United

States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332-334; United States v. Miller, 317

U.S. 369; Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 261; United States v.
Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 76. The court
must exclude any depreciation in value caused by the prospective
taking once the Government "was committed" to the project.

United States v. Miller, supra,at 376-377; see United States v. Cors,
supra, at 332. Accordingly, the impact of that event upon the likeli-

394 See Redevelopment Agency of City of Santa Monica v. Zwerman, 49

Cal. Rptr. 443 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
395 United States v. 244.48 Acres of Land, 251 F. Supp. 871 (W.D. Pa.
1966).
896 Rumors or announcements that particular property will be taken for
a project, or preliminary action by officials, normally will eliminate
buyers from the market; but in some situations there is speculation
either on what the Government will pay or on the possibility the
land will not be taken but will be near enough to a project to receive
benefits that raise valuations. See STAFF OF SELECT SUBCOMM. ON REAL
PiROPERTY AcQuisTIoN, HOUSE COMM. OF PUBLIC WORKS, 88th Cong. 2d
Sess., STUDY OF COMPENSATION AND ASSISTANCE FOR PERSONS AFFECTED
BY REAL PROPERTY ACQUISITION IN FEDERAL AND FEDERALLY ASSISTED

PRoGRAMs
ment, but
pensation
156 F.2dj 5

62 (Comm. Print No. 31, 1964). It is not the owner's investthe value of his interest in the property, for which comis paid. Thus speculation is risky. Kinter v. United States,
(3rd Cir. 1946). Also see Riley v. District of Columbia Rede-

velopment Land Agency, 246 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
It should be noted that where enhancement results from general
governmental policy rather than from the taking for a special project,
the increased value may be included in the award. United States v.
Douglas, 207 F.2d 381 (9th Cir. 1953) (increase resulting from regional
irrigation development); United States v. Jaramillo, 190 F.2d 300
(10th Cir. 1951). See also Iriarte v. United States, 157 F.2d 105, 111

(1st Cir. 1946).
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hood of actual exercise of the easement cannot be considered. As
one writer has pointed out, "[i]t would be manifestly unjust to
permit a public authority to depreciate property values by a threat
...[of the construction of a government project] and then to
take advantage of this depression in the price which it must pay
for the property" when eventually condemned. 1 Orgel, Valuation

under Eminent Domain, § 105, at 447 (2d ed.); see Congressional
School of Aeronautics39v. State Roads Comm'n, 218 Md. 236, 249250, 146 A.2d 558, 565. 7
Obviously a major problem is determining the critical date when
the United States becomes "committed" to a project, and the guideposts are not too clear.3 9 s As a general rule, however, it appears
the Court will pick the date of Congressional authorization or the
date of an appropriation for a project. 399

M. THE "PossBmrrY OF CoviNATIoN" RULE Am VALUEs ATTmmUTABLE TO STEmA- FLOW.

A perusal of the decisions reveals that private owners have been
confronted with a number of legal hurdles in their efforts to obtain
compensation from the government and it can be argued that the
Supreme Court's philosophy has been a tremendous encouragement
to large scale projects. 400 In this connection the control of damsite
and riparian land values by use of the possibility of combination
with other properties doctrine is of interest. Generally, the rule
is that if the property under consideration must be consolidated
with other properties to make it suitable for a special use, such

special use cannot be considered in the valuation unless the possibility of effecting the necessary combination is so likely that
market value is affected.
397

398

365 U.S. 624, 636 (1961).

See

STAFF OF SELECT SUBCOMMnv. ON REAL PROPERTY AcQUISITION, HOUSE

Commn. ON PuBLic WoRKs, 88th Cong. 2d Sess., STUDY OF

COmPENSATION

A=D AssIsTANcE FOR PERSONS AFFECTED BY RiEAL PROPERTY AcQuIsITIoN

iN FEDERAL AN FEDERALLY AssisTED PROGRAMS 62-67 (Comm. Print
No. 31, 1964); Glaves, Date of Valuation in Eminent Domain: Irreverence for Unconstitutional Practice, 30 U. Clrr. L. REv. 319 (1963);
Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of
Supreme Court ExpropriationLaw, 1962 SuP. CT. REv. 63, 90-105.
399 See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943). Cf. United States v.
172.80 Acres of Land, 350 F.2d 957 (3d Cir. 1965) with United States v.
Chance, 341 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1965). United States v. 811.92 Acres of
Land, 404 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1969) (Whether property within scope of
project proper question for jury).
400 See Comment, Just Compensation and the Navigation Power, 31 WASH.
L. REv. 271, 284 (1956); Fitts and Marquis, Liability of the Federal
Government and Its Agents for Injuries to Real Property Resulting
from River Improvements, 16 TENN. L. REV. 801, 802, 826-27 (1941);
50 YALE L. J.668, 675, 679 (1941).
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The first principal decision occurred during 1878 in a diversity
action between a private corporation with the power of condemnation and a riparian owner.4 0 ' The condennor argued that because it
had an exclusive state franchise to control logs on a river, the value
of the condemnee's property as a boom site should be excluded from
the award. The United States Supreme Court held that the state
could not confer such an exclusive use of navigable waters; that
there could be other possible users for boom purposes besides the
condemnor; and that in such cases the rule of law is that in determining market value consideration must be given to all available
uses for which the property is suitable. This rule would appear to
mean that in a condemnation action by the Government, riparians
should receive payment for all potential uses of the uplands including their use as a damsite or flowage area. It was this formula,
however, which the Supreme Court later limited by the possibility
of combination standard, a standard it used until 1956 to effectively
restrict the amount private
owners received in connection with
40 2
eminent domain awards.
In the leading decision, Olson v. United States, 40 3 which involved
condemnation of flowage easements upon lands bordering Lake of
the Woods, the condemnees asked payment for the value of their
lands as a reservoir site on the theory that that was the most profitable use to which the lands were adaptable. The opinion reasserts
that the test of fair market value is to be based on all possible available uses which would include reservoir easements in connection
with the development of power generation. The Court said:
The sum required to be paid the owner does not depend upon
the uses to which he has devoted his land but is to be arrived at
upon just consideration of all the uses for which it is suitable. The
highest and most profitable use for which the property is adaptable and needed or likely to be needed in the reasonably near future
is to be considered, not necessarily as the measure of value, but
to the full extent that the prospect of demand for such 40use
affects
4
the market value while the property is privately held.

401 Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403 (1878).
402

McGovern v. New York, 229 U.S. 363 (1913); New York v. Sage,
239 U.S. 57 (1915); Continental Land Co. v. United States, 88 F.2d

104 (9th Cir. 1937) cert. denied, 302 U.S. 715 (1937); United States v.
Washington Water Power Co., 41 F. Supp. 119 (E.D. Wash. 1941); aff'd,

135 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 747 (1943). Cf.

United States v. 1532.63 Acres of Land, 86 F. Supp. 467 (W.D. S.C.
1949).
403

292 U.S. 246 (1934). See Highmark, Legal Aspects of Highest and
Best Use, in CONDEMNATION APPRAisAL PR cTIcE 25 (1961).

404

292 U.S. at 355.
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Nonetheless, the Court thereafter affirmed the trial court awards

which were based upon the value of the land for agricultural, not
reservoir, purposes. The Court first noted that even though the most
profitable use of a tract necessitates combining it with other lands,
such use can be included in the valuation if the possibility of combination is reasonably sufficient to affect market value. The particular
facts of the case, however, convinced the Court there was no possibility of the owner or others-excluding the expropriating authority
-using the condemned property in consolidation with other
American and Canadian shore lands for reservoir purposes. This
conclusion was based upon the fact that Indian lands were involved,
the unlikelihood of Canada ever consenting to private use, and the
diversity of ownership of the numerous lands which would have to
be flooded. Without a power of eminent domain, the chance of
acquiring all property essential for the most profitable use was
deemed too remote and speculative to be allowed.
United States ex Tel. TVA v. Poweson,4 5 a decision in 1943
involving a non-navigable stream, considered the probability of
combination rule when the condemnee has the power of eminent
domain. Powelson, the assignee of a utility company which possessed the power of eminent domain under the laws of North
Carolina, sought to establish a valuation based upon the theory
that the condemned property, plus other company land, could be
united with tracts owned by strangers to permit erection of a
four-dam hydroelectric project. The condemnee's basic position
was that the possibility of acquiring the necessary lands was reasonably probable because of the company's power to condemn.
Justice Douglas, writing for the 5-4 majority, thought this contention was out of the question because the condemnee's eminent
domain power was as yet unexercised and was revocable by the
state at any time. It followed that once the element of eminent
domain power was discarded, the chances of combining the necessary land became too remote to affect the valuation. He added that
if North Carolina were taking the property, it would not pay an
increased award based upon the condemnee's privilege to use the
power of eminent domain, and that when the state need not pay,
the United States need not.
This result is proper because once the United States decides to
take over a site, any existing local interest in developing water
power at the location necessarily ends. When the local plan
expires, the power of eminent domain to effectuate the plan termi405

319 U.S. 266 (1943).
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nates by implication due to the federal pre-emption of the project.
In other words, once the development ability of the state and its
permittees is pre-empted by federal power, there is no longer any
reason for the delegated authority from the state. The United States
should therefore not be liable for any valuation which depends
upon such authority. When the condemnor is other than the federal
government, of course, different considerations govern.
In Powelson, the United States had contended that no recovery
could be had for the water power value of a non-navigable stream,
but the Court refused to consider whether the servitude extends to
a non-navigable watercourse so as to preclude recovery. Five years
later in Grand River Dam v. Grand-Hydro,40 6 both the condemnor,
an Oklahoma conservation and reclamation district, and the condemnee, a public utility, had a state granted power of eminent
domain. In addition, the condemnor had a license from the Federal
Power Commission authorizing it to develop the Grand River, a
non-navigable stream. The Commission had found a proposed dam
on the stream would affect navigable waters of the United States
to which the stream was tributary, 40 7 but the condemnation proceedings were based upon state law as the condemnor placed no
reliance on either its federal license or the Federal Water Power
Act. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court did not view
as an issue in the case the matter of whether the Act would
prevent determining value under state laws and held Oklahoma
law applicable. Oklahoma permitted evidence of value based upon
availability as a damsite even though a condemnee had neither a
state nor federal permit to develop a site. Therefore, compensation
based upon such evidence was awarded. The Court expressly
observed it did not purport to decide whether the same rule would
apply in the event the United States or its licensee were acquiring
property under the Federal Water Power Act.
Justice Douglas, the author of the opinion in Powelson, was
joined in Grand River by three other dissenting justices in his view
that the United States had asserted exclusive control over the water
power by virtue of the Federal Water Power Act. Thus, when the
condemnor received its federal permit to develop the site, the condemnee thereafter had no claim to any water power value. The
effect of the majority opinion, according to Justice Douglas, is to
make condemnors holding federal licenses pay private claimants
for privileges which only the United States can give. "[T]he conse-

406 335 U.S. 359 (1948).
407 Union Elec. Co., 27

F.P.C. 801 (1962).
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quence is to give private parties an entrenched property interest in
the public domain, which the Federal Power Act was designed
to defeat."408
N. EFFECT oF FEDFEAL WATER PowER ACT ON PRIVATE RiGHTs.
The minority view never prevailed. In FPC v. Niagara Mohawk
Power Corp.,40 9 decided in 1954, the Court held that the Federal
Water Power Act did not abolish rights, existing under state law,
to use the water of a navigable stream; and in an earlier decision,
Henry Ford & Son v. Little Falls Fibre Co.,410 it had been decided
that when the United States delegates its power by granting a
license under the Federal Water Power Act, the licensee must pay
for damage to private riparian rights even though the riparians
would have been unable to recover from the federal government
for the same harm. The opinion in the Henry Ford case states that
while Congress could exercise its dominant servitude if it desired,
the terms of the Act showed that it did not intend to exempt federal
licensees under the Act from paying damages.
The Henry Ford decision was followed during 1967 by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Public
Utilities DistrictNo. 1 of Pend Oreille Co. v. City of Seattle.41 ' After
obtaining a license from the Federal Power Commission to construct
a hydroelectric project on the Pend Oreille River, a navigable
stream flowing from the State of Washington into Canada, the City
of Seattle commenced proceedings to condemn both uplands and
shorelands 4 2 owned by the Utility District. At the pretrial con408 Grand River Dam v. Grand-Hydro, 335 U.S. 359, 376 (1948) (dissenting opinion). In Public Util. Dist. No. 1 of Pend Oreille Co. v. City of
Seattle, 382 F.2d 666 (9th Cir. 1967), the court assumed the condemnee
could, without resort to eminent domain, assemble the, land package
necessary to engage in a certain use; but it stated, "Accepting that in
a proper case land may be evaluated by capitalization of earnings
of the project into which it is to be incorporated, we hold that such
methods of evaluation are not proper, since the contemplated use is
too remote, when that use rquires a federal license which has not
been obtained and where the condemner is the successful competitor
for a federal license."
409 347 U.S. 239 (1954). See Schwartz, Niagara-Mohawk v. FPC: Have
Private Water Rights Been Destroyed by the Federal Power Act?,
102 U. PA. L. REv. 31 (1953).

410 280 U.S. 369 (1930).
411 Public Util. Dist. No. 1 of Pend Oreille Co. v. City of Seattle, 382
F.2d 666 (9th Cir. 1967). Petitions for certiorari have not been passed
on. Docket Nos. 22 and 23, 37 U.S.L.W. 3014 (1968).
412 Shorelands "are between the line of navigability of the river and the
mean high water mark." Uplands are above mean high water mark.
Id. at 668 n.1.
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ference in the district court, the issue arose whether Seattle, as a
federal licensee, could assert the dominant navigational servitude
of the United States. If it could, no evidence would be admissible
concerning the value of the shorelands. In holding the property
was free from the non-compensable effect of the servitude, the
court distinguished the position of a Federal Power Commission
licensee from that of the Government on the ground that the United
States acts in the public interest on a national scale but licensees
frequently perform only on local projects which do not justify
asserting national power. Further, licensees are often privately
owned profit-making utility companies or manufacturers; and if
compensation were not paid by them for destruction of state-created
property rights, the benefits would go to the utility shareholders,
power consumers, and manufacturers. In choosing between the
competing interests, the court did not believe property rights and
the power of a state to create them should be destroyed unless
Congress clearly intended this should be done. No such intent was
found in the Federal Power Act. Rather, it was pointed out that
section 10 (c) expressly provides:
Each licensee hereunder shall be liable for all damages occasioned
to the property of others by the construction, maintenance, or
operation of the project works or of the works appurtenant or accessory thereto, constructed under the license, and in no event
shall the United States be liable therefor.
The court thereafter cited with approval from its 1931 opinion
in United States v. Central Stockholders' Corp.:
The Supreme Court held in the Ford case, in effect, that it was
not the intention of Congress to vest any portion of its sovereign
power in the permittee.... [T]he general purpose of the act was
to permit what would otherwise be an infringement of the rights
of the federal government and an interference with navigation,
that is, to permit a purpresture, requiring the permittee, however,
to make due compensation
where the project involved the taking
413
of private property.
The court concluded that if the shorelands were necessary for the
city's projects "they must be taken in the constitutional sense, and
'414
compensation for the taking must follow.
Judge Byrne dissented. 15 He distinguished between condemnation actions brought in state courts under state law such as Grand
River Dam Authority v. Grand-Hydro4l. from those brought "in
413 52 F.2d 322, 332 (9th Cir. 1931).
414 382 F.2d at 672.

415 Id. at 674.

416 335 U.S. 359 (1948).
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reliance upon rights under the Federal Power Act." In the latter
case, he said no reason exists to distinguish between the United
States and its licensee and the licensee is entitled to the benefit of
the federal navigation servitude. Judge Byrne also thought that
the United States has a direct interest in mirimizing construction
costs because it retains a right to take over licensed projects after
fifty years by paying the licensee's net investment.
Niagara Mohawk,417 which arose in a different context, also
squarely presented the issue of whether or not the Federal Water
Power Act destroys private usufructuary rights in navigable
streams. The company had a federal license to divert water from
the navigable Niagara River to operate a hydroelectric plant for
fifty years; and under the provisions of section 10 (d) of the Act,
after the first twenty years of the period it had to establish amortization reserves out of any surplus earned in excess of a reasonable
return upon net investment. At the expiration of the license, the
United States could take over or "recapture" the project upon
payment of the licensee's net investment, an amount equaling the
original cost of the project less the amortization reserves. In computing earnings to determine its amortization reserves, Niagara
Mohawk deducted as a proper expenditure sums it had paid or
incurred to rent water rights from others who held them under the
laws of New York. The Federal Power Commission refused to
allow these rentals as valid operating expenses on the ground that
a licensee under the Federal Water Power Act can use the waters
specified in its license without renting them from persons who may
have state recognized rights. The Commission's conclusion therefore was that the licensee's payments were unnecessary and improper as items of expense. The effect of disallowing the water-right
payments was to decrease the amount which the Government would
have to pay if it decided later to take the property. Conversely,
permitting the payments as expenses increased the ultimate obligation of the United States.
In a 4-3 decision sustaining the licensee's position, the Court
said that although the Government could take riparian rights
under the dominant navigational servitude, exercise of the servitude
to eliminate state water rights requires clear Congressional authorization and the Act itself does not justify such an interpretation.
On the contrary, the references in the Act to pre-existing rights
imply that these are to be given continued recognition. For instance,
section 14 states, "nor shall the values allowed for water rights ...
[used in computing a licensee's net investment] be in excess of
417

FPC v. Niagara-Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239 (1954).

422

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 48, NO. 2 (1969)

the actual reasonable cost thereof at the time of acquisition by the
licensee. . . ." Thus under the Niagara Mohawk reasoning, the
federal government in the first instance does not have to pay
compensation for state recognized water rights falling within the
scope of the servitude, but if it grants a license under the Federal
Water Power Act and thereafter decides to recapture the project it
has to pay an amount which includes the licensee's investment in
state created water rights. The dissenting judges in Niagara Mohawk objected to construing the Federal Water Power Act as requiring the United States to pay for something it already owns.418

0.

NON-COmPENsABIL=TY OF LOCATIONAL VALUES ATTRIBUTABLE TO

USE OF THE FLOW.
In United States v. Twin City Power Co.,419 a 1956 decision, the
Court finally faced a situation in which the owner of a damsite
had acquired all the necessary property so that a project was neither
speculative nor remote. The area, about 4700 acres which included
a waterfall, had been acquired by Twin City and held at all times
for the purpose of developing a power damsite. The Government
condemned the property which was still vacant so it could build
a multipurpose structure for hydroelectric power generation and
flood control. Special commissioners denied a motion to strike evidence of potential damsite value, and found as a damsite the compensation due was 1,257,033 dollars but as farm land the property was
worth only 150,841.85 dollars. The larger sum was awarded by the
United States District Courts in Georgia and South Carolina and the
Fourth and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals affirmed. On certiorari,
the Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision reversed. Both the majority and
the four dissenting judges relied on the same case, United States
v. Chandler-DunbarCo.,420 a 1913 decision which was the leading
case until the Twin City decision.
In Chandler-Dunbar,the defendant had constructed facilities in
the navigable St. Mary's River pursuant to permits from the Secretary of War. It was developing and selling water power when
Congress ordered that the permits be revoked and all necessary
land and structures, plus the entire flow of the river, be taken to
improve the Sault River. In the condemnation proceedings which
followed, Chandler-Dunbar claimed compensation for loss of: (1)
uplands adjacent to the river bank, (2) a proprietary right in the
418

Id. at 258.
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350 U.S. 222 (1956). For a discussion of the cases in the District and
Circuit courts, see Note, 65 YALE L. J.96 (1955).

-420 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
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bed of the stream opposite its shore which it owned to the middle
of the watercourse under local Michigan law, and (3) structures in
the stream resting upon the river bottom. Further, the company
asked that an element of additional value be added because of the
potential adaptability of the land for a factory site and for locks and
canals. It also contended that another special value attached to the
fast lands due to the company's interest in the undeveloped water
power in excess of navigational needs. This, of course, constituted
a claim of an ownership interest in the raw water.
The trial court held that the United States could exercise its
navigation servitude to eliminate, without compensation, the company's dams and other structures on the submerged land within
the bed of the river below high-water mark, but that compensation
was payable for the taking of land above that level. No dispute
arose regarding these matters in the Supreme Court. Rather, the
controversy centered upon awards to the company for values associated with the flow of the watercourse. In fixing compensation,
the lower court allowed:
(1) 550,000 dollars for water rights, i.e., the additional value of
the lands above high water mark-fast lands-attributable to suitability for producing water power,
(2) 20,000 dollars in connection with an eight acre strip of fast
land which was a potential factory site,
(3) 25,000 dollars based upon availability of the same eight acres
for canal and lock purposes and 10,000 dollars for a small area consisting of two acres of fast lands for "its special value for canal and
lock purposes."
The Supreme Court reversed the first awards but sustained the
"canal and lock" judgment.
In the Supreme Court, the Chandler-Dunbar claim that because
it owned the fast lands it owned the river and the inherent power of
the falls and rapids was rejected on the grounds that although the
company was entitled to payment for the uplands it had no right to
the flow of the water.
Ownership of a private stream wholly upon the lands of an individual is conceivable; but that the running water in a great navigable stream is capable of private ownership is inconceivable. 42 '

421

Id. at 69.
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Later in the opinion, while considering the factory site value, the
Court referred back to the claim of interest in the raw water and
said:
Having decided that the Chandler-Dunbar Company as riparian
owners had no such vested property right in the water power
inherent in the falls and rapids of the river, and no right to place
in the river the works essential to any practical use of the flow
of the river, the Government cannot be justly required to pay
for an element of value which did not inhere in these parcels as
upland. The Government had dominion over the water power of
the rapids and falls and cannot be required to pay any hypothetical
no right to approadditional value to a riparian owner who had 422
priate the current to his own commercial use.
Therefore no value could attach for loss of the water, and in any
event, use by Chandler-Dunbar depended upon the Government's
permission which had been cancelled. The company, no longer
having a right to maintain the structures essential for utilizing the
stream for power, could claim no damage for water it could not
put to use. Chandler-Dunbar also argued that it had been deprived
of all the water and should receive compensation for any surplus
not necessary for navigation and commerce. To this the Court
answered that once Congress decided to promote navigation by
excluding the company from use of the bed, no valid objections
could be made concerning disposition of the excess power. After
exclusion, the company had no interest in the matter whatsoever.
It is difficult to reconcile denying special value to the fast lands
because of their suitability for a "factory site" with granting special
damages to the fast lands for their availability for "canals and
locks." Both involve use of the water. A license was necessary for
the canal and lock as well as for the dam; therefore, the situations
are indistinguishable on the basis of the Government's power to
withhold utilization of the water. This contradiction was recognized
by the Court and it tried to explain the canal and lock award by
saying:
That this land had a prospective value for the purpose of constructing a canal and lock parallel with those in use had passed
beyond the region of the purely conjectural or speculative. That
one or more additional parallel canals and locks would be needed
to meet the increasing demands of lake traffic was an immediate
probability. This land was the only land available for the purpose. It included all the land between the canals in use and the
bank of the river. Although it is not proper to estimate land condemned for public purposes by the public necessities or its worth
to the public for such purpose, it is proper to consider the fact
that the property is so situated that it will probably be desired
422

Id. at 76.

EMINENT DOMAIN AND WATER LAW
and available for such a purpose. Lewis on Eminent Domain, § 707.
Boom Co. v. Patterson,98 U.S. 403, 408; Shoemaker v. United States,
147 U.S. 282; Young v. Harrison, 17 Georgia, 30; Alloway v. Nashville, 88 Tennessee, 510; Sargent v. Merrimac, 196 Massachusetts,
171.423
With this as the background, Justice Douglas, for the majority
in Twin City, faced the problem of damsite valuation in a situation
where all the essential land for the project was in a single ownership. He reduced the controversy to one question which appeared
uncomplicated to him. In his view, the federal government can,
without giving compensation, exclude riparian owners from the
benefits of navigable watercourses. To hold otherwise would necessitate payment for the right to the flow of a stream. Such a result,
by taking into consideration value attributable solely to the flow,
424
would be directly contrary to the rationale of Chandler-Dunbar.
In answer to the condemnee's argument that uplands on a navigable
stream are unburdened by the navigation servitude, the Court
answered:
The flaw in that reasoning is that the landowner here seeks a
value in the flow of the stream, a value that inheres in the Government's servitude and one that under our decisions the Government
can grant or withhold as it chooses. It is no answer to say that
payment is sought only for the location value of the fast lands.
That special location value is due to the flow of the stream; and
if the United States were required to pay the judgments below, it
would be compensating the landowner for the increment of value
added to425the fast lands if the flow of the stream were taken into
account.
Twin City thus holds that when the United States exercises
its navigation easement riparian lands on a navigable watercourse
can gain no value from possible uses of the water which an owner
might have made; and the decision by implication overrules the
"canal and lock" award in Chandler-Dunbar.6 The Court did not,
however, expressly disapprove the "canal and lock" award and
lower federal courts continued to follow it. 42 7 It should be noted
that Twin City also inferentially overrules Monongahela Navigation
423
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In a footnote, the majority opinion said that the lock and canal award
in Chandler-Dunbarperhaps is understandable because such use was
"wholly consistent with the dominant navigation servitude of the
United States and indeed aided navigation." United States v. Twin
City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 226-27 (1956).
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In the Chandler-Dunbarcase, the canal and lock damages were small
and it appears the Court failed to thoroughly consider its ruling concerning the matter. See I ORGEL, supra note 106, at 369, n. 38.
E.g., Rands v. United States, 367 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'd, 389
U.S. 121 (1967).
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Co. v. United States, 428 an early decision. In a number of opinions,
Monongahela has been distinguished and overruled by implication;
but only overruling the decision and the "canal and lock" award
could provide a consistency in doctrinal approach. This appears
to have been done in United States v. Rands, a 1967 decision.429 The
Rands owned two tracts of land along the Columbia River in Oregon which were about six miles upstream from the John Jay Dam.
On November 1, 1962, they leased the land to the State for inclusion
in an industrial park. The lease gave the State an option to buy
most of the property for 150,000 dollars, but a portion was denominated "port-site property" and priced at 400 dollars per acre. During
August of 1963, before the option was exercised, the United States
condemned the tracts in connection with a river development project
of which the John Jay Dam and the reservoir were a part. Almost
all of the Rands' land was flooded.
The United States then conveyed the land by federal deed to
the State of Oregon under the provisions of a statute authorizing
the Secretary of the Army to sell excess river development project
land to states for port and industrial purposes when the objectives
of the over-all project are served. 430 Oregon, after paying considerably less than the option price which the Rands had hoped to
receive from the state, turned the property over to the Boeing Company, a private corporation, under the terms of a lease agreement.
When the case came before the Supreme Court of the United
States, the issues were those arising from the action of the trial
judge in the United States District Court for Oregon. He had
limited the compensation payable to the value of the tracts for
sand, gravel and agricultural purposes and had excluded an offer of
proof that the land was worth at least 50,000 dollars as a port-site.
When the Rands were awarded only about one-fifth of the alleged
port-site value, they appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit which reversed on the ground that the trial judge was wrong
when he ignored the port-site value. 431 Judge Duniway, writing for
the court of appeals, distinguished Commodore Park on two grounds.
First, there was a taking or invasion of the Commodore Park company's tangible property; second, the fact that access to navigable
waters may be cut off without compensation does not mean access
cannot be considered in an eminent domain case when it is shown to
be part of the value of the land actually taken. The court of appeals
428
429
430
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relied strongly on the "lock and canal" award in United States v.
Chandler-DunbarCo.432 and on Monongahela Nay. Co. v. United
4 3
States.
The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded with
direction to reinstate the district court judgment. In doing so, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the rationale of the Twin City decision
that an owner is not entitled to compensation for location values
attributable to uses, actual or potential, which are dependent upon
use of the water or access to it. In answer to the inconsistent holdings upon which the court of appeals relied, the Court said:
Our attention is also directed to MonongahelaNavigation Co. v.
United States, 148 U.S. 312, (1893), where it was held that the
Government had to pay the going-concern value of a toll lock
and dam built at the implied invitation of the Government, and
to the portion of the opinion in Chandler-Dunbar approving an
award requiring the Government to pay for the value of fast lands
as a site for a canal and lock to bypass the falls and rapids of the
river. Monongahelais not in point, however, for the Court has since
read it as resting "primarily upon the doctrine of estoppel..."
Omnia Commercial Co., Inc. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 513-514,
(1923). The portion of Chandler-Dunbarrelied on by respondent
was duly noted and dealt with in Twin City itself, 350 U.S. 222,
226, n. (1956). That aspect of the decision has been confined to its
special facts, and, in any event, if it is at all43inconsistent
with
Twin City, it is only the latter which survives. 4
The court of appeals had also relied on 33 U.S.C. § 595 which
provides that when land is taken for a river improvement compensation is to be reduced by any special and direct benefits conferred upon the owner's remaining land by the project, and upon
United States v. River Rogue Improvement Co.48 5 In that case, the
United States took property to widen the River Rogue and this
made other property of the riparian condemnee more valuable
because it was given direct access to the stream for building
wharves and piers. The Court held this special benefit to the
remainder should be subtracted from the award for the property
taken even though the benefits could be destroyed by exercise of
the navigation servitude at any time by the Government without
payment of compensation. The Rands argued, and the court of
appeals agreed, that if it is fair to reduce an award on the basis that
the enhancement of value due to a riparian location is a real
resulting benefit, then fairness and consistency dictates that the
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same value attributable to the same source (port-site value due to
riparian location) be recognized in the award when riparian property is taken by the Government. The Supreme Court answered
that there was no inconsistency. It reasoned that in the River Rogue
situation, the condenee received a valuable right he did not have
before and this right was secure against other riparians and even
against the State. Therefore, setting off such enhanced value against
the award simply allocated these special values to the public rather
than to private interests. If at a later time the United States acquires the port-site value of the remainder by condemnation, it
obtains only values it was already entitled to under the doctrine of
Twin City.

P. THE TwIN CITY DISSENT

AND THE DECISION IN THE GRAND RIVER
DAM AUTHORITY AND THE VEPCO CASES.

In contrast to the majority, the dissenting judges in Twin City,
relying on the "canal and lock" award in Chandler-Dunbar,argued
that the navigation servitude should not be interpreted to allow
government acquisition of a damsite at a lower cost than a private
power company would have to pay.436 In addition, the dissenters
viewed the case as governed by the clear language in Olson v. United
4 38
States43 7 and Boom Co. v. Patterson
which would require payment
for all immediately prospective uses because:
The potential use of this land for dam, plant and reservoir purposes is far from speculative in the light of the 50 years of recognition of its availability and suitability for those purposes. The
land was accumulated by Twin City for this very purpose and it
is now flooded as part of the Clark Hill project.... If a purchase
price had been sought by negotiation in 1947, it is inevitable that
a primary consideration would have been the value of the flowage
rights and of the dam
and plant locations in relation to waterpower development.43 9
The minority objected to the majority view that when the
federal government is the condemnor, then the usual measure of
436

United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 269 (1956)

(dis-

senting opinion). The minority said that compensation was denied
for the "factory site" in Chandler-Dunbar due to "the speculative
nature of the proposed use," and that compensation was required for
the "canal and lock" purposes because the use was established and
within the "immediately prospective" use doctrine, i.e., the possibility

of such use "had passed beyond the region of the purely conjectural
or speculative."
437 292 U.S. 246 (1934).
438 98 U.S. 403 (1878).
439 United States v. Twin City Power Co. 350 U.S. 222, 237 (1956) (dissenting opinion).
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compensation, what a willing buyer will pay a willing seller, becomes inoperative. The next question is whether the United States
would have the same advantage in relation to private power companies if the uplands were adjacent to a non-navigable, rather than
a navigable stream. A factual situation presenting this matter arose
in Oklahoma a few years after the decision in Twin City.
In United States v. Grand River Dam Authority,40 the Authority
was an agency of Oklahoma created to develop hydroelectric power
on the Grand River, a non-navigable tributary of the navigable
Arkansas River. After its creation in 1935, the Authority proposed
a river development plan in Pensacola, Markham Ferry and Ft.
Gibson although an Army Engineers' report in 1930 had concluded
federal development of the three sites was uneconomical at that
time. The Authority obtained a license from the Federal Power
Commission and completed the Pensacola project in 1940. A year
later, in the Flood Control Act of August 18, 1941, Congress adopted
a 1939 recommendation of the Army Engineers for a federal threedam coordinated undertaking on the Grand River. Pursuant to the
Act, the United States completed the Ft. Gibson project as "an
integral part of a comprehensive plan for the regulation of navigation, the control of floods, and the production of power on the
Arkansas River and its tributaries." 441 In connection with this
project, the Government condemned a seventy-acre tract of land
and flowage rights. The Authority claimed payment for the alleged
taking of its water power rights at Ft. Gibson and for its exclusive
state franchise to develop electric power at the site. The Government refused payment and the Authority sued in the court of claims
which held the United States liable. The Supreme Court reversed.
It was recognized that the United States would not be liable for
depriving the Authority of the stream flow to produce power if the
same rule applied to a non-navigable tributary as was held applicable to a navigable stream in Twin City. In addition, there would
be no liability if the servitude were applicable to non-navigable
watercourses and the Government urged adoption of that view.
But conversely, in United States v. Cress and in Kansas City Life
Ins. Co. v. United States, compensation had been awarded when
Congressional regulation of a navigable watercourse indirectly interferred with private owners on non-navigable watercourses.
Neither decision, however, answered the question whether compensation is due when the United States expressly and directly
exercises its power over non-navigable tributaries of navigable
streams.
440
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430

The Court unanimously held that no rights attach to the flow of
a non-navigable tributary when Congress exercises its power to
control floods in aid of navigation on a main stream which is navigable. Riparians on both navigable and non-navigable streams hold
their property subservient to the power of Congress to regulate and
improve navigable waters of the United States and the power is
applied when Congress specifies the waters which it believes are
necessary in aid of navigation. The following language from the
opinion clearly shows this:
Congress by the 1941 Act, already mentioned, adopted as one
work of improvement "for the benefit of navigation and the control
of destructive floodwaters" the reservoirs in the Grand River.
That action to protect the "navigable capacity" of the Arkansas
River (United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690,
708) was within the constitutional power of Congress. We held
in Oklahoma v. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, that the United States
over the objection of Oklahoma could build the Denison Dam on
the Red River, also nonnavigable, but a tributary of the Mississippi.
We there stated, "There is no constitutional reason why Congress
cannot, under the commerce power treat the watersheds as a key
to flood control on navigable streams and their tributaries." Id., at
525. And see United States v. AppalachianPower Co., 311 U.S. 377,
426; Grand River Dam Authority v. Grand-Hydro, 335 U.S. 359,
373. We also said in Oklahoma v. Atkinson Co., supra, that ".... the

power of flood control extends to the tributaries of navigable
streams." Id., at 525. We added, "It is for Congress alone to decide
whether a particular project, by itself or as part of a more comprehensive scheme, will have such a beneficial effect on the arteries
of interstate commerce as to warrant it. That determination is legislative in character." Id., at 527. We held that the fact that the project had a multiple purpose was irrelevant to the constitutional
issue, id., at 528-534, as was the fact that power was expected to
pay the way. Id., at 533. "[T]he fact that ends other than flood
control will also be served, or that flood control may be relatively
of lesser importance, does not invalidate the exercise of the authority conferred on Congress." Id., at 533-534.
We cannot say on this record that the Ft. Gibson dam is any less
essential or useful or desirable from the viewpoint of flood control
and navigation than was Denison Dam. When the United States
appropriates the flow either of a navigable or a nonnavigable
stream pursuant to its superior power under the Commerce
Clause, it 4is42 exercising established prerogatives and is beholden
to no one

The Grand River Dam Authority decision was followed by the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals during 1966 in United States v.
531.13 Acres of Land.443 To construct the federal Hartwell Dam
project on the navigable Savannah River, the United States con442

Id. at 232-33.

443 366 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1966).
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demned 531.1 acres along the non-navigable Seneca River which
were owned by Duke Power Company. This land included 27.4 acres
occupied by the company's dam and reservoir, which together with
a powerhouse, substation and transmission lines, constituted the
hydroelectric facilities. All were entirely inundated when impoundment of waters behind the dam flooded the entire length of
the Seneca. The district court sustained a commission's $500,000.00
award of compensation for the taking. Since the Duke operation
did not in any way influence the flow of the Savannah, the court
relied on the Cress case44 4 as authority for the proposition that the
Government had no greater interest in the non-navigable Seneca
than did the defendant power company. On appeal, the court of
appeals disregarded the navigability issue and reversed. It justified
federal control of the Seneca on the basis of flood control and an
exercise of power over a tributary of a navigable watercourse.
After citing Grand River Dam Authority and United States v.
Willow River Power Co.,445 the decision points up the dichotomous
state of the Supreme Court cases by the following statement:
Undebatably, United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 37 S. Ct. 380,
61 L. Ed. 746 (1917), in the Kelly appeal No. 718, relied upon by

Duke is a holding contrary to our conclusion here....

However, Cress on the Kelly appeal has been so severely pared
as a precedent on the present point that we do not feel justified
in allowing it to prevail here. Its scope was sharply straitened
by United States v. Willow River Power Co .... Finally, Grand
River... squarely refutes and rebukes the thought that Cress warrants recovery by Duke. 446
In the Twin City case the Supreme Court had denied compensation for the value of riparian lands attributable to the flow of a
navigable watercourse. It appears to many lawyers that the Court
retreated from this holding in 1961 when it permitted a private
power company to share in compensation for nonriparian uses

because it owned a flowage easement over the property. In United
States v. Virginia Elec. Co.,4 47 [hereinafter called Vepco] the federal

government condemned a flowage easement over 1840 acres of
private riparian lands on a navigable stream for a dam project. On
1540 of the acres Vepco already owned a flowage easement which
it had acquired for use in connection with erection of a power dam.
When litigation commenced to condemn the Vepco easement, the

Government's position was that it was worthless when appropriated
by the United States because it could only be exercised in conjunc444

United States v. 531.10 Acres, 243 F. Supp. 981; 991 (W.D. S.C. 1965).

445 324 U.S. 499 (1945).
446 366 F.2d 922 (4th Cir. 1966).
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tion with water power development of the stream's flow. The sole
question in the case was the amount of compensation,
if any, due
448
Vepco for the destruction of its easement.
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, said the procedure of
the district court was correct in excluding all value attributable to
the riparian location of the land,449 i.e., in eliminating consideration
of stream flow, and then basing the damages to all the interests in
the property by taking the difference between the value of the land
before and after imposition of the government easement. It was
held error, however, to apportion the damages between the
owner of the fee and Vepco on the basis that the fee interest was
worthless and that Vepco's flowage easement had a value equivalent
to all non-riparian uses of the fee. In other words, the Court held
Vepco should not be
awarded damages as though it owned the
450
unencumbered fee.
The Vepco easement had value, according to the Court, because
it could be used to destroy all nonriparian uses which might be
made on the property, i.e., agriculture, forestry and grazing. The
Court said the value of the easement therefore was "the nonriparian
value of the servient land discounted by the improbability of the
easement's exercise."451 For instance, if the nonriparian value of
a property were 1,000,000 dollars and the chances of the flowage
easement being exercised were 75 per cent (or 25 per cent improbable), then the computation would be:
Nonriparian market value
Less 25 per cent improbability
of easement's exercise times
$1,000,000

$1,000,000

Value of the easement

$ 750,000

250,000

A simpler formula is that an easement's value is the nonriparian
value of the servient land, 1,000,000 dollars multiplied by the probability the easement will be put to use, 75 per cent.
Thus in apportioning an award between the owner of the fee
and the owner of a right to flood the land, the probability of the
easement being exercised has to be assessed. If an assessment shows
448 The servient fee owner agreed to convey for $1.00 because of her

449
450
451

interest in developing the balance of her estate as a wild life preserve.
A contiguous artificial lake presumably would enhance this use. See
United States v. Virginia Elec. Co., 365 U.S. 624, 625 n.1 (1961).
Id. at 631
Id. at 633.
Id. at 635.
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that the easement holder is in a position to flow the lands, the rights
are valuable. But conversely, if the evidence is that the easement
holder could never exercise its easement, then it would not be
entitled to any compensation and the entire award would be payable to the owner of the fee. The question of how to measure the
"improbability of the easement's exercise" is an extremely difficult
one. The Court adopted language from the decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Augusta Power Co. v. United
States, 52 which stated that the factors to be considered in the
valuation of flowage easements include the chances of a power
company assembling the necessary lands for its project and getting
the necessary license from the Federal Power Commission, the
need for additional power in the area, and the increasing advantage
of steam plants over hydroelectric ones.
In making the assessment of probability or improbability, there
must be excluded from consideration the prospect of appropriation
by the United States and any depreciation which such a prospect
might cause. If the government decision to construct the project
were taken into account, the easement would be valueless because
all possibility of Vepco ever exercising it would be gone. But even
after excluding completely the prospect of a government dam, there
still existed the possibility that neither Vepco nor other private
interests would build and thereby use the easement. If the assessment of improbability test showed this to be so, then any payment
to Vepco would violate the usual rule that compensation should not
exceed what the owner lost. It was for this reason, according to the
Court, that a decision had to be made concerning division of the
award.
Justice Douglas, who wrote the majority opinion in the Twin
City case, concurred on the ground that Vepco stood in the shoes of
its grantor, the owner of the fee. He then asserted that although a
fee owner is not entitled to any element of value from the flow of
the stream, from any head of water, or from the strategic location
of the land for hydroelectric development, still he and his grantee
of the flowage easement have all the other property rights which
the fifth amendment protects.453
The dissent protested that Vepco was not entitled to any compensation because exercise of the easement, Vepco's sole right in the
lands, required erection of a dam to back the river's waters; erection
of a dam was dependent upon securing a license from the Federal
452
453

278 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1960).
365 U.S. 624, 636 (1961) (concurring opinion).
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Power Commission; and once the Government decided to build the
dam itself, there was no possibility that Vepco could ever get a
license. In addition, Vepco's flowage easement was necessarily dependent upon using the water of the river to overflow the riparian
lands and under the rationale of the Twin City case such a claim to
the flow is non-compensable. 4 4
However, in a situation where the estate has been severed,
denial of compensation seems unjust to the owner of the flowage
easement and it should be noted that recovery in both Twin City
and Vepco was limited to the nonriparian value of the property. In
Twin City the Government purchased the right to destroy the nonriparian uses from the owner; in Vepco, the Government purchased
the right from the one who possessed it, i.e., the holder of the flowage easement. Under this analysis, the opinions are not inconsistent
and Vepco would not be construed as a retreat from the rationale
of Twin City.

Q. SUMMARY

OF SERVrITUDE DECISIONs RELATING TO COMPENSABILITY.

In reviewing the servitude cases, several important factors stand
out. First, the servitude is not co-extensive with the power of the
United States over the country's watercourses under the commerce
clause. The navigation power today extends to watercourses navigable in fact, those which are non-navigable but can be made
navigable by artificial improvements at a reasonable cost, and nonnavigable tributaries. 45 Justice Burton alluded to this in United
States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co. 456 when he wrote, "It is not the
broad constitutional power to reguluate commerce, but rather the
servitude derived from that power and narrower in scope, that
frees the Government from liability in these cases."
Second, recovery against the Government is more likely if the
level of the water in the watercourse is raised. This is shown by
those cases holding damages are consequential when they result
from Government works which deflect the current and cause
riparian lands to wash away.457 Third, there have been few recoveries against the Government between Pumpelly v. Green Bay
Co.,4- 5 the 1871 decision awarding compensation for flooding riparian
454 Id. at 624. Cf. Comment, 14 STAN. L. REV. 800 (1962) (Hofeldian
analysis concluding case correctly decided).
455 See United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
456 339 U.S. 799, 808 (1950).

457 E.g., Franklin v. United States, 101 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1939), aff'd,
308 U.S. 516 (1939).

458 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 166 (1871).
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uplands, and United States v. Kansas City Life Insurance Co.,459
which permitted recovery in 1950 when the waters of a nonnavigable tributary were backed under riparian property.
Fourth, the principal compensable situation arises when work
done by the United States for improvement of navigation causes
water to permanently overflow lands above ordinary high water
mark.4 6 0 If the property is subjected to periodic overflows, the
Government is liable for the value of a flowage easement rather
than for the taking of a fee. Damages from temporary flooding are,
however, consequential and no liability is incurred by the Government to the landowner. 461
An award for the flooding of uplands must exclude all elements
of value associated with the riparian location of the land. Thus
recovery for value of property as a damsite is impermissible because
the servitude bars private rights in the flow of the watercourse and
the essential federal license is unattainable once the United States
decides to condemn a location. 462
Fifth, the Government incurs no liability for activities in aid of
navigation when these are carried on between the ordinary highwater marks of navigable stream beds; but when the Government
exercises its power over navigable streams and thereby causes
interference or injuries to private property on non-navigable tributaries, compensation is payable.46 3 For instance, it has been pointed
out that in the Cress case, federal power was exercised solely on
and for a navigable stream, but the damage occurred on another
stream in which Congress had not asserted to exercise the servitude.
Therefore the damage to property in congressionally unspecified
waters was compensable. 4 " But when the United States expressly
appropriates the flow of either a navigable or a non-navigable
watercourse to promote navigation, no compensation is due for
injuries to property which may be vested in riparians under state
law.46 5 In other words, when the United States, to aid navigability
on the main stream, invokes the servitude with specificity as to
particular non-navigable tributaries, no compensation is payable to
riparians for damages sustained by them below the high-water level.
459 339 U.S. 799 (1950).
460
461
462

463

E.g., Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871); United
States v. Grizzard, 219 U.S. 180 (1911).
For cases, see Mandelker, Inverse Condemnation: The Constitutional
Limits of Public Responsibility, 1966 WIs. L. REv. 3, 41 n.122.
United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917); United States v. Kansas
City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950).

464 See Comment, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1384, 1387 (1960).
465

United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229 (1960).
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R. A BRrEF CRITIQUE OF THE

SERVITUDE DOCTRINE.

Awarding compensation to riparians on non-navigable streams
for damages when water in the main channel is lawfully raised to
improve navigation 66 relieves them from bearing part of the cost
of a federal project (although they may not receive compensation if
the power of the United States is expressly invoked) .467 However,
as Justice Douglas points out, why should a riparian on a nonnavigable stream be made whole while a riparian on a navigable
main stream
who suffers damages from the same act is denied
468
relief?

Some early decisions simply assumed private owners were
obligated "to suffer the consequences" 469 when improvements were
made in aid of navigation, but later opinions of the Court regularly
injected the concept of a servitude to explain the denial of compensation. A review of the decisions leads to the conclusion that the
Court is not confident about how the concept became the raison
d'etre of plenary federal power over the nation's watercourses. It
has been stated that the source of the power is in:
1. The commerce clause of the Constitution.470 This is an unsatisfactory explanation because the Constitution does not say that
the clause giving Congress power over commerce is superior to the
provision guaranteeing that private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation. 471 Further, only in the
'"river" cases is the commerce clause given such a construction.
2. The fact that persons acquiring property on navigable streams
have had "ample notice over the years that such property is subject
to a dominant public interest. This right of the public has crystallized in terms of a servitude over the bed of the stream. '472 In Union
Bridge Co. v. United States, 473 the Court indicated notice was an
important basis of the doctrine when it said that a bridge across
466

United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917); United States v. Kansas

City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950).
467 United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229 (1960).
468 See Justice Douglas, dissenting in United States v. Kansas City Life
Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 812 (1950).
469 Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 276 (1897).
470 E.g., United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 224 (1956);
United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 808 (1950);
United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53,
62 (1913); Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897); United
States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967).
471 See Annot., 21 A.L.R. 206, 220-21 (1922).
472 United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 808 (1950).
-473 204 U.S. 364, 400 (1907).
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navigable waters had been erected "with knowledge of the paramount authority of Congress to regulate commerce" and "subject
to the possibility that Congress might, at some future time . . .
exert its power.... " During 1967, in United States v. Rands, it is
again stated:
The proper exercise of this power is not an invasion of any private property rights in the stream or the lands underlying it, for
the damage sustained does not result from taking property from
riparian owners within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment but
from the lawful exercise of a power to which the interests of
riparian owners have always been subject.4 74
To base the servitude on a theory of notice ignores that the
pre-1937 Court limited the federal commerce power to navigable
streams but today almost all watercourses in the country are subject
to exclusive Congressional control.475 Thus the bootstrap nature of
the notice language becomes apparent whenever a Supreme Court
decision enlarges the scope of the servitude so as to eliminate rights
which previously could not have been taken without payment of
just compensation. If notice were the basis of the doctrine, the
scope of federal power would be dependent upon the definition of
navigation at the time when an owner obtained title under local
law, but the rule denying compensation has uniformly been applied
with no consideration of this factor.
3. The common law of England. A comparison between the
servitude doctrine and the English law gives persuasive weight to
the conviction that the doctrine has its roots in antiquity. Support
for this hypothesis is found in statements by eminent experts in the
area of water law4 76 and in United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co.
United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123 (1967).
475 See Sato, Water Resources-Comments Upon the Federal-State Relaship, 48 CA-r. L. REv. 43 (1960); Silverstein, Jr., The Legal Concept
of Navigability v. Navigability in Fact, 19 RocKy MT. L. REV. 49
(1946); B. ScnwARTz, TnE SuPRmw CoURT 45-46 (1957); Justice
Roberts, dissenting in United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co.,
311 U.S. 377, 429 (1940).
476 See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Irrigation and Reclamation of
the House Comm. on Interiorand InsularAffairs, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 9, pt. 1, at 332-33 (1959); Hearings on Federal-State Water Rights
Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. 97 (1961) (statements by Mr. Elmer Bennett, Under Secretary of the Interior). See also STAvF OF Hous. Comm. oN INTEmoR
474

AND INwsuLAR AFFpA
, 89th CONG., 2d SEss., REPORT ON FEDERAL WATER
RIGHTS LE-isAiON 17 (Comm. Print No. 19, 1960); Fitts and Marquis,

Liability of the Federal Government and Its Agents for Injuries to
Real Property Resulting from River Improvements, 16 TENN. L. REy.

801, 813 (1941); Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters: the

Navigation Power and the Rule of No Compensation, 3 NATURAL REsouRcEs J. 1, 25 (1963). Also Comment, 55 MRcH. L. REV. 272, 275 (1956).
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where Justice Burton refers to authorities discussing the English
law of public rights on navigable waters. 477 The true origin is
important because government immunity would tend to become
narrower if the Court's philosophy were to move towards a view
that the fundamental purpose of the doctrine is to grant immunity
only for those activities which are closely related to aiding navigation. There is a vast difference between power under the commerce
clause and under the English doctrine that the King controlled
navigable watercourses to benefit subjects who used them for navigation purposes. For this reason a brief summarization of the
English law is appropriate.
478
S. EARLY ENGLISH LAW.

Without tracing in detail the complete historical development of
English water rules, it appears that in the very early times the King
treated all waters and the soils under them as his own. He disposed
of the uplands which bordered on streams, on lakes and on the sea
as he pleased, and he likewise gave away or sold lands submerged
under both tidal and nontidal waters. No question arose concerning
whether he held title in a representative capacity for the benefit of
the public or in a proprietary private capacity for his own advantage
and profit. He treated the title as private, acting on the theory that
anything he owned he could use, sell, or give away; therefore, the
common experience in England was that fishing rights and water
beds under both navigable and non-navigable waters were conveyed
into private hands except insofar as the King retained them for his
own pleasure or profit. 479 In ancient times, there were no waters in
all the kingdom to which Englishmen could assert a common right
of use.
477

478

479

339 U.S. 799, 808 (1950). The citations are J. GOULD, A TREATISE ON
LAW OF WATERS, ch. IV, § § 86-90 (1883) and 1 H. FARNnAM, THE LAW
OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, § 29 (1904). In the same paragraph,
Justice Burton also finds the source of the servitude in "notice" and
in the "commerce clause."
A more detailed discussion of the early English law appears in R.
Harnsberger, The Status of Public and Private Rights in Wisconsin's
Waters 524-35 June 1, 1959. (unpublished thesis in Law Library, Univ.
of Wis.). See also Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters: the
Navigation Power and the Rule of No Compensation, 3 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 1, 26-28 (1963).
Stuart A. Moore in his noted treatise, S. MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE
FORESHORE (3d ed. 1888) at page 27 states: "The Crown therefore had

parted with almost all the seacoast by grants to its subjects before
the end of the reign of King John." See also Annot., 23 A.L.R. 757
(1923), and 1 H. FAmNAV, LAw OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 166
(1904).
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T. DEVELOPimNT OF THE DOCTRINE UNDER WHICH THE "Jus PuaLICUm" COULD NOT BE SOLD OR Giv AWAY BY THE KING.

As Englishmen later agitated for navigation rights and then for
fishing privileges, the lines became blurred concerning whether the
King held the waters of the Kingdom for himself or for his subjects.
Gradually however, his dual capacity as a private person and as
ruler of the country became apparent; and, once this was perceived, fixed distinctions began to emerge concerning rights to use
the waters between the monarch and the common people. Thereafter, certain rights attached to public waters, and Englishmen could
pass and repass without payment of toll. In addition, at least from
the time of Magna Charta, 1215, the public had a right to fish in tidal
waters where the King was presumptively the owner of the submerged land. 480
As finally recognized, English waters were classified either as
public or as private. Public waters were those the use of which
belonged to all Englishmen in common for fishing and for navigation and its incidents. These use rights of the public were held by
the King in his representative capacity in trust for all the people;
the title, a sovereign or political one for the benefit and advantage of
the general public, was called the jus publicum. It was inalienable
on the part of the King; he could neither surrender nor transfer
such waters into private hands.
However, rights other than fishing and navigation existed in
connection with English waters and the submerged beds. These
remaining rights, such as to minerals, to wreck and to treasure
trove, were held by the Crown in a proprietary ownership; and,
unlike the jus publicum, this private ownership in submerged soils,
or the jus privatum, could be given away or granted by the King
and always remained alienable at common law until the right was
taken away during the reign of Queen Anne. But all grants of the
jus privatum were subject to the jus publicum, and as it actually
developed the questions most frequently litigated were whether
grantees of the jus privatum from the King could destroy the jus
480

Some authorities indicate that it was not clear whether a public right
existed in the public to fish in tidal waters before King John granted
Magna Charta in the year 1215. The fact that the King before that
time did grant the exclusive right of fishing to individuals and excluded the public is, however, of only academic interest because it
remained unquestioned that after Magna Charta exclusive fisheries
could not be granted by the Crown to individual subjects. See Malcomson v. O'Dea, 11 Eng. Rep. 1155, 1165-66 (H. L .1863); Fitzhardinge
v. Purcell, [1908] 2 Ch. 139, 167. See Annot. 23 A.L.R. 757 (1923).
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publicum. 4s ' In the cases it was held that an absurdity would result
if the subject could destroy the jus publicum which the King himself as sovereign had a duty to maintain. 4 2 Statements found in the
American cases which assume that the King could not grant the
beds of navigable waters, the jus privatum, into private ownership
are wrong.48 3 And, even though the King's power to grant the
jus privatum finally was taken away, it must be remembered that
the right to make such grants was assumed by Parliament.

U. DEVELOPIENT OF THE DocTRIE UNDER WHICH THE "Jus PRIvATUM" BECAME INALIENABLE ON THE PART OF THE CROWN.

About 1568, during the reign of Queen Elizabeth, Thomas Digges,

an attorney for the Crown, wrote a brochure entitled, Proofs of the
Queen's Interest in Lands Left by the Sea and the Salt Shores
Thereof,48 4 which was absolutely contrary to the actual facts,
presupposing as it did that the lands between high-water and lowwater mark had not been already granted or given by the Crown
into private hands. This proposition, enlarged to include all sub481

Mr. Fraser has pointed out that the disputed question in the English
cases was not whether the King could grant submerged tidal land
but what public uses the lands were subject to in the hands of the

grantees. See Fraser, Title to the Soil Under Public Waters-The
Trust Theory, 2 MINN. L. REv. 429, 435 (1918). Sir Mathew Hale, Lord

482

483

484

Chief Justice of England who died in 1676, wrote a noted treatise
in about 1666 entitled M. HALE, DE JURE MARIS (1666). It is set out
in 1 HARGRAVE'S TRAcTs 5-44 (1787) and in MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE
FoSHORE (3rd ed. 1888) beginning at page 185. In Chapter VI, Hale
states: "the people have a publick interest, a jus publicum, of passage
and repassage with their goods by water and must not be obstructed.
... For the jus privatum of the owner or proprietor is charged with
and subject to that jus publicum which belongs to the King's subjects; as the soil of a highway is, which though in point of property
it may be a private man's freehold, yet it is charged with a publick
interest of the people, which may not be prejudiced or damnified."
See Attorney General v. Tomline, 12 Ch. D. 214 (1879), 14 Ch. D.
58 (1880) and Attorney General v. Parmeter, 10 Price 378, 400-01, 147
Eng. Rep. 345, 352 (1811).
See Fraser, Title to the Soil Under Public Waters-The Trust Theory,
2 MiNx. L. REv. 429, 433 (1918). "The statement that the title of the
Crown to the subaqueous lands was not a proprietary right, if that
means without any right of enjoyment or power of alienation, is
incorrect. It has no support in the English common law and the
authority to the contrary is conclusive."
For discussions pertaining to Mr. Digges' theory see S. MOORE, A HisTORY OF THE FoREsHORE 180-84 (3d ed. 1888); 1 H. FARNHAIVI, THE LAW
OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 39 (1904); Fraser, Title to the Soil
Under Public Waters-A Question of Fact, 2 MINN. L. REV. 313, 317-21,
337 (1918); Coudert, RiparianRights: A Perversion of Stare Decisis, 9
COLum. L. REV. 217, 219-21 (1909); and Riggs, The Alienability of the
State's Title to the Foreshore, 12 CoLumv. L. REV. 395, 398-400 (1912).
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merged soils as far as the sea flowed, was adopted by the Stuart
kings, because if accepted, the Crown presumptively would own all
soils underlying the tide waters. This would provide a means to
secure revenue by reselling the foreshore and tidal river beds to
the subjects. Of course, the landowners strenuously resisted, for,
as Mr. Stuart A. Moore points out, the Crown theretofore had
asserted no title to the foreshore when the subjects claimed it and
before Elizabeth the English law had presumed the subjects owned
to low-water mark. 48 5 Further, riparian titles generally rested on
Crown grants centuries old, and those had been lost. Digges'
doctrine, if once judicially recognized, would, by creating a presumption of Crown ownership, permit it to take over lands
whenever riparian owners failed to prove title resting upon ancient
sovereign grant. Proof of such title was an insurmountable task,
and the Crown would unjustly recover solely on the weakness of
the riparian owners' proof. This would allow the Crown to get
back what it had already parted with, and riparians then would be
forced to purchase, or lose access to the water because title to the
strip between the high-water mark on their uplands and the lowwater mark would rest either in the Crown or in the third party
grantee from the King. A strip of land separating the privately
owned uplands from the water would create an intolerable situation.
After lengthy and bitter litigation extending over more than a
half century between the riparian landowners on the one side and
the Crown or Crown grantees on the other side, it finally became
settled that lands covered by the tide are prima facie in the Crown
and that riparians claiming to the contrary have the burden of
proving their right of ownership. 48 6
This acceptance of Digges' doctrine, which was established only
after the Crown had exerted considerable pressure on the English
courts, was one of the causes of the revolution,487 and one of the
charges which led to King Charles I losing his crown was "the
taking away of men's rights under colour of the King's title to land
between high and low water marks." 488
The ultimate outcome was that after it became well established
that Crown rights in tidal waters could be conveyed only subject to
public rights, it became settled that as a part of the coronation
A HISTORY OF TEE FoRESHoRE 169, 177 (3d ed. 1888).
486 The first case recognizing the doctrine is Attorney General v. Philpot,
485 S. MooRE,

reported in MooRE, A HIsTORY OF THE FoREsHoRE, app. I (3d ed. 1888).

See also Attorney General v. Richards, 2 Anst. 603, 614, 145 Eng.
Rep. 980, 983 (Ex. 1793).

487 S. MooRE, A HISTORY OF THE FOREsHORE XXXV
488 Id. at 310.

(3d ed. 1888).
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procedure the King was required to grant all submerged soils for
the common good.48 9 And, finally, in the first year of the reign of
Queen Anne, 1702, a statute was enacted which prevented the
Crown from making any grants except upon conditions imposed
by Parliament. 490
Thus in the common law it developed that both the public rights
of use, the jus publicum, and the private rights of use and enjoyment, the jus privatum, became inalienable on the part of the
Crown. The jus publicum had been inalienable for centuries and
the jus privatum became so by Acts of Parliament and by custom.
V.

THE ComIoN LAW RIGHT OF THE PUBLIC TO NAVIGATE IN PRIvATE
WATERS.

The right of the public in England to use the tidal waters ultimately became associated with public ownership of the subaqueous
soil. Because title to submerged beds under tidal waters was presumptively in the Crown-the sovereign state-use of tidal waters
was common to everyone. The resulting general rule became settled
that such waters were public waters, the right of the public being
limited by the ebb and flow of the tide.
Above the flow and reflow of the tide, title to the underlying
stream beds was prima facie private and waters uninfluenced by
the tide were regarded private both as to right of use and ownership
of the bottom 4 91 The theory under which the Crown held prima
facie title to land under the tidal waters never applied to submerged beds of fresh waters because the claim of the large landowners whose lands bordered on fresh water streams was too firmly
established, and besides, most of the important English waters were
tide waters. Therefore, the desire of the Crown for further extension of its ownership was never great.
In this situation the courts faced a dilemma because use of the
large fresh water rivers in England was essential for passage of
boats bearing products of the country and carrying on commerce.
H. FARNmAm, THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, § 36, at 170
(1904).
The Crown Lands Acts of 1702, 1 Anne, c. 7, § 5, 3 HALSBURY'S STATUTES

489 1

490

OF ENGLAND
491

214 (1929); see also The Crown Lands Act of 1829, 10

Geo. IV, c. 50, § 8, 3 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 223 (1929).
M. HALE, DE JuRE MARis (1666), in S. MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE
FoREsHoRE 270 (3d ed. 1888). For an exhaustive treatment of this sub-

ject, see Fraser, Title to the Soil Under Public Waters-A Question
of Fact, 2 MINN. L. REV. 313 (1918). See also Note, 32 VMnN. L. REV.
484 (1948), and Blount v. Layard, [1891] 2 Ch. 681, 689 (printed in note
to Smith v. Andrews, [1891] 2 ch. 678).
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Yet the submerged soils of these rivers above the tide had been in
private hands from the -earliest times and it had to be conceded
as a matter of principle that public use of the water for navigation
is inconsistent with private ownership of the beds. It had further
to be conceded that the private ownership would be infringed if the
Crown's title were extended to the soil under fresh waters for the
purpose of giving a right to navigate over what would then have
become public waters.
To solve this difficulty, a legal fiction called "navigable in law"
was introduced to limit the Crown's title solely to tidal waters. This
fiction meant simply that in connection with determining title to
the seashore and to soils underlying streams no waters were regarded as navigable above the places where the tide ebbed and
flowed. The fiction had no effect whatsoever on public rights to fish
and to pass and repass in tidal waters492 but affected only title
determinations.
Once the King's title was limited, the dilemma of giving Englishmen the indispensable right they needed to navigate in fresh waters
where the submerged beds were in private ownership was solved
by judicial evolution of another doctrine. This was "navigable in
fact." Under this doctrine the rule came to be that streams and
lakes which were actually capable of navigation, even though
uninfluenced by the tide, were subject to a public right to navigate.
The theory upon which this right rested was never too clear,493 but,
from whatever source derived, the rule became settled that the
public had a "servitude" for boat passage in the navigable rivers of
the Kingdom above the tide as well as in tidal waters. The tide
remained the prima facie test of public use and enjoyment generally,
but the test of the public right to pass and repass became naviga494

bflity.

Thus it finally became settled that tidal waters could be used
for the benefit of all the subjects; and in the private waters actually
capable of commerce Englishmen secured a right to navigate by
virtue of the judicial decisions even though the courts always had
492 1

H.

FANnAVm,

THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTs

§ 23f, at 117

(1904).
493

See H. CouLsoN

494

AND

U. FORBES, THE LAw

OF WATERS

AND

LAND

279 (6th ed. 1952); Phear, Rights of Water 15, cited in J.
GouLD, A TREATISE ON T= LAW OF WATERS § 55 at 119 n.5 (3d ed. 1900).
See 1 C. KINE, LAW OF IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS 560-62 (2d ed.
1912); See aZso J. GoULD, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF WATERS § § 52,
53, 55, 81 (3d ed. 1900); M. HALE, DE JuRE MRIs (1666) in S. MOORE,
A HISTORY OF THE FOREsHORE 374 (3d ed. 1888).
DRAINAGE
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difficulty formulating any well-founded rationale to give everybody
this enforceable claim to boat as against private riparian landowners
who owned the submerged beds.
A public right to navigate was recognized in the Colonies; and
after adoption of the Constitution, the federal government became
the preserver of the privilege of free passage. The United States
Supreme Court made certain basic modifications of the common law
to accommodate the conditions and topography of the country,495
but the concept continued that waters navigable in fact were public
as to use. If the concept of the "servitude" as it existed in the
English law were followed, the scope of property encompassed
would be reduced considerably and the liability of the United States
to pay compensation when exercising its "navigation easement"
would thereby be enlarged. In 1964, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit said it still considered the law to be
that compensation must be paid for interfering with access or for
taking property below the ordinary highwater line unless the
taking either aids navigation or bears some positive relation to its
control. 496 Nevertheless, statements by the Supreme Court appear
to broaden the rule to permit at least a limited exercise of the
49 7
servitude in the interest of factors such as commerce generally.
Invoking the servitude where navigability has not really been an
for the Senate Select Comeconomic fact was one cause of concern
498
mittee on National Water Resources.
At the state level, power may be exercised either under the
doctrine that the ownership of water is held in trust for the
people49 9 or the navigational servitude. The doctrines vary from
state to state, and for that reason great care must be used in applying precedents in one jurisdiction to cases in another. However,
with few exceptions the state courts hold payment must be made
when private rights are taken unless a project is closely related
to acknowledged public rights in navigable waters. Further, it is
not enough that the public works aid navigation incidentally. The
495

The fact of navigability was substituted for the fiction of ebb and flow
of the tide. Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851).
For a discussion of the reasons behind the Genesee Chief decision,
see J. HURST, THE GnowTH OF AmEVIcAw LAw: THE LAW MAKE-S 8,

496

United States v. 50 Foot Right of Way 337 F.2d 956 (3d Cir. 1964).
E.g., United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426
(1940); Note, 72 DICK. L. REv. 375, 390 n.75 (1968).
S. REPT. No. 29, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1961).
See, e.g., Waite, The Dilemma of Water Recreation and a Suggested
Solution, 1958 Wis. L. REV. 542, 567.

12-13 (1950).
497
498
499

EMINENT DOMAIN AND WATER LAW
purpose must be to improve or control navigation. 500 On the other
hand, in denying compensation to shipyard owners where access
was blocked by a low-level highway bridge, the California Supreme
Court recently stated that the servitude in California is not limited
to purposes of navigation and that such a circumscription is
obsolete.
The limitation of the servitude to cases involving a strict navigational purpose stems from a time when the sole use of navigable
waterways for purposes of commerce was that of surface water
transport .... That time is no longer with us. The demands of modern commerce, the concentration of population in urban centers
fronting on navigable waterways, the achievements of science in
devising new methods of commercial intercourse-all of these factors require that the state, in determining the means by which the
general welfare is best to be served through the utilization of navigable waters held in trust for the public, should not be burdened
classification favoring one mode of utilization
with an outmoded
over another.501
The Colberg decision may foreshadow a change of viewpoint in
other states. Its rationale is profitable to the public and to those
directly interested in large scale developments because more of the
burden is shifted to riparian proprietors. Also, there can be no
disagreement with the concept that legal rights must be reevaluated
from time to time for admittedly things have changed since formation of the English law and since 1789 when it took George Washington a week to travel from Alexandria to New York for his
inauguration. But to permit non-navigational improvements without payment of compensation for injured property rights is not only
unsound historically, it conflicts with the purpose of harmonizing
public rights and private interests by subordinating the latter only
when navigation is advanced. To expropriate riparian rights to
advance any type of commerce, e.g., automobile traffic on freeways,
would appear to make the government's power almost unlimited.
The California doctrine expounded in Colberg is too expanded a
view of the navigation servitude doctrine unless riparian rights are
so outmoded that their taking should be now made non-compensable.50 2 Not all courts will agree that riparians must sacrifice
so much.
Beidler v. Sanitary Dist., 211 IU. 628, 71 N.E. 1118 (1904). Annot.,
18 A. L. R. 403 (1922); Note, 72 DICK. L. REv. 375, 388 n.68 (1968); 13
Vmii. L. RPv. 667, 668 n.16 (1968); 21 VAN. L. REv. 277, 279 n.14
(1968); Colberg, Inc. v. State, 67 Cal 2d 408, 434-35, 432 P.2d 3, 20,
62 Cal. Rptr. 401, 418, (1967) (dissenting opinion).
501 Colberg, Inc. v. State, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 421-22, 432 P.2d 3, 12, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 401, 410 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 949 (1968).
502 See Baldwin, The Impact of the Commerce Clause on The Riparian
Rights Doctrine, 16 U. FLA. L. REv. 370, 421-22 (1963).
500
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STATUS OF STATE CREATED RIGHTS, INCLUDING IRRIGATION DIVERSION WORKS AD CONSUMPTIVE USES.

It is impossible to calculate the effect of the federal navigation
servitude on private investments, but it is noteworthy that a subcommittee of the American Bar Association on Public Land Use reported
during 1967 that the servitude "has inhibited the development of
waterfront areas over navigable waters by private enterprise" and
that the doctrine:
creates a hazard to financing which makes the development of
such projects difficult from the practical point of view. Title companies generally list this right as an exception in policies of title
insurance which has the effect of rendering the property largely
unmortgageable. 503

At the present time, another, important problem relates to the
effect of the servitude upon diversions for irrigation, municipal
supplies, and other comsumptive uses. It appears that because of
the servitude private diversions "rest upon a slippery legal foundation and that there is merit, in law if not in practice, to the complaint
that a sword of Damocles hangs over them, due allowance being
made for the exaggeration in any such statement as this." 50 4 In a
comprehensive article, Professor Morreale of the Rutgers Law
School has written:
It should be noted that none of the previously discussed cases,
whether denying or granting compensation, concerned a consumptive water right or, more narrowly, an irrigation water right. Congress, of course, has often been solicitous of state-created Western
water rights....
But while there is no case subjecting irrigation water rights to
the rule of no compensation nothing on the other hand suggests
their compensability....
Any assertion therefore that the use of a navigable stream for
irrigation purposes is the kind of "vested property right" that survives the exercise of the congressional power to deal with the nation's waterways is unfounded. The congressional appropriation of
a navigable river for the (perhaps only incidental) benefit of navigation leaves the owner of state-created water rights without recourse. Regarding actual diversion works, placed in the river,
United States v. Chandler-DunbarCo. is directly applicable....
As for the actual withdrawal of the water, Chandler-Dunbar

again seems conclusive of the issue. The claim to the non-consumptive use of water constituted the assertion of private ownership
over "the running water in a great navigable stream." The claim
to the consumptive use of such water must then do likewise. And
if such an assertion was "inconceivable" in the one case, so ought
503 2 A.B.A. REAL PROPERTY AND TRUST J. 597 (1967).
504 STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. OF INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 86th CONG.,

2D SEss., REPORT OF FEDERAL WATER RIGHTS LEGISLATION 20 (Comm.
Print No. 19, 1960).
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it to be in the other. Nor would the "owner" of the water right in
question be permitted to show that his individual diversion does not
impede navigation. The congressional declaration that the protecttion or improvement of navigation requires the appropriation of
the entire stream flow would again have the legislative and conclusive effect similar declarations have had in the past.
Thus the question of the compensability of a state-created, consumptive water right on a navigable stream must be answered in
the negative. Any destruction or impairment of such a use, caused
by a federal dam, constructed under congressional authorization
and serving, perhaps incidentally only, the improvement of navigation, is merely the505exercise of a power to which such use had
always been subject.

Congress, however, may exercise less than its entire power and
in the past has frequently recognized state law.50 6 The O'MahoneyMilliken Amendment to the 1944 Flood Control Act,5 °7 for instance,
prefers beneficial uses over navigation in the Western states by
providing:
The use for navigation, in connection with the operation and maintenance of such works herein authorized for construction, of waters
arising in States lying wholly or partly west of the ninety-eighth
505 Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters: The Navigation Power

and the Rule of No Compensation, 3 NATURAL REsou css J. 1, 64-66
(1963) (footnotes omitted). See also Sato, Water Resources-Com-

ments Upon the Federal-State Relationship, 48 CALIF. L. Rzv. 43, 47
(1960); Corker, Water Rights and Federalism-The Western Water
Rights Settlement Bill of 1957, 45 CAIF. L. REv. 604, 618-21 (1957);
Comment, Western Water Rights: May They Be Taken Without Com506

507

pensation, 13 MoNT. L. REv. 102 (1952).
See Hearings on S. 1658 Before the Subcomm. on Irrigation and
Reclamation of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. 709-16 (1964); Hearings on S. 1275 Before the
Subcomm. on Irrigation and Reclamation of the Senate Comm.
on Interior and Insular Affairs, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 302-310 (1964).
S. REP. No. 2587, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, 41-46 (1956). In United
States v. Fallbrook Pub. Util. Dist., 165 F. Supp. 806, 841 (S.D.
Cal. 1958), Judge Carter collects numerous Congressional acts which
he describes as "an almost unbroken line of statutes by which Congress has deferred to state laws concerning water." The major acts
which have general application are the Reclamation Act of 1902, the
Federal Power Act of 1920, and the Watershed Protection and Flood
Prevention Act of 1954. For an excellent discussion of section 8 of the
Reclamation Act of 1902, see Sax, Problems of Federalism in Reclamation Law, 37 U. COLo. L. REv. 49 (1964).
58 Stat. 887 (1944), 33 U.S.C. § 701-1(b) (1964). Exercise of the overriding federal navigation servitude to destroy state created water
rights without compensation is prohibited. The water user's remedy
is damages in an inverse condemnation action, not injunction. Turner
v. Kings River Conservation Dist., 360 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1966). For a
discussion whether hydroelectric power generation is granted a priority
over navigation, see STAP oF SENATE Comm. ON INTEMIOR AND INSULAR
AFFAIRS, 87TH CONG., 1ST SESS., Missoulu BAsIN WATER RiGHTs (Comm.

Print 1961).
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meridian shall be only such use as does not conflict with any beneficial consumptive use, present or future, in States lying wholly or
partly west of the ninety-eighth meridian, of such waters for
domestic, municipal, stock water, irrigation, mining, or industrial
purposes.

Congress also has indicated that compensation be paid even in
situations where there would be no obligation. United States v.
Gerlach Live Stock Co.,50° is a case in point. There construction of
the Fraint Dam as part of the Central Valley Project in California
deprived riparian owners on the San Joaquin River of their traditional use of seasonal stream overflow and made their lands barren.
The federal government attempted to avoid payment of compensation for the taking on the theory Congress has declared the "entire
Central Project... is... for the purposes of improving navigation,
regulating the flow of the San Joaquin River and the Sacramento
River, controlling floods, providing for storage, and for the delivery
of the stored waters thereon. . . ." The court of claims found the
purpose of the dam was to irrigate nonriparian lands, not aid navigation, and entered awards against the United States for compensation. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgments but
avoided the question whether the Government can destroy the flow
of a navigable stream and carry away its waters for sale to private
interests without compensation to those deprived of rights recognized by state law. Justice Jackson, writing for the majority, said
that Congress had showed no intent to invoke the navigation servitude and intended to require compensation for all damages to water
rights under the Reclamation Act of 1902.
X.

CONCLUSION.

Previously it has been shown that the navigation servitude
originated in the common law, not in the commerce clause. It became incorporated in American constitutional law at a time when
the federal government's main concern was limited almost entirely
to maintaining streams, lakes and harbors as free public highways
for trade. The emphasis was on lighthouses, public piers, locks,
canals, and harbor and river improvements. Over the years, the
federal interests have expanded tremendously until today the
United States is engaged extensively in irrigation reclamation
projects, municipal water supply, pollution control, flood regulation,
recreation, and hydroelectric power generation and distribution. 50 9
508

509

339 U.S. 725 (1950).
Ashwander v. TVA 297 U.S. 288 (1936); United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940) (Congress may prohibit
all obstructions in navigable waters and therefore may also license
obstructions for generation of power).
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The question thus arises whether the servitude power has expanded
with the enlarged definition of navigable waters of the United States
or whether it is, as it was at common law, coextensive with protection and promotion of a paramount public right of navigation.
Counsel for the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs has
stated the question to be:
whether the existence of the servitude and its benefits depend
upon the nature of the stream (in which case any navigable stream
may be used by the Federal Government for any of its constitutional functions without compensation) or upon the nature of the
use (in which case it is only a navigation use or, at most, a use
cognizable under the commerce clause of the Constitution which
carries with it the right to use without compensation).510
The theoretical base of the servitude doctrine is federal power
over watercourses as public highways and matters not in aid of
navigation are outside the scope of the doctrine. As a practical
matter, though, the Supreme Court will not interfere with a Congressional declaration that a particular activity promotes navigation;
consequently, "takings" for federal projects can be sheltered under
what even the Court has referred to as a "strained interpretation"
of the power over navigation.51 1
Prior to the Court's statement in Gerlach that"... this Court has
never permitted the Government to pervert its navigation servitude
into a right to destroy riparian interests without reimbursement
where no navigation purpose existed,151 2 language in the decisions
510

WITmEm,

FEDERAL

WATER

RIGHTS .LEGISLATION-THE

PROBLEMS

AND

THEIR BAcKGROUND, HOUSE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS,
86TH CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON FEDERAL WATER RIGHTS LEGISLATION
511
512

21-22 (Comm. Print No. 19, 1960).
United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 738 (1950).
Id. at 737. In United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269
U.S. 411, 419 (1926), the Court said: "The right of the United States
in the navigable waters within the several States is, however, 'limited
to the control thereof for the purposes of navigation.' Port of Seattle v.
Oregon Railroad Co. 255 U.S. 56, 63 (1921). And while Congress, in
the exercise of this power, may adopt, in its judgment, any means
having some positive relation to the control of navigation and not
otherwise inconsistent with the Constitution, ...it may not arbitrarily
destroy or impair the rights of riparian owners by legislation which
has no real or substantial relation to the control of navigation or
appropriateness to that end." In United States v. Appalachian Elec.
Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 425 (1940), the Court said River Rouge
involved a right of access, a use fixed by state law, and the conclusion that the United States could not interfere, except for navigation, with the right of access required no appraisal of other rights.
City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320, 334 (1958), states
that it is no longer open to question that the federal government
"has dominion, to the exclusion of the States, over navigable waters
of the United States."
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emphasized the Court's abstention from determining whether navigation is in fact advanced.
So unfettered is this control of Congress over the navigable
streams of the country that its judgment as to whether a construction in or over a river is or is not an obstacle and a hindrance to
navigation, is conclusive. Such judgment and determination is the
exercise of legislative power in respect of a subject wholly within'
its controL.51
[Tihe question ...whether the whole flow of the stream should
be conserved for the use and safety of navigation, are questions
514
legislative in character ....

15
In Arizona v. California,5
decided in 1931, Arizona claimed that
the Congressional declaration of purpose to improve navigation in
connection with the Boulder Dam Project Act was "a mere subterfuge and false pretense." Mr. Justice Brandeis, writing for the
Court, discussed whether the Congressional statement was conclusive or whether the Court could inquire into the contention that
the real intent was to destroy navigability by diversions for consumptive uses such as irrigation. He concluded that the motives
which induced members of Congress to approve the Act could not be
examined and it was for Congress rather than for the Supreme
Court to decide whether the particular structures proposed were
reasonably necessary.

Although some authorities believed Gerlach was a rejection of
the paramount rights theory, 516 the Court since that decision has
reaffirmed the finality of Congressional assertion of its power. In
United States v. Twin City Power Co.,5 17 exercise of the servitude
was upheld in connection with the Clark Hill project which was
primarily for development of power and which benefited navigation
only incidentally, if at all. The court of appeals had found improvement of navigation was not the purpose of the project which it said
was constructed for flood control and development of power, but
the Supreme Court concluded the decision of Congress that the
project would serve the interests of navigation was final "unless
it is shown 'to involve an impossibility.' "51
513

United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 64

514

Id. at 65. See also id. at 66 and Greenleaf Johnson Lbr. Co. v. Garrison,

(1913).

237 U.S. 251 (1915).

283 U.S. 423, 455 (1931). See also United States v. Commodore Park,
Inc., 324 U.S. 386 (1945) which indicates the activity need have no
connection with aid to navigation.
516 See Treadwell, Developing a New Philosophy of Water Rights, 38
515

CAIF. L. REv. 572 (1950).

350 U.S. 222 (1956).
51sId. at 224.
517
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In recent years, numerous efforts have been made to subject the
federal government to state water law. The much discussed Barrett
bill, the Western Water Rights Settlement Bill of 1957,519 was one
of the first. Any hope for its passage was unrealistic but the bill
did serve to focus attention upon the area of federal-state relations.5 20 In considering the matter, the outstanding feature is the
overriding federal interest in the comprehensive development of the
national land and water resources 521 and the obvious concern of the
United States to maintain control over the engineering, economic
522
and financial soundness of the country's vast public works.
2
8
Flood control and maintenance of navigability clearly are federal
functions; but when no significant navigation in fact exists, exercise
of the servitude to avoid payment of just compensation is "highly
fictional." 52 The Supreme Court has gone too far in equating noncompensable takings under the navigation servitude with federal
power over navigation ever to return completely to historic English
origins. Nevertheless, a shift in philosophy to original principles
would tend to restrict use of the servitude doctrine to activities
closely associated with preserving navigable waters such as removal

519 S. 863, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
520 See Corker, Water Rights and Federalism--The Western Water Rights
Settlement Bil of 1957, 45 CAIFr. L. REv. 604, 634 (1957). Recent
bills include S. 1275, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); S. 1636, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1965). For a list of numerous bills introduced in the

House see STAFF OF HousE Comm. ON INTERIOR
86TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON FEDERAL WATER

521

RIGHTS LEGISLATION 1
(Comm. Print No. 19, 1960).
Fox & Craine, OrganizationalArrangements for Water Development, 2
NATURAL REsouRcEs J. 1 (1962). For suggestions regarding strengthening the role of the states see Engelbert, Federalism and Water Re-

sources Development, 22

522
523

AND INSULAR AFFAIRS,

LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.

323, 325, 344 (1957).

See also Veeder, The Pelton Decision: A Symbo--A Guaranty That
the Development and Conservation of Our Nation's Resources Will
Keep Pace With Our National Demands, 27 MONT. L. REV. 27 (1965).
See First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Co-op v. FPC, 328 U.S. 152, 172, 181,
(1946).
See United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, (1940)
("Flood protection, watershed development, recovery of the cost of
improvements through utilization of power are likewise (in addition to
navigation] parts of commerce controL"); Oklahoma v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, (1941); United States v. West Virginia Power
Co., 122 F.2d 733 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 683 (1941); STAFF
OF SENATE SELECT COVIM. ON NATIONAL

WATER REsouRcEs, 86TH CONG.,

2D SESS., REPORT ON FLOOD, AND FLOOD CONTROL IN

524

THE UNITED STATES

(Comm. Print No. 15, 1960).
United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 737 (1950).
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of physical obstructions and abatement of pollution.525 These affect
stream flow and federal power should be and is plenary. When
Congressional action affects the uplands, however, so as to benefit
private interests, there are other considerations.
Again the Gerlach decision is illustrative. The United States was
not taking the water for itself but rather was exercising its power
in connection with construction of a reclamation project. The
effect was to transfer water rights from one private group to another, and the project costs were to be reimbursed over a forty
year period by those who obtained use of the water. This reimbursement feature places reclamation cases in a different category
from those in which the Government itself takes and uses the flow.
The question of compensation is a matter of whether private interests should secure so direct an economic advantage by virtue of
governmental activities, and the answer is no. Employment of the
servitude to take property for public welfare ends would be an
abuse of power. Further, the controversial subject of subsidies in
federal irrigation projects 526 is a factor when consideration is given
to the appropriateness of paying compensation for takings of
riparian interests in furtherance of reclamation plans. The Supreme
Court, in other decisions in which the federal interest is a peripheral
one, frequently has found compensation payable. 527 Further, since
the Gerlach decision, it is indisputable that Congress has the power
under the general welfare clause to tax and appropriate for largescale reclamation and irrigation projects and other works of internal
improvement.528 The former custom of invoking the navigation
525

For a discussion whether stream flow abatement which prevents raw
sewage and wastes from being carried away is a compensable taking
see Lewis, The Phantom of Federal Liability for Pollution Abatement
in Condemnation Actions, 17 MERCER L. REV. 364 (1966). A number of

state cases hold compensation is payable when the purpose of a
public work such as a dam is not to improve navigation. E.g., Natcher
v. City of Bowling Green, 264 Ky. 584, 95 S.W.2d 255 (1936).

For other cases, see Mr. Justice Peters, dissenting in Colberg, Inc.

v. State, 67 Cal.2d 408, 426, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401, 418, 432 P.2d 3, 20
(1967); 21 VAND. L. REV. 277 (1968); 13 VmL. L. REV. 667 (1968).
526 See HUFFMAN, IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC WATER POLICY
87-91 (1953). See also 3 PREsIDENT's WATER REsOURCES POLICY COMM'N.,
Sax, Selling Reclamation Water
Rights: A Case Study in Federal Subsidy Policy, 64 MIcH. L. REV. 13
(1965); Clark, Northwest-Southwest Water Diversion-Plans and
Issues, 3 WiLLTAmETTE L. J. 215, 254-56, 258-61 (1965); J. HIESHLEIFER,
J. DE HAVEN & J. MILLIMAN, WATER SUPPLY: ECONoMIcs, TECHNOLOGY
AND POLICY 226-30 (1960).
WATER RESOURcES LAW 204 (1950);

527

528

See Henry Ford & Sons, Inc. v. Little Falls Fibre Co., 280 U.S. 369
(1930); International Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399 (1931);
FPC v. Niagara-Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239 (1954).
The foundation case is United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
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power to buttress federal authority in sanctioning internal improvements is therefore unnecessary and should be discontinued unless
federal interests are directly involved.
In view of the plenary power of the United States, the matter
of compensability is almost entirely a matter of Congressional
policy. Professor Morreale, who has considered the servitude problem exhaustively,-29 recently wrote an excellent article on Congressional clarifying legislation530 in connection with the federalstate relationship in the Western states. She concluded that "private
rights which would be compensable under the fifth amendment if
taken in exercise of any other federal power should be compensable
if taken for water resources development." 53 1 This would return
closer to the English origins of the servitude, abolish time-worn
fictions, and reach a justifiable result.
Limited permit systems are not uncommon at the state level in
the East, and proposals have been advanced that permits or licenses
be issued by federal agencies for a period of time sufficiently long
to permit amortization of investments which are made in reliance
upon a continued source of water supply.532 One suggestion is that
a new federal agency modeled after the Federal Power Commission
grant permits (some conditioned on payment in money or in water
supply) to private developers, states, local communities, regional
53
authorities or any combination of public and private groups. 3
Possibly these should not take effect until expiration of a certain
time after they have been reported to Congress. Congressional
handling could be either by a single committee in each House or
by committees meeting in joint session such as the Public Works
Committee and the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs in the
Senate. Most permits would be routine, but hearings might be
called for in connection with projects such as the $600,000,000 one
Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters: The Navigation Power
and The Rule of No Compensation,3 NATURAL REsoURcEs J. 1 (1963).
530 S. 1636, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) would require payment of compensation even though the taking were by virtue of the navigation
servitude. Section 2 which would require the United States to respect
state laws does not apply when the Government establishes "water
rights under its own laws."
531 Morreale, Federal-State Conflicts Over Western Waters-A Decade of
Attempted "Clarifying Legislation," 20 RUTGEas L. REv. 423, 512 (1966).
532 2 ABA REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AwD TRUST J. 599 (1961) (proposal of
Association of the Bar of the City of New York); Forer, Water Supply:
Suggested Federal Regulation, 75 HAav. L. REv. 332, 347-49 (1967).
533 Forer, Water Supply: Suggested Federal Regulation, 75 HAzv. L. Ray.
332, 348 (1967).
529
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proposed on filled in land along lower Manhattan. 534 When consumptive diversions do not affect in-the-channel uses, and it is
foreseeable that they will not do so within the time covered by the
permit, it would appear reasonable for Congress to authorize a
procedure for such licensing. Permits, even though they might not
work an estoppel against the Government,53 5 would as a practical
matter confer a degree of tenure security and go far to alleviate
feelings of apprehension and distrust, especially in the West.
Lastly, it may be observed that among the numerous memorable
passages from opinions of the United States Supreme Court, two are
especially appropriate as the "thinking through" process continues.
Rights, property or otherwise, which are absolute against all the
538
world are certainly rare, and water rights are not among them.
Ownership of a private stream wholly upon the lands of an individual is conceivable; but that the running water in a great navig37
able stream is capable of private ownership is inconceivable.6
Toward the end of his excellent article entitled, InterpositionWild West Water Style,58 which discusses the old states' rights
arguments, Mr. B. Abbott Goldberg concluded:
The real answer to fear of federal encroachment is the assumption of greater responsibilities by the state, not the head-on collision of forces. In such a collision the states are bound to come out
second best. It is possible for a state and the United States to
develop a reasonable modus vivendi, as the parallel existence of
the California State Water Project and the Central Valley Project
shows.
Taking a long view, it must be recognized that the federal government has by and large acted with restraint, that many proponents of "state rights" are private interests in disguise, and that
efforts to balkanize the country in the field of resource development
are doomed. Extreme legislation which is upsetting to the principle
of federalism is not the answer, but more protection for private
investments is a desirable step.
534

N.Y. Times, May 13, 1966, at 1, col. 2; 2 A.B.A. REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE
AND TRUST J. 597 n.127 (1967).

-35

For an excellent discussion see Morreale, Federal Power in Western
Waters: The Navigation Power and The Rule of No Compensation,
3 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 1, 67 (1963). See also STAFF OF HOUSE COmm.
ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 86TH CONG. 2D SEss., REPORT OF
FEDERAL WATER BIGHTS LEGISLATION 21 (Comm. Print No. 19, 1960).
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537
-538

United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 510 (1945).
United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 69
(1913).
17 STAN. L. REV. 1, 37 (1964). See also Trelease, Federal Limitations on
State Water Law, 10 BuFFALo L. REV. 399 (1961).
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Governmental agencies and authorities are necessities. They are
capable of rendering great and beneficent public services. But any
appeal to the tradition of our laws which omits a decent regard
for private property rights is both inaccurate and distorted. It is
because of this regard that our governmental agencies and authorities in acquiring properties for their public purposes are generally
required to proceed under the power of eminent domain rather
than under the police power. Such a policy has not resulted in a
destruction of flood control and improvement agencies in the past
and there is no reason to apprehend that the continuation of such
policy will prove 53
overly costly or inimical to the American way of
life in the future. 9

539 Brazos River Authority v. City of Graham, 163 Tex. 167, 176, 354

S.W.2d 99, 105 (1961).

